Smith v. Air Ambulance Network, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 January 1993
• Docket Number: No. A92A1839,A92A1839
• Citation: 427 S.E.2d 305,207 Ga.App. 75
• Parties: SMITH v. AIR AMBULANCE NETWORK, INC.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 305

427 S.E.2d 305

207 Ga.App. 75

SMITH v. AIR AMBULANCE NETWORK, INC.

No. A92A1839.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Jan. 12, 1993.

Cofer, Beauchamp & Butler, Bryant K. Smith, Atlanta, for appellant.

Greenfield, Bost & Kliros, Thad C. Gould, Atlanta, for appellee.

CARLEY, Presiding Judge.

While in Germany, appellant-plaintiff, a Georgia resident, contracted with appellee-defendant, a Florida corporation, to provide air ambulance service to Atlanta. When those services were not performed, appellant filed suit for breach of contract and fraud. Appellee moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted appellee's motion and appellant appeals.

"Georgia's Long Arm Statute states that the courts of this State may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident as if he were a resident of the State, if in person or through an agent he: '(1) Transacts any business within this State....' This has been interpreted to mean that 'purposeful acts' must have been performed by the defendant to tie it to the State, and '(m)ere telephone or mail contact with an out-of-state defendant, or even the defendant's visits to this state, is insufficient to establish the purposeful activity with Georgia required by the "Long Arm" statute. (Cit.)' [Cits.]" Mayacamas Corp. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 190 Ga.App. 892, 893(1), 380 S.E.2d 303 (1989). Likewise, appellee's mere placement of advertisements in Georgia would be insufficient to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Flint v. Gust, 180 Ga.App. 904, 905(1), 351 S.E.2d 95 (1986), reversed on other grounds, Gust v. Flint, 257 Ga. 129, 356 S.E.2d 513 (1987).

"Basically, all that existed [in the instant case] were the out-of-state negotiations that led to the signing of the contract and the contract itself, which the Supreme Court [of the United States] ... indicated was not [itself] sufficient to meet the minimum contacts requirement. There was no subsequent course of dealing established between the parties as a result of the contract, nor did the future consequences of the contract come to fruition. [Appellee] did nothing beyond entering into the contract that constituted a purposeful engagement of activities within the forum." Mayacamas Corp. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., supra 190 Ga.App. at 894(1), 380 S.E.2d 303. That appellee provided ambulance service into and out of Georgia on previous occasions is irrelevant. The Long Arm Statute requires that the cause of action arise from the act of transacting business in Georgia. Castleberry v. Gold Agency, 124 Ga.App. 694, 697(2), 185 S.E.2d 557 (1971). In the instant case, appellee's cause of action arose entirely as the result of transactions occurring outside Georgia. Accordingly, the trial court correctly held that it lacked personal jurisdiction over appellee as to appellant's breach of contract...