Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Nations, 6 Div. 247.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1938
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 247.
• Citation: 183 So. 871,236 Ala. 571
• Parties: SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. NATIONS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

183 So. 871

236 Ala. 571

SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. NATIONS.

6 Div. 247.

Supreme Court of Alabama

October 13, 1938

Certiorari to Circuit Court, Jefferson County; J. F. Thompson, Judge.

Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act, Code 1928, § 7534 et seq., by W. L. Nations against the Sloss-Sheffield Steel &amp Iron Company. From a judgment awarding compensation, the employer brings certiorari.

Affirmed.

Bradley Baldwin, All & White and Kingman C. Shelburne, all of Birmingham, for appellant.

Hugh A Locke and Andrew W. Griffin, both of Birmingham, for appellee.

GARDNER Justice.

Plaintiff Nations had for some years been employed in defendant's mine as inside electrician, with one Moss, the "haulage boss," his immediate superior. While on his way to secure needed supplies, and in order to facilitate the work, Nations rode on the loaded cars as they were going to the top of the mine, when a derailment occurred, resulting in his severe injury, for which he was awarded compensation.

The finding of the trial court that the business of defendant was being facilitated by the plaintiff at the time of his injury, as to walk would have caused him to secure the supplies too late and time was an important factor, and that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment is well sustained by the proof and indeed uncontroverted. Unquestionably Nations was acting in entire good faith, in order, as he thought, best to serve defendant's interest at the time.

There was a rule of defendant company which prohibited the riding of loaded cars. As to this rule the court below finds, and such finding is amply sustained by the proof, that "the mine foreman, haulage boss, the superintendent and the chief electrician rode loaded trips out of the mine at frequent intervals, and that plaintiff had been ordered, allowed and permitted to ride loaded trips out of the mine for the purpose of securing supplies, and that any rule of defendant or statute preventing the riding of loaded trips was disregarded and unenforced."

Defendant on the trial pleaded as a defense the wilful violation of its rule against riding loaded trips, and the wilful violation of the statute to like effect. Section 7544, Michie Code of 1928.

A jury trial was demanded and had as to these issues (section 7578, Michie Code 1928; Ex parte Woodward Iron Co., 212 Ala. 220, 102 So. 103), and a verdict favorable to plaintiff was rendered thereon.

There is here no serious insistence that plaintiff is barred from compensation on any theory of a wilful violation of defendant's rule. Here, as in Moss v. Hamilton, 234 Ala. 181, 174 So. 622, the rule was more honored in the breach than in the observance, and was wholly disregarded by those in active charge of the operation of the mine. Under such circumstances, the defense of wilful violation of the employer's rule is not sustained. Moss v. Hamilton, supra; 71 Corpus Juris 767; Ann.Cas.1916A, 792; Beck v. C. & J. Commercial Driveaway, Inc., 260 Mich. 550, 245 N.W. 806; Kuhner Packing Co. v. Hitchens, 97 Ind.App. 228, 186 N.E. 262. And that plaintiff, when injured, was acting in entire good faith in an honest attempt to further his employer's business (23 A.L.R. 1166), and in the line and scope of his employment, is not here questioned. Moss v. Hamilton, supra; Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Jones, 220 Ala. 10, 123 So. 201.

But the violated rule was embodied in a statute (section 1717, Code of 1928), for a violation of which a penalty is prescribed in section 4987, Ala. Code 1928.

Defendant, therefore, strenuously insists that upon the issue of a wilful violation of this statutory law, it was due the affirmative charge, and this presents the pivotal question on this appeal.

We have given due consideration to the numerous authorities noted by defendant to the effect that the law will not grant relief when a cause of action is grounded upon an illegal transaction, among them: Oscanyan v. Winchester Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 26 L.Ed. 539; Treadwell v. Torbert, 119 Ala. 279, 24 So. 54, 72 Am.St.Rep. 918; Addington v. State, 201 Ala. 331, 77 So. 993; Collier's Adm'r v. Windham, 27 Ala. 291, 62 Am.Dec. 767; Walker v. Graham, 228 Ala. 574, 154 So. 806; Ellis v. Batson, 177 Ala. 313, 58 So. 193; Farrior v. New England Mortgage Sec. Co., 88 Ala. 275, 7 So. 200; Heland v. City of Lowell, 3 Allen, Mass., 407, 81 Am.Dec. 670; Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 130, 65 N.E. 84, 60 L.R.A. 286; McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 19 S.Ct. 839, 43 L.Ed. 1117; Western Union Tel. Co. v. McLaurin, 108 Miss. 273, 66 So. 739, L.R.A. 1915C, 487; West v. Ball, 12 Ala. 340; Petty v. Gayle, 25 Ala. 472; United States Lumber Co. v. Cole, 202 Ala. 688, 81 So. 664; Lloyd v. North Carolina Rwy. Co., 151 N.C. 536, 66 S.E. 604, 45 L.R.A.,N.S., 378; Frese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 263 U.S. 1, 44 S.Ct. 1, 68 L.Ed. 131.

But these authorities and the principles therein recognized are inapplicable here.

Plaintiff's claim does not rest upon a violation of any law, but upon the express terms of the Workmen's Compensation statute, which awards him damages for injuries received in the line and scope of his employment, and excludes from consideration as defeating his claim any question of mere negligence on his part or assumption of risk, and the like. Code 1928, section 7535. To his claim there are specified defenses available. One of them relates to the employee's wilful violation of law. To establish such a defense the burden of proof rests upon the employer. Section 7544, Code, supra. It is his action, and not that of the employee, that injects such an issue into the case. And the defense does not rest upon a mere violation of a statute, but upon a wilful violation thereof, and, we think, without further extending the discussion of this theory of the case, that the statute itself clearly indicates the general principle of law found stated in the above noted authorities, has no application to cases of this character.

It is not pretended that Nations had any actual knowledge of any statutory law against riding loaded trips, and, indeed, it appears from the proof that his immediate superior officers had no such knowledge. But it is argued that everyone is presumed to know the law, and as a consequence that Nations will not be heard to say he was ignorant of the statute, and had no intent to violate the law. Schuster v. State, 48 Ala. 199; American Surety Co. v. Sullivan, 2 Cir., 7 F.2d 605; Smith v. State, 223 Ala. 346, 136 So. 270; State v. Silva, 130 Mo. 440, 32 S.W. 1007; State v. King, 86 N.C. 603.

It is further argued that the statute (section 7544, supra) in making reference to the knowledge of the rule or regulation of the employer, and omitting such expression as to the violation of a law, indicates a legislative intent that as to the latter the presumed knowledge of the law will suffice for proof of a wilful violation thereof. But such an argument gives no due weight to the language of the statute in the use of the word "wilful" in connection with the violation of the law and runs counter to the interpretation of this statute by this Court in Ex parte Woodward Iron Co., 212 Ala. 220, 102 So. 103, wherein it was said that " 'willful misconduct' * * * includes all conscious or intentional violations of definite law or definitely prescribed rules of conduct, as to which obedience is not discretionary, as contradistinguished from inadvertent, unconscious, or involuntary violations thereof. * * *

"We would find no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that all of the specifications of willful acts found in section 9 would be embraced under the general prescription of 'willful misconduct,' and that they are added merely ex majore cautela, in illustration of the general phrase preceding." [ page 105.]

And in Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Greer, 216 Ala. 267, 113 So. 271, the Woodward Iron Company Case, supra, is approved with the added holding that the employer need not show that the employee in the violation of a known rule was thinking of the rule at the time, and entertained the specific intent to violate it. Due regard must be given the word "wilful," as used in the statute, which, as we have often stated, should be liberally construed to effectuate its beneficent purpose. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Jones, 220 Ala. 10, 123 So. 201.

The Virginia court in King v. Empire Collieries Co., 148 Va. 585, 139 S.E. 478, 58 A.L.R. 193, considering a case which bears strong analogy to this, defining the word "wilful" in a statute much like our own, said [page 479]: " 'Willful,' as used in the statute imports something more than a mere exercise of the will in doing the act. It imports a wrongful intention. An intention to do an act that he knows, or ought to know, is wrongful or forbidden by law. It involves the idea of a premeditation and determination to do the act, though known to be forbidden." And the opinion further observes that the specified acts of conduct which will defeat compensation "all involve the idea of moral blame, or of 'conduct of a quasi criminal nature, the intentional doing of something either with the knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury or with a wanton and reckless disregard of its probable consequences.' * * * That 'willful...