Smiley v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.
| Decision Date | 05 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:12cv2380,3:12cv2380 |
| Parties | BOBBI-JO SMILEY, AMBER BLOW and KELSEY TURNER, Plaintiffs v. E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY and ADECCO USA, INC., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Munley)
Before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 112). This motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
BACKGROUND
The instant federal and state wage and hour action arose from Plaintiffs Bobbi-Jo Smiley, Amber Blow and Kelsey Turner's (collectively "plaintiffs") employment with E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company and Adecco U.S.A., Inc. (collectively "defendants").
Defendants employ hundreds of hourly workers at DuPont's manufacturing plant in Towanda, Pennsylvania (hereinafter "Towanda Plant"). .1 Plaintiffs were assigned to work twelve-hour shifts from 6:30 a.m./p.m. to 6:30 p.m./a.m. (Id. ¶ 2). During their twelve-hour shift,defendants compensated plaintiffs for three, thirty-minute meal periods. (Id. ¶ 4; Doc. 112-3, Ex. E, Break/Lunch Period Policy revised 11/09/2001 (hereinafter "Break Policy") at 1; Doc. 112, Ex. A, Dep. of Kelsey Turner (hereinafter "Turner Dep.") at 56; Ex. B, Dep. of Bobbi-Jo Smiley (hereinafter "Smiley Dep.") at 74-76, 84-86, 91-92; Ex. C, Dep. of Amber Blow (hereinafter "Blow Dep.") at 72-73).
Plaintiffs claim that defendants required them to work, without pay, before and after their twelve-hour shift. First, defendants directed plaintiffs to be in their areas before their regularly-scheduled start time to provide "shift relief."2 (SOF ¶ 3). Second, defendants required plaintiffs to be present at the facility before and after their scheduled shifts to put on and take off (don and doff) uniforms and protective gear. (Id. ¶ 4).
Accordingly, plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on November 28, 2012, and an Amended Complaint on March 15, 2013. In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter "FLSA") and Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and Collection Law (hereinafter "WPCL"). Specifically, plaintiffs seek to recover overtimecompensation for donning and doffing their uniforms and protective gear and performing shift relief before and after their regularly-scheduled shifts.
At the conclusion of discovery, defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 112). The parties then briefed the issues bringing the case to its present posture.
JURISDICTION
The instant suit is brought under the FLSA, which provides that suits "may be maintained against any employer . . . in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Accordingly, the court has federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
LEGAL STANDARD
Granting summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.See Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Int'l Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986). A fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by showing that the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must go beyond itspleadings, and designate specific facts by the use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
DISCUSSION
Defendants' motion for summary judgment presents three issues: First, defendants argue that the FLSA allows them to use paid non-work time to offset unpaid work time. Second, plaintiffs are not owed any overtime compensation because the amount of paid non-work time exceeds unpaid work time. Third, defendants ability to offset does not expose them to additional liability under the FLSA. The court will addresses these issues in seriatim.
Defendants contend that the FLSA allows them to use paid non-work time to offset unpaid work time. Specifically, defendants paid plaintiffs for three thirty-minute bona fide meal periods, which are not considered work time under the FLSA. 29 C.F.R. § 785.19. Defendants assert that this paid non-work meal period time can be used to offset plaintiffs' unpaid donning and doffing and shift relief time. Plaintiffs argue that offsetting their donning and doffing and shift relief time with the paidmeal periods misallocates agreed upon wages in contravention of the FLSA. As this issue turns on interpreting the FLSA, the court begins by laying out the controlling provisions of the statute.
The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he central aim of the [FLSA] was to achieve . . . certain minimum labor standards." Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). To accomplish this goal, "[t]he FLSA establishes federal minimum-wage, maximum-hour, and overtime guarantees that cannot be modified by contract." Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, —U.S.—, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2013).3
Under the FLSA, covered employers may not employ any employee "for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment . . . at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).4 The FLSA "provides that 'employee' generally means 'anyindividual employed by an employer,' and, in turn, provides that to 'employ' is 'to suffer or permit to work.'" Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., —U.S.—, 134 S. Ct. 870, 875 (2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(1) and 203(g)).
Additionally, "the 'regular rate' at which an employee is employed shall be deemed to include all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee[.]" 29 U.S.C. § 207(e) (hereinafter "section 207(e)"). The regular rate, however, "shall not be deemed to include . . . payments made for occasional periods when no work is performed due to vacation, holiday, illness, failure of the employer to provide sufficient work or other similar cause[.]" 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the phrase "shall not be deemed" means "that employees seeking unpaid overtime may not under the FLSA require that non-work pay be added to the regular rate." Wheeler v. Hampton Twp.,399 F.3d 238, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2005).
The FLSA does not expressly grant employers permission to use paid non-work time to offset unpaid work time. Rather, the statute and interpreting cases preclude offsetting in two ways. First, employers cannot use paid non-work time to offset unpaid work time when the paid non-work time is excluded from the regular rate of pay. Second, if the parties agree to treat paid non-work time as "hours worked," and this time is included in the regular rate of pay, the employer cannot offset. As such, defendants cannot offset if either of the above apply.
The FLSA expressly precludes an employer from using paid non-work time to offset unpaid work time when the paid non-work time is excluded from the regular rate of pay. The FLSA provides that:
29 U.S.C. § 207(h). Thus, defendants cannot offset if the FLSA expresslyexcludes plaintiffs paid meal periods-non-work time-from plaintiffs' regular rate of pay.
The FLSA excludes specific payments from an employee's regular rate of pay. "Where payment is ostensibly made as compensation for . . . hours . . . not regarded as working time under the [FLSA], the payment is nevertheless included in the regular rate of pay unless it qualifies for exclusion . . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 778.223. Section 207(e) lists several categories of compensation which are excluded from the regular rate of pay. Here, the only category arguably implicated is found in section 207(e)(2). Section 207(e)(2) excludes from the regular rate any "payments made for occasional periods when no work is performed due to vacation, holiday, illness, failure of the employer to provide sufficient work, or other similar cause . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2).5
The federal regulations pertaining to this issue, however, clearly establish that the payments for plaintiffs' regular bona...
To continue reading
Request your trial