Smith v. Capital Region Med. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 18 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | WD 81273 |
| Citation | 564 S.W.3d 800 |
| Parties | Dorothy SMITH, Appellant, v. CAPITAL REGION MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Jason J. Iezzi and John B. Boyd, Independence, MO, for appellant.
Alex L. Wulff and Richard L. Montgomery, Jr., Columbia, MO, for respondents.
Before Division Three: Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge and Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judge
Dorothy Smith ("Smith") appeals from a trial court judgment dismissing with prejudice her petition which sought to hold Capital Region Medical Center ("Capital Region") in contempt for failing to pay interest on a workers' compensation award.1 Because civil contempt does not lie to compel the payment of a money judgment, we find no error, and affirm the trial court's judgment.
On November 13, 2013, the Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (the "Commission") awarded Smith temporary total disability benefits, death benefits, funeral expenses, and interest as provided by law following a workers' compensation claim arising from the death of her husband.2 Capital Region appealed the Commission's award. We affirmed the Commission's award in Smith v. Capital Region Medical Center , 458 S.W.3d 406 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (hereinafter " Smith II "), and our mandate issued on May 1, 2015.
On May 28, 2015, Capital Region paid Smith a sum3 representing awarded benefits that had accrued through the time of Capital Region's appeal in Smith II . However, Capital Region did not pay Smith interest on the benefit payments that had accrued through the time of Capital Region's appeal.
On July 27, 2015, Smith filed a petition in the Jackson County Circuit Court which sought to hold Capital Region in civil contempt for failing to pay interest as required by the workers' compensation award. The case was thereafter transferred to the Cole County Circuit Court.
Capital Region filed a motion to dismiss Smith's petition, arguing that civil contempt is not an appropriate procedure to seek to enforce or collect a money judgment, and further arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition because the determination of whether interest was owed was a matter over which the Commission possessed exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to section 287.120.4
On October 24, 2017, the trial court entered its judgment granting Capital Region's motion to dismiss Smith's petition with prejudice ("Judgment"). The Judgment concluded that Smith was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because civil contempt does not lie to compel the payment of money.
Smith appeals.
"This Court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. " Jackson v. Barton , 548 S.W.3d 263, 267 (Mo. banc 2018). "This Court ... assumes all facts alleged in the petition are true and construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Id. "In determining the appropriateness of the trial court's dismissal of a petition, an appellate court reviews the grounds raised in the defendant's motion to dismiss." In re Estate of Austin , 389 S.W.3d 168, 171 (Mo. banc 2013). "The appellate court reviews the petition to determine whether facts alleged by the plaintiff meet the elements of a recognized cause of action or of a cause of action that might be adopted in that case." Id. "If the motion to dismiss cannot be sustained on any ground alleged in the motion, the trial court's ruling will be reversed." Id.
In Smith's sole point on appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in granting Capital Region's motion to dismiss because her petition sufficiently stated a claim for civil contempt based on her statutory right to recover interest on the workers' compensation award. Smith's point effectively argues that the trial court's grant of Capital Region's motion to dismiss cannot be sustained on either ground raised in the motion.5
The Judgment dismissed Smith's petition with prejudice on the ground that civil contempt cannot be used to enforce the payment of money. The Judgment was silent on whether the Commission possessed exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether interest was owed, the additional ground for dismissal raised in Capital Region's motion to dismiss. We begin our analysis with Capital Region's exclusive jurisdiction argument. If the motion to dismiss can be sustained on that ground, then the trial court's ruling on the use of civil contempt to enforce the payment of money would be rendered superfluous.
Capital Region argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider Smith's petition because "whether interest is due and the amount ... remains indeterminate and ‘open’." [Respondent's Brief, p. 9]. Capital Region argues that as a result, the Commission retains exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to section 287.120 to determine whether and in what amount interest is owed to Smith. We disagree.
The Commission awarded Smith interest on her award. Specifically, the Commission held that "any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law." It is settled that "such language constitutes an award of interest pursuant to section 287.160.3."6 Sutton v. Vee Jay Cement Contracting Co. , 37 S.W.3d 803, 807-08 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000) (). There is no indeterminate issue, therefore, regarding "whether" interest was awarded. Plainly, it was.
It is true that the Commission's award did not calculate the amount of interest owed. It did not state when interest would begin to accrue, or at what rate. However, that does not render the award of interest indeterminate or open. The "amount" of interest awarded on past due compensation owed Smith was "as provided by law." The phrase "shall bear interest as provided by law" is "susceptible to only one interpretation: interest shall be calculated pursuant to [section] 287.160.3." Miller v. Wefelmeyer , 890 S.W.2d 372, 377 (Mo. E.D. 1994) ; Tidwell v. Kloster Co. , 8 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999) (). Thus, where the Commission awards interest "as provided by law," the amount of interest awarded is not indeterminate and open because it "can be determined from an examination of the record and the applicable statute." Sutton , 37 S.W.3d at 808. Assuming the matter was otherwise properly before the trial court,7 the trial court would have had the authority to calculate interest due Smith based on application of section 287.160.3 to the record.8
Capital Region cites no authority to the contrary addressing the calculation of interest awarded "as provided by law." Instead, it relies by analogy on State ex rel. ISP Minerals, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission , 465 S.W.3d 471 (Mo. banc 2015), where the Supreme Court found that a settlement remained subject to the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction to review claims pursuant to section 287.801 because the settlement "left the issue of Employee's entitlement to compensation for future medical care indeterminate and ‘open.’ " Id. at 476. In effect, the settlement was a "partial award," that left the Commission with jurisdiction over the claim for purposes of future adjustments. Id.
State ex rel. ISP Minerals, Inc. is distinguishable from the instant case. The Commission's November 13, 2013 award was a final award. It did not leave any claim for benefits undetermined. Interest was awarded as provided by law. Calculation of the exact amount of interest owed is not an open claim that remained subject to the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction.
The trial court's grant of Capital Region's motion to dismiss cannot be affirmed on this basis that the Commission possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the calculation of interest owed to Smith.
We therefore turn to the second ground for dismissal raised in Capital Region's motion to dismiss – the ground expressly relied on by the trial court to grant the motion. The trial court found that civil contempt "does not lie merely to compel the payment of money." Though Smith argues to the contrary, Missouri law on this point is clear and settled.9
"Civil contempt is intended to benefit a party for whom relief is granted by coercing compliance with the relief granted." State ex rel. Koster v. Cain , 383 S.W.3d 105, 112 (Mo App. W.D. 2012) (citing Smith v. Pace , 313 S.W.3d 124, 130 (Mo. banc 2010) ). "The power to enforce judgments by contempt resides in the circuit court." Div. of Classification and Treatment v. Wheat , 829 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992). Thus, a judgment may be enforced by contempt if "the court has (1) jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter; (2) the court has jurisdiction to render the particular judgment in the case before it; and (3) the judgment specifically requires some affirmative action other than the payment of money ." Wheat, 829 S.W.2d at 584 (emphasis added). Consistently, section 511.340 provides:
When a judgment requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money , a certified copy of the judgment may be served upon the party against whom it is given, and his obedience thereto required. If he neglect or refuse, he may be punished by the court as for a contempt , by fine or imprisonment, or both, and, if necessary, by sequestration of property.
(emphasis added). Our courts have long held that Section 511.340 prohibits the use of civil contempt to enforce the mere payment of money.10 White v. Hutton , 240 S.W.2d 193, 200 (Mo. App. 1951) ; State ex rel. City of Pacific v. Buford , 534 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Mo. App. 1976). This case offers no reason to depart from that settled principle.
Undeterred, Smith relies on Deane v. Mo. Employers Mutual Ins. Co. , 437 S.W.3d 321, 326 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014). Smith's reliance on Deane is unavailing. In De...
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