Smith v. Alvarez

• Decision Date: 15 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11 C 0190.,11 C 0190.
• Citation: 898 F.Supp.2d 1057
• Parties: Seneca SMITH (# K–76299), Plaintiff, v. Lt. ALVAREZ, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

898 F.Supp.2d 1057

Seneca SMITH (# K–76299), Plaintiff,

v.Lt. ALVAREZ, et al., Defendants.

No. 11 C 0190.

United States District Court,

N.D. Illinois,

Eastern Division.

Oct. 15, 2012.

Roger Williams, Joliet, IL, pro se.

Colleen Bernadette Cavanaugh, Martin D. Syvertsen, Richard J. Daley Center, James Charles Pullos, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ELAINE E. BUCKLO, District Judge.

The plaintiff, currently an Illinois state prisoner, has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff claims that the defendants, correctional officials and health care providers at the Cook County Jail, violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical/mental health needs. More specifically, the plaintiff alleges that correctional officers refused him access to a psychiatric evaluation even though he was expressing suicidal thoughts, resulting in an overdose. This matter is before the court for ruling on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated in this order, the motion is granted.

I. STANDARD ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 988 (7th Cir.2006). In determining whether factual issues exist, the court must view all the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Weber v. Universities Research Assoc., Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir.2010). The court does not “judge the credibility of the witnesses, evaluate the weight of the evidence, or determine the truth of the matter. The only question is whether there is a genuine issue of fact.” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

However, Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Sarver v. Experian Information Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir.2004) (citations omitted). “A genuine issue of material fact arises only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists to permit a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Egonmwan v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 602 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir.2010) (quoting Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 640–41 (7th Cir.2008)).

II. FACTS

The defendants' statement of facts is based almost entirely on the plaintiff's deposition testimony, which I have read. The court has disregarded any statements in the plaintiff's “Declaration” (Exhibit A to his summary judgment brief) that conflict with his sworn deposition testimony. “[L]itigants cannot create sham issues of fact with affidavits that contradict their prior depositions.” Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. A & E Oil, Inc., 503 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir.2007)). The plaintiff may not backpedal from factual assertions he made under oath simply because they have become inconvenient at the summary judgment stage.

Given the considerations stated above, the court views the following facts as uncontested for purposes of the motion for summary judgment:

The plaintiff, Seneca Smith [also known as Roger Williams], was a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections at all times relevant to this action. (Defendants' Exhibit A, Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 6, 13.) Defendants Nancy Alvarez, Belinda Blunt, Nakeea Buchanan–Smith, and William Lopez are all correctional officers of various ranks at the Cook County Jail. (Complaint, pp. 2–2(A).)

The plaintiff claims to suffer from psychotic disorder, acute depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. (Plaintiff's Exhibit A, Declaration of Seneca Smith, ¶ 2; Plaintiff's Dep., pp. 18–19.) At the time of the events giving rise to this action, the plaintiff was housed in the jail's Division Ten, a medical tier for detainees with acute psychological needs. (Plaintiff's Dep., pp. 21–22.) Inmates in Division Ten receive greater care than inmates in the general population.

The plaintiff's psychiatric medications at that time included Trazodone, Zoloft, Risperdal, Elavil, and Neurontin. ( Id., pp. 24–25.) A “majority of the time,” the plaintiff took his pills three times a day as prescribed. ( Id., p. 26.) However, on some occasions the plaintiff “d[id no]t care” enough to take his medications; instead, he would secretly store the pills in his cell, in violation of jail rules. ( Id., pp. 26–27.)

On the morning of March 20, 2009, the plaintiff suffered a mental breakdown of sorts and experienced suicidal thoughts. ( Id., p. 16.) He felt not “in the best shape mentally,” and a number of things were bothering him that day. ( Id.)

The plaintiff requested a psychological evaluation, telling defendant Lopez, an officer assigned to his tier, that he did not want to live and that he wanted to kill himself. ( Id.; Plaintiff's Declaration, ¶ 3.) Lopez allegedly responded, “Stop bullshitting me, you're not getting a psych eval,” and continued to let the inmates out of their cells. (Plaintiff's Dep., p. 16; Plaintiff's Declaration, ¶ 3.) When the plaintiff asked Lopez a second time for a psych evaluation, the officer just gave him a strange look and walked away. (Plaintiff's Dep., p. 16.)

About ten minutes later, the plaintiff saw defendant Blunt through an interlock. ( Id., p. 27.) He shouted to her that if he did not get a psych evaluation, he was going to swallow a lot of pills and kill himself. ( Id.) Instead of arranging for a psych evaluation, Blunt escorted the plaintiff to “Intake.” ( Id., p. 28.) [Neither party explains what “Intake” signifies, but it appears to be some type of isolation/observation cell near supervisors' offices, where an inmate may be monitored. See Plaintiff's Dep., pp. 66–68.] Blunt placed the plaintiff in an Intake bullpen and walked away. ( Id., p. 28; Plaintiff's Declaration, ¶ 7.) The plaintiff did not get a psych evaluation. (Plaintiff's Dep., p. 28.)

While the plaintiff was in the bullpen, defendant Buchanan–Smith sat down at a nearby desk. ( Id.) The plaintiff asked Buchanan–Smith, too, for a psychiatric evaluation. ( Id.) The plaintiff began to cry as he told Buchanan–Smith that he hated his life, might never see his children again, and wanted to die. ( Id., p. 28; Plaintiff's Declaration, ¶ 9.) Buchanan–Smith, however, refused to “get involved.” (Plaintiff's Declaration, ¶ 9.)

Afterwards, the plaintiff asked defendant Alvarez for a psych evaluation, again threatening to kill himself. (Plaintiff's Dep., p. 29.). Lt. Alvarez told the plaintiff that she was sorry, but that she was tired of seeing him. ( Id., p. 29.) The plaintiff acknowledges that he had previously “acted out a lot and stuff like that.” ( Id.) When the plaintiff continued to cajole Alvarez and threaten suicide, she retorted, “I don't care. Kill yourself, then.” ( Id., p. 30.) Buchanan and another officer laughed at Alvarez' rejoinder. ( Id.; Plaintiff's Declaration, ¶ 10.)

At that, the plaintiff began to pull pills out of his pocket and started swallowing them. (Plaintiff's Dep., p 30.) The plaintiff ingested both pills of his own that he had saved and pills he had accumulated from other inmates. ( Id., pp. 30–31.)

Alvarez and Buchanan stopped laughing ¹ when they saw the plaintiff begin taking pills. ( Id., p. 30.) Alvarez exclaimed to Blunt, “How did he get those pills?” and “Why hasn't he been searched?” ( Id., p. 30.)

The plaintiff estimates that he swallowed 40–50 pills. ( Id., p. 31.) As he took the pills, he called out to Alvarez and Blunt that they didn't care, that he might as well be dead, and that he hoped to die. ( Id., pp. 30–31.)

About fifteen to twenty minutes later, the plaintiff was rushed to the emergency room at Cermak Health Services for treatment of his drug overdose. (Plaintiff's Dep., p. 32.) Due to complications, he spent the next five days at an outside hospital. ( Id.; see also Plaintiff's Declaration, ¶ 15.)

On March 15, 2010, the plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the purported March 2009 denial of a psychiatric evaluation. (Exhibit 3 to Defendants' Deposition.) The plaintiff wrote, “This is my second grievance concerning what took place [on] 3–20–09.” ( Id.) The administration responded, “The aforementioned allegations are without merit. All psych evaluation requests are taken seriously by staff and is (sic) acted upon immediately. R/Lt. Blunt only has knowledge of detainee Roger Williams through disciplinary reports.” ( Id.) The Appeal Board denied the plaintiff's ensuing appeal, holding: “Original Response to Stand. The Appeal Board cannot substantiate nor deny the alleged unprofessional conduct. The appeal process does NOT award monetary compensation.” ( Id., p. 2) (emphasis in original).

III. ANALYSIS

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the court concludes that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiff satisfied the administrative exhaustion prerequisite to filing suit. However, even viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, no reasonable person could find that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk of serious harm.

A. The...