Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. House

• Decision Date: 22 March 1928
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 982
• Citation: 217 Ala. 422,116 So. 167
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. HOUSE.

116 So. 167

217 Ala. 422

SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. HOUSE.

8 Div. 982

Supreme Court of Alabama

March 22, 1928

Rehearing Denied April 12, 1928

Petition of the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company for certiorari to the law and equity court of Franklin county to review the judgment and finding of that court in a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Lula House against the petitioner. Affirmed.

Williams & Chenault, of Russellville, and Bradley, Baldwin, All &amp White, J.D. Rucker, and S.M. Bronaugh, all of Birmingham, for appellant.

Key &amp Key, of Russellville, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

The Workmen's Compensation Law (Code 1923, §§ 7534-7597) contemplates that conclusions of fact must be based on legal evidence; but, where there is any legal evidence to support the finding of the trial court, such finding is conclusive and no technical questions as to the admissibility of evidence will be considered on appeal. Greek v Sloss-Sheffield Co., 207 Ala. 219, 92 So. 458; Woodward Iron Co. v. Bradford, 206 Ala. 447, 90 So. 803; Ex parte H.T. Smith Lumber Co., 206 Ala. 483, 90 So. 807. This means, of course, that the conclusion reached and expressed cannot be allowed to rest on surmise--there must be legal evidence of the facts necessary to relief.

Appellant's case in this court rests upon the assertion that there was no evidence that appellee's husband in the employment of appellant suffered the injury which caused his death by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Code, § 7534. The evidential facts, briefly stated, on which appellee's case rested, were as follows: Deceased, appellee's husband, was employed by appellant to feed and care for "a bunch of mules" which were kept at night in a barn about 100 yards distant from the house in which deceased and appellee lived. About 6 o'clock in the morning, November 10th, deceased went to the barn to feed the mules. Appellee went with him about half way on business of her own. Deceased, on his way to the barn, remained in sight of appellee for about half of the remaining distance. There was nobody else at the barn. After an hour or thereabouts, that being the time usually required by his duties at the barn, deceased returned to the house, complaining of the injury which afterwards caused his death, and had his wife to give it some attention. His shin was barked, and he told his wife how it had happened, but his statement as to the manner of his hurt was excluded by the court. Afterwards appellee went to the barn, and saw that deceased had cared for his mules as usual. Septicaemia, blood poisoning, developed from the wounded shin, and in about two weeks appellee's husband died in consequence.

From the facts thus shown, we think a reasonable inference may have been drawn that the accident which caused the injury and death of appellee's husband arose out of and in the course of his employment. Deceased had no business at the barn save to...