Smith v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Authority

• Decision Date: 01 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. S92A0640,COUNTY-KENNESTONE,S92A0640
• Citation: 423 S.E.2d 235,262 Ga. 566
• Parties: SMITH et al. v. COBBHOSPITAL AUTHORITY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 235

423 S.E.2d 235

262 Ga. 566

SMITH et al. v. COBB COUNTY-KENNESTONE HOSPITAL AUTHORITY.

No. S92A0640.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Dec. 1, 1992.

Paul M. Hawkins, Lawrence J. Myers, William G. Scoggin, Freeman & Hawkins, Atlanta, for Smith et al.

Kenneth B. Pollock, Judson Graves, Alston & Bird, Atlanta, for Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Authority.

Y. Kevin Williams, Downey, Cleveland, Parker, Williams & Davis, Marietta.

Benny C. Priest, Barnes, Browning, Tanksley & Casurella, Marietta.

Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Alston & Bird, Atlanta.

Houston D. Smith, III, Downey, Cleveland, Parker, Williams & Davis, Marietta, for other appellee.

BELL, Presiding Justice.

Appellants-plaintiffs, as next friends of their daughter, Krista A. Smith, contend that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions by minors, OCGA § 9-3-73(b), is unconstitutional as applied to her. We find no merit in their arguments, and affirm the judgment in favor of defendants-appellees.

A brief description of the facts of this case and the history of § 9-3-73(b) is necessary in order to lay the foundation for our discussion of appellants' constitutional arguments. Krista Smith was born on July 1, 1981, and allegedly suffered brain damage during her birth. Under the versions of OCGA §§ 9-3-71, 9-3-73, and 9-3-90 in effect at the date of her birth, Krista Smith suffered from a disability due to her minority, and, had those statutes remained unchanged, she would have enjoyed the benefit of having the statute of limitations, § 9-3-71, tolled until her eighteenth birthday. At the time of her birth, § 9-3-71 set forth the pertinent statute of limitations, requiring that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this article [OCGA Title 9, Ch. 3, Art. 4], an action for medical malpractice [had to] be brought within two years after the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred." However, in conjunction with then § 9-3-73, ¹ § 9-3-71 mandated that the statute of limitations would be tolled if the injured party suffered from a disability prescribed in OCGA Title 9, Chapter 3, Article 5. One of the Code sections in Article 5, OCGA § 9-3-90(a) (as amended in 1984 respecting "persons imprisoned," Ga.L.1984, p. 580), provides that

minors and persons who are legally incompetent because of mental retardation or mental illness, who are such when the cause of action accrues, shall be entitled to the same time after their disability is removed to bring an action as is prescribed for other persons. [Emphasis supplied.]

Section 9-3-71 was amended in 1985, in part, to provide that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this article, an action for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred" (emphasis supplied), but this change did not affect Krista Smith, as the alleged malpractice of which she complains and the alleged injuries arising therefrom occurred on the same date.

A 1987 amendment to § 9-3-73 and a subsequent construction of that statute by this Court did affect Krista Smith, as under that construction she had until July 1, 1989, for a suit to be brought on her behalf. On July 1, 1987, an amendment to § 9-3-73 became effective which significantly restricted the period of disability that would toll the operation of § 9-3-71. Pursuant to that amendment, § 9-3-73 now provides that:

(a) Except as provided in this Code section, the disabilities and exceptions prescribed in Article 5 of this chapter in limiting actions on contracts shall be allowed and held applicable to actions, whether in tort or contract, for alleged malpractice.

(b) Notwithstanding Article 5 of this chapter, ... all minors who have attained the age of five years shall be subject to the periods of limitation for actions for medical malpractice provided in this article. A minor who has not attained the age of five years shall have two years from the date of such minor's fifth birthday within which to bring a medical malpractice action if the cause of action arose before such minor attained the age of five years.

....

(g) No action which, prior to July 1, 1987, has been barred by provisions relating to limitations of actions shall be revived by this article, as amended. No action which would be barred before July 1, 1987, by the provisions of this article, as amended, but which would not be so barred by the provisions of this article and Article 5 of this chapter in force immediately prior to July 1, 1987, shall be barred until July 1, 1989. [Emphasis supplied.]

Krista Smith attained the age of five years on July 1, 1986, and, under the literal wording of subsections (b) and (g), would only have had until July 1, 1988, for suit to have been filed on her behalf. However, in Mansfield v. Pannell, 261 Ga. 243, 245, 404 S.E.2d 104 (1991), we "construe[d] subsection (b) and (g) as meaning that no action will be barred before two years from the effective date. The result of that construction is that no action will be barred before July 1, 1989." Thus, Krista Smith had until the latter date for her suit to be filed.

Even so, appellants did not file suit against appellees-defendants until June 26, 1991. ² Appellees moved for summary judgment on the ground that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations, and appellants opposed the motions on the ground that § 9-3-73(b) is unconstitutional. The trial court found the statute constitutional, and entered summary judgment for appellees. The present appeal followed.

1. Appellants contend that § 9-3-73(b), ³ as applied to Krista Smith, ⁴ denies her equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the 1983 Georgia Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 1, Para. 2, ⁵ because treating Krista Smith "as though she were an adult has no fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Appellants contend that the "statute treats minors with medical malpractice injuries differently than minors with other injuries for no useful reason," and "unconstitutionally draw[s] a distinction between children with injuries arising from medical malpractice and those that have other actionable injuries." Appellees' response is twofold. First, they argue that in Mansfield v. Pannell, supra, 261 Ga. 243, 404 S.E.2d 104, this Court has already decided the equal protection question raised by appellants. Second, they assert that, even if Mansfield did not determine the equal protection question, appellants' equal protection argument has no merit. Appellants reply that Mansfield did not decide the equal protection issue.

For the following reasons, we find that Mansfield does not control the equal protection issue raised in this case, but we further find that appellants' equal protection argument has no merit.

1a. Although our opinion in Mansfield has language that can be read as implying that the equal protection argument raised by appellants here was addressed and decided in that case, in fact this Court's holding was limited to a different equal protection issue. In Mansfield the exact question was whether "children born between July 1, 1980 and before July 1, 1982, are denied the two-year cushion [the grace periods of § 9-3-73(b) and (g) ] and are denied equal protection," Mansfield, supra, 261 Ga. at 243, 404 S.E.2d 104. We concluded that the "scheme [t]here is not rational," id. at 244, 404 S.E.2d 104, and then judicially construed the statute to remedy the defect and thereby render the statute "constitutional, rational, and consistent with the intent of the legislature," id. at 245, 404 S.E.2d 104. Having construed the statute so that "no action [would] be barred before July 1, 1989," we announced that "[t]hus construed, the statute is constitutional." Id.

Appellees contend that by holding that "[t]hus construed, the statute is constitutional," we implicitly evaluated and determined the equal protection claim raised by appellants in this case, but our response is that our holding in Mansfield was limited solely to the equal protection question expressly addressed in that opinion, and in no way was intended to signal that we had reached and determined the equal protection question raised by appellants in this case. ⁶ See generally Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 471, 298 S.E.2d 484 (1983). ⁷

1b. We find that appellants' equal protection argument has no merit. Appellants concede that the

standard of review in this case is the "rational basis" test. This standard requires that classifications created by a state "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." [Cits.] [Allrid v. Emory University, 249 Ga. 35, 38(1c), 285 S.E.2d 521 (1982).]

" 'If the legislative purpose is legitimate and the classification drawn has some reasonable relation to furthering that purpose, the classification passes muster.' " Doran v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 254 Ga. 63, 67(1), 69, 326 S.E.2d 221 (1985), quoting from Wilder v. State, 232 Ga. 404, 405, 207 S.E.2d 38 (1974).

Laws enacted by our legislature are presumed to be constitutional and the burden is on the party challenging the law to prove its invalidity. [Cit.] When classifications are challenged under the equal protection guarantees they will be upheld if there is any set of facts upon which they could be sustained. [Cit.] [Dept. of Transportation v. Ga. Mining Assoc., 252 Ga. 128, 129-30(1), 311 S.E.2d 443 (1984).]

As part of its amendment of § 9-3-73, the General Assembly provided us with specific objectives that it hoped to accomplish by amending the statute, and also with its own finding that there is a rational basis between the statute and its stated objectives:

(f) The findings of the General Assembly under this Code section include, without limitation,...