Sloan v. Greenville Hosp. System
| Decision Date | 14 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 26827.,26827. |
| Citation | 694 S.E.2d 532,388 S.C. 152 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Edward D. SLOAN, Jr., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellant,v.GREENVILLE HOSPITAL SYSTEM, a Political Subdivision of the State of South Carolina, and Leighton Cubbage, Chairman of the Board, Respondents. |
Jennifer J. Miller and James G. Carpenter, both of The Carpenter Law Firm, of Greenville, for Appellant.
Boyd Benjamin Nicholson, of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, of Greenville, for Respondents.
Edward D. Sloan, Jr. (“Sloan”) sued the Greenville Hospital System (“Hospital”) and Leighton Cubbage, Chairman of the Board (collectively, “Respondents”), challenging the Hospital's method of procuring construction services. Sloan contended the Hospital is a state governmental body and must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the South Carolina Consolidated Procurement Code, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 11-35-10 to -5270 (Supp.2009) (“Procurement Code”). The circuit court ruled the Hospital is a local political subdivision, not a state governmental body as defined by the Procurement Code, and it is not subject to the Code's procurement procedures. The circuit court further found the Hospital's own procurement provisions that were challenged by Sloan complied with state law. Sloan appeals from these rulings. We affirm.
Sloan brought three declaratory judgment actions against Respondents challenging the Hospital's procurement procedures for construction services: (1) the Parking Deck Case, (2) the Construction Management Case, and (3) the Request for Qualifications (“RFQ”) Case.
In all three actions, Sloan alleged the Hospital is a “political subdivision” of the state of South Carolina that was required to establish, and to abide by, appropriate procurement procedures as required by section 11-35-50 of the South Carolina Code. See S.C.Code Ann. § 11-35-50 (Supp.2009) (). Sloan alleged the Hospital had violated its own “Policy for the Procurement of Construction and Design Services for the Greenville Hospital System” (“Hospital Policy”) in securing the construction services and, moreover, that some of its policies violated section 11-35-50.
In 2005, Sloan was permitted to amend his complaints to allege that the Hospital is a state “board” or “governmental body” as defined by state law and that it must follow the requirements of the Procurement Code. Sloan alleged the Hospital had violated the Procurement Code in its handling of certain construction projects and, in the alternative, if the court deemed the Hospital a local “political subdivision” rather than a state “governmental body,” that certain provisions of the Hospital Policy violated section 11-35-50 because they did not embody “sound principles of appropriately competitive procurement.” The three actions were consolidated for trial.
Sloan and Respondents filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the preliminary issue of whether the Hospital is a “governmental body” as defined in the Procurement Code. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the Hospital, ruling it is not a governmental body as defined by the Procurement Code. The circuit court found the Hospital was, instead, “a political subdivision, and more specifically, a special purpose district.” Under this ruling, the Hospital was, therefore, entitled to institute its own procurement procedures.
Thereafter, in an order regarding the Parking Deck Case, the circuit court found the Hospital had improperly utilized the “Sole Source Procurement” method of selecting construction services under the Hospital's own procurement policy and that the contract for this work was, therefore, invalid and void. In a separate consent order, Sloan was awarded costs and attorney's fees of $21,789.95 in this matter. No appeal has been made from the rulings in the Parking Deck Case.
In a subsequent order regarding the two remaining matters, the Construction Management Case and the RFQ Case, the circuit court granted judgment to the Hospital. The circuit court rejected Sloan's argument that several provisions of the Hospital's Policy failed to embody the principles of appropriately competitive procurement as required by section 11-35-50 of the South Carolina Code.
Sloan appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in finding the Hospital was not a governmental body subject to the state's Procurement Code and, in the alternative, if the Hospital is a political subdivision, the Hospital violated its own Hospital Policy in securing the disputed construction projects and several of the policy provisions violate section 11-35-50's mandate that political subdivisions enact ordinances or procedures embodying sound principles of appropriately competitive procurement.
Under Rule 56(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), SCRCP. “An appellate court reviews the granting of summary judgment under the same standard applied by the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP.” Hooper v. Ebenezer Senior Servs. & Rehab. Ctr., 386 S.C. 108, 114, 687 S.E.2d 29, 32 (2009) (citing Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp., 341 S.C. 372, 379, 534 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2000)).
A suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable; rather, it is determined by the nature of the underlying issue. Sloan v. Greenville County, 380 S.C. 528, 534, 670 S.E.2d 663, 666 (Ct.App.2009). “The issue of statutory interpretation is a question of law for the court,” and this Court may decide questions of law without deference to the trial court. Id. at 534, 670 S.E.2d at 667.
Sloan first argues the circuit court erred in finding the Hospital is a political subdivision and not a governmental body as those terms are defined in the Procurement Code. If the Hospital is a governmental body, it is subject to the requirements of the Procurement Code, and if it is not a governmental body, the Hospital must follow the provisions of its own Hospital Policy that it adopted to govern the procurement of construction and design services.
The South Carolina Legislature has stated the underlying purposes of the Procurement Code are “to provide increased economy in state procurement activities and to maximize to the fullest extent practicable the purchasing values of funds while ensuring that procurements are the most advantageous to the State and in compliance with the provisions of the Ethics Government Accountability and Campaign Reform Act,” as well as “to require the adoption of competitive procurement laws and practices by units of state and local governments[.]” S.C.Code Ann. § 11-35-20(a), (e) (Supp.2009).
The Procurement Code “applies to every procurement or expenditure of funds by this State under contract acting through a governmental body as ... defined” in the Procurement Code. Id. § 11-35-40(2) (emphasis added).
Governmental Body. The term “governmental body” is defined in the Procurement Code as follows:
“Governmental Body” means a state government department, commission, council, board, bureau, committee, institution, college, university, technical school, agency, government corporation, or other establishment or official of the executive or judicial branch. Governmental body excludes the General Assembly or its respective branches or its committees, Legislative Council, the Office of Legislative Printing, Information and Technology Systems, and all local political subdivisions such as counties, municipalities, school districts, or public service or special purpose districts or any entity created by act of the General Assembly for the purpose of erecting monuments or commissioning art that is being procured exclusively by private funds.
Id. § 11-35-310(18) (emphasis added). “State” as used in the Procurement Code “means state government.” Id. § 11-35-310(32). Sloan alleges the Hospital is a state government board.
Political Subdivision. In contrast, the Procurement Code states “ ‘[p]olitical subdivision’ means all counties, municipalities, school districts, public service or special purpose districts.” Id. § 11-35-310(23). Political subdivisions are excluded from the definition of a governmental body and are not subject to the procurement procedures outlined in the Procurement Code. Id. § 11-35-310(18).
Section 11-35-50 of Procurement Code requires political subdivisions to develop and adopt their own procurement procedures:
Id. § 11-35-50.
In considering the Hospital's status, the circuit court observed that the Hospital does not perfectly fit into any category, but that its purpose is essentially local and it is not a state “governmental body” as that term is defined by the Procurement Code; rather, it is a “political subdivision,” and more particularly a “special purpose district” serving local needs:
GHS [the Hospital] does not fit perfectly within the categories that the State Procurement Code creates. As a...
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