Smith v. City of Lexington
| Decision Date | 22 November 1957 |
| Parties | Alberta SMITH et al., Appellant, v. CITY OF LEXINGTON, Kentucky, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Jesse K. Lewis, John C. Anggelis, Lexington, for appellant.
John R. Cook, Jr., Foster Ockerman, Lexington, for appellee.
Appellant, Alberta Smith, and others instituted action against appellee, city of Lexington, for injuries alleged to have been sustained from a collision which occurred at an intersection of streets in that city between an automobile driven by appellant and a vehicle owned by the city of Lexington and operated by the fire department in connection with First Aid and Emergency Rescue Service. Upon a motion for summary judgment, it was adjudged that the city, through its fire department and employees, in carrying on First Aid and Emergency Rescue Service, was engaged in a governmental function and, therefore, was not liable in an action sounding in tort.
On the day of the accident, Alvin A. Johnson, an employee of the fire department, was sent by his superior officer, in response to a call, to the residence of Mrs. Stamper on Tennessee Avenue for the purpose of rendering first aid. When Johnson and another employee arrived at the home of Mrs. Stamper they found that she had a nosebleed and he and the other employee, at her request, put her in a vehicle belonging to the city and started with her to the Good Samaritan Hospital. The accident happened at an intersection within a few hundred feet of the hospital.
The question for determination on this appeal is whether the operation of an emergency first aid rescue squad by a municipality may be classified as being an exercise of a governmental function of the city as differentiated from one proprietary in character.
A city is generally granted the same immunity against claims for damages for its acts done in its governmental capacity as is enjoyed by the state in such matters. When acting in its proprietary capacity, however, it is liable for its torts in the same manner as is a private corporation.
The line which marks the distinction between the public or governmental and the private or proprietary side of a municipal corporation, it has been said, is often quite difficult to discern. City of Hazard v. Duff, 287 Ky. 427, 154 S.W.2d 28. The reason for this difficulty, no doubt, lies in the fact that the courts have never been able definitely to devise a formula to aid in classification. It...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc.
...580 A.2d 127, 131 [D.C.Ct.App.1990]; Ayala v. City of Corpus Christi, 507 S.W.2d 324, 328 [Tx.Civ.App.1974]; Smith v. City of Lexington, 307 S.W.2d 568, 569–570 [Ky.Ct.App.1957] ). Consistent with this view and our reasoning in Laratro, 8 N.Y.3d 79, 828 N.Y.S.2d 280, 861 N.E.2d 95, we belie......
-
Caneyville v. Green's Motorcycle
...or governmental duty imposed upon it by law, and for that reason it cannot be held liable for injuries resulting."); Smith v. Lexington, 307 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Ky.1957) ("This [C]ommonwealth, however, is generally committed to the theory that when a city engages in an activity which relates p......
-
Wanzer v. District of Columbia
...328 (Tex.Civ.App.1974) (citations omitted); see Thornton v. Shore, 233 Kan. 737, 741, 666 P.2d 655, 659 (1983); Smith v. City of Lexington, 307 S.W.2d 568 (Ky.Ct.App. 1957); Ross v. Consumers Power Co., 420 Mich. 567, 651, 363 N.W.2d 641, 676 (1984);3 King v. Williams, 5 Ohio St.3d 137, 449......
-
Happy v. Erwin
...is liable because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. City of Louisville v. Bridwell, 150 Ky. 589, 150 S.W. 672; Smith v. City of Lexington, Ky., 307 S.W.2d 568. Consequently the suits were properly dismissed as to these This brings us to the possible liability of the individual defendan......