Smith v. City of Norwich

• Decision Date: 07 April 2022
• Docket Number: 532967
• Citation: 205 A.D.3d 140,166 N.Y.S.3d 688
• Parties: In the Matter of Dennis SMITH, Appellant—Respondent, v. CITY OF NORWICH et al., Respondents—Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

205 A.D.3d 140
166 N.Y.S.3d 688

In the Matter of Dennis SMITH, Appellant—Respondent,
v.
CITY OF NORWICH et al., Respondents—Appellants.

532967

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: February 17, 2022
Decided and Entered: April 7, 2022

166 N.Y.S.3d 690

Spicer Law Office, Syracuse (Lewis G. Spicer of counsel), for appellant-respondent.

Coughlin & Gerhart, LLP, Binghamton (Angelo D. Catalano of counsel), for respondents-appellants.

Before: Garry, P.J., Lynch, Pritzker, Colangelo and McShan, JJ.

OPINION AND ORDER

McShan, J.

205 A.D.3d 141

Cross appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Burns, J.), entered October 29, 2020 in Chenango County, which, among other things, granted petitioner's application, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to annul a determination of respondent City of Norwich denying petitioner's application for benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207–a.

205 A.D.3d 142

Less than six months after being hired as a full-time probationary firefighter by respondent City of Norwich, petitioner attended the Binghamton Fire Academy to complete an approved fire basic training program required of his position (see General Municipal Law § 209–w ; 19 NYCRR 426.6 ). While practicing for one of the required physical tests, petitioner sustained an injury to his left knee and was unable to complete the training or return to active duty. He subsequently applied for benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207–a, but that application was denied on the ground that petitioner's injury did not occur during the performance of his duties. Because the collective bargaining agreement between the City and petitioner's union contained no provision for an administrative appeal of the denial, petitioner commenced this combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment seeking to annul the City's determination as arbitrary and capricious and in violation of General Municipal Law § 207–a. Petitioner also sought declaratory relief in the form of a declaration that he is entitled to General Municipal Law § 207–a benefits. Respondents joined issue and simultaneously moved to dismiss the petition. Supreme Court denied respondents’ motion and annulled the determination, but declined to grant the declaratory relief sought. Petitioner appeals from so much of the judgment as denied his request for declaratory relief, and respondents cross-appeal from that part of the judgment that denied their

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motion to dismiss and annulled the determination.

Where, as here, an administrative determination is made where an evidentiary hearing is not required by law, this Court's review is limited to whether the determination had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious (see CPLR 7803[3] ; Matter of Ward v. City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042, 1043, 962 N.Y.S.2d 587, 985 N.E.2d 898 [2013] ; Matter of Dalotto v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 195 A.D.3d 1180, 1181, 150 N.Y.S.3d 782 [2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 914, 2021 WL 5467216 [2021] ). "An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts" ( Matter of Peckham v. Calogero, 12 N.Y.3d 424, 431, 883 N.Y.S.2d 751, 911 N.E.2d 813 [2009] [citations omitted]; accord Matter of Murphy v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 21 N.Y.3d 649, 652, 977 N.Y.S.2d 161, 999 N.E.2d 524 [2013] ).

General Municipal Law § 207–a provides for the payment of the full amount of regular salary or wages to a firefighter who is injured "in the performance of" or "as a result of" his or her job duties ( General Municipal Law § 207–a [1] ; see

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Matter of Ridge Rd. Fire Dist. v. Schiano, 16 N.Y.3d 494, 497, 922 N.Y.S.2d 249, 947 N.E.2d 140 [2011] ; Matter of White v. County of Cortland, 97 N.Y.2d 336, 339, 740 N.Y.S.2d 288, 766 N.E.2d 950 [2002] ). To be eligible for benefits, a firefighter need only demonstrate "a direct causal relationship between job duties and the resulting illness or injury" ( Matter of White v. County of Cortland, 97 N.Y.2d at 340, 740 N.Y.S.2d 288, 766 N.E.2d 950 ; accord Matter of Theroux v. Reilly, 1 N.Y.3d 232, 243–244, 771 N.Y.S.2d 43, 803 N.E.2d 364 [2003] ; Matter of Sullivan County Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn., Inc. v. County of Sullivan, 173 A.D.3d 1545, 1547, 104 N.Y.S.3d 374 [2019] ), without regard to "whether the specific injury-causing activity was one entailing the ‘heightened risk’ " posed to firefighters ( Matter of Theroux v. Reilly, 1 N.Y.3d at 241, 771 N.Y.S.2d 43, 803 N.E.2d 364 ; see Matter of Schafer v. Reilly, 3 N.Y.3d 691, 692, 784 N.Y.S.2d 1, 817 N.E.2d 818 [2004] ). The term "duties" in General Municipal Law § 207–a "encompasses the full range of a covered employee's job duties" ( Matter of Theroux v. Reilly, 1 N.Y.3d at 244, 771 N.Y.S.2d 43, 803 N.E.2d 364 ; accord Matter of Martino v. County of Albany, 47 A.D.3d 1052, 1053, 850 N.Y.S.2d 250 [2008] ).

We agree with Supreme Court that the denial of petitioner's application for General Municipal Law § 207–a benefits was arbitrary and capricious. In its denial letter, the City set forth that the application was denied on the ground that petitioner's alleged injury occurred while training, not as a result of the performance of his duties. However, General Municipal Law § 209–w and the governing regulations require that probationary firefighters, such as petitioner, complete an approved fire basic training program within a prescribed period of time following their initial hire (see General Municipal Law § 209–w [1] ; 19 NYCRR 426.5, 426.6 [a]).¹ Petitioner was injured while practicing for the candidate physical ability test, a mandatory component of the required training (see 19 NYCRR 426.6 [b], [c][12]). Although petitioner's injury did not occur in the course of his actual performance of the required test, successful completion of the

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candidate physical ability test was a necessary requirement of petitioner's position, and petitioner was engaged in the expected and foreseeable task of practicing for that test during a mandatory training program that was part of his duties as a probationary firefighter (cf. Matter of O'Mahony v. DiNapoli, 157 A.D.3d 1107, 1109, 69 N.Y.S.3d 167 [2018] ; Matter of Fanning v. DiNapoli, 140 A.D.3d 1582, 1583, 35 N.Y.S.3d 529 [2016] ; Matter of Stimpson v. Hevesi, 38 A.D.3d 979, 980, 830 N.Y.S.2d 856 [2007] ). The record further reflects that petitioner was attending the Fire Academy at

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the direction of the City, that the training was paid for by the City and that petitioner was receiving full pay for his attendance and participation in the program. Mindful that, as a remedial statute, General Municipal Law § 207–a "should be liberally construed in favor of the injured employees the statute was designed to protect" ( Matter of White v. County of Cortland, 97 N.Y.2d at 339, 740 N.Y.S.2d...