Smith v. Daniel

• Decision Date: 11 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. CV–14–10,CV–14–10
• Citation: 452 S.W.3d 575,2014 Ark. 519
• Parties: Charles Smith, Betty Mains, James Scoggins, Bryan Hall, Each Individually and in their Official Capacity, as employees of the Department of Human Services, Department of Behavioral Sciences serving the Arkansas State Hospital, Appellants v. Gloria Daniel, Appellee
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2014 Ark. 519
452 S.W.3d 575

Charles Smith, Betty Mains, James Scoggins, Bryan Hall, Each Individually and in their Official Capacity, as employees of the Department of Human Services, Department of Behavioral Sciences serving the Arkansas State Hospital, Appellants
v.
Gloria Daniel, Appellee

No. CV–14–10

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered December 11, 2014

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Gary L. Sullivan, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellants.

Sutter & Graham, P.L.L.C., by: Luther Oneal Sutter and Lucien Gillham, Little Rock, for appellee.

Opinion

JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Associate Justice

This interlocutory appeal arises from a lawsuit filed pursuant to the Arkansas Whistle–Blower Act and state and federal civil rights claims. Charles Smith, in his official capacity as the Administrator of the Arkansas State Hospital (State Hospital) and Betty Mains in her individual capacity appeal from the denial of their motion for summary judgment. The circuit court found that Gloria Daniel's claim for retaliation was not barred by sovereign immunity and that the remaining defendants in the lawsuit are not entitled to qualified immunity. On appeal, appellants argue: (1) the Circuit Court erred in denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity; and (2) the Circuit Court erred in denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified/statutory immunity grounds. We affirm in part; reverse in part; and remand.

Daniel was fired from her position as a registered nurse at the State Hospital thirteen months after she reported to Charles Smith, the Director of Behavioral Health Services and others that a patient's death was attributable to abuse or neglect and the failure of the hospital to have present

452 S.W.3d 577

basic life-saving equipment. The purported reason for terminating Daniel was that she violated the seclusion/restraint policies for a patient and for making “unprofessional” comments.

Daniel filed suit, asserting claims under the Arkansas Whistle–Blower Act, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.¹ In the body of her third amended complaint, in the paragraph styled “PARTIES AND JURISDICTION,” Daniel recited the following:

Plaintiff is a black female resident and citizen of the State of Arkansas, who formerly worked for the Department of Human Services AND DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES at the Arkansas State Hospital, an instrumentality of the State of Arkansas. Charles Smith is the Administrator of the Arkansas State Hospital, who is sued in his official capacity only under the Whistleblower's Act [sic]. Charles Smith, James Scoggins, Bryan Hall, and Betty Mains were employees who participated in the decision to terminate the Plaintiff because she is black and female, and each is sued in their individual capacity. This is an action also brought for termination in violation of the ACRA and the Arkansas Whistleblower's Act. But this action brought under the ACRA, 42 USC 1983 and 42USC 1981 only against the individual Defendants. Accordingly, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Venue is proper. To the extent not otherwise dismissed by the Court, the previous Complaints are incorporated by reference.

Appellants' summary judgment motion recited that it was seeking relief for “Charles Smith, in his official capacity, and Betty Mains, in her official and individual capacities.² ” It alleged the following:

1. The Third Amended Complaint fails to state sufficient facts as required by the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure to allow the lawsuit to continue.

2. The Whistle–Blower Act does not provide for the claim against Smith or Mains in any capacity.

3. Any Whistle–Blower Act claim against Mains is time-barred

4. There are no pending individual claims against Smith.

5. The official capacity Arkansas Civil Rights Act claims are barred by sovereign immunity.

6. ACRA does not provide for discrimination claims against state actors.

7. The ACRA retaliation claims are barred by statutory immunity.

8. There was no causal connection between Daniel's “report” to Smith and her termination.

9. Defendants are protected by sovereign and statutory immunity from Daniel's discrimination and retaliation claims.

In its December 31, 2013 order, the circuit court dismissed the Whistle–Blower claim against Maims and all individual-capacity claims against Smith. It denied summary judgment for the Whistle–Blower claim against Smith in his official capacity, denied qualified immunity to any defendant, and, after acknowledging that it had considered all of the other arguments submitted by the Defendants denied summary judgment as to each argument.

452 S.W.3d 578

On appeal, appellants first argue that the circuit court erred in denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity. They acknowledge that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is “not a suit against that person, but rather is a suit against that official's office.” Appellants further note that the Arkansas Whistle–Blower Act contemplates suits only against a “public employer,” not an individual.³ While appellants concede that the Arkansas Whistle–Blower Act “implies a waiver of immunity as to ‘an agency, department, or institution of state government,’ ” it nonetheless asserts that it does not waive immunity in this case because “public employer” does not include individuals.

In an interlocutory appeal from a denial of summary judgment based on sovereign immunity, two standards of review can apply. Ark. Lottery Comm'n v. Alpha Mktg., 2013 Ark. 232, 428 S.W.3d 415. Where the circuit court makes no “substantive interpretations of law,” but instead makes its decision based on whether the pleadings state “sufficient facts for [an] exception to sovereign immunity,” we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Id. In those instances, we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the party who filed the complaint. Id. However, where the issue is whether a statute provides a waiver of sovereign immunity, our review is de novo, giving no deference to the circuit court's interpretation of the statute. Weiss v. McLemore, 371 Ark. 538, 268 S.W.3d 897 (2007). The case before us implicates both standards of review.

The defense of sovereign immunity originates from the Arkansas Constitution, which provides that “[t]he State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.” Ark. Const. art. V, § 20. We have recognized three ways in which a claim of sovereign immunity may be waived: (1) where the State is the moving party seeking specific relief; (2) where an act of the legislature has created a specific waiver of sovereign immunity; and (3) where the state agency is acting illegally or if a state agency officer refuses to do a purely ministerial action required by statute. Ark. Dept. of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff, 2013 Ark. 36, 425 S.W.3d 731. A statutory waiver of sovereign immunity may be express or implied. Id.

We agree with appellants that when the legislature authorized a cause of action against a “public employer” in the Arkansas Whistle–Blower Act, it expressly

452 S.W.3d 579

waived sovereign immunity. We likewise agree that a suit against a public official in his or her official capacity is essentially a suit against that official's agency. See, e.g., Simons v. Marshall, 369 Ark. 447, 255 S.W.3d 838 (2007) ; Fegans v. Norris, 351 Ark. 200, 89 S.W.3d 919 (2002). We have held that official-capacity suits generally represent a way of pleading a cause of action against the entity of which the officer is an agent. Simons, supra. While it is true that the Arkansas Whistle Blower Act does not directly state that a suit against a director of a state entity is a suit against the public employer, in interpreting a statute, we presume that the legislature is familiar with our decisions. Books–A–Million, Inc. v. Ark. Painting & Specialties Co., 340 Ark. 467, 10 S.W.3d 857 (2000). Accordingly, we hold that the suit against Smith in his official capacity as chief executive officer of the Arkansas State Hospital was in effect a suit against a public employer.⁴ We note as well that in the style of her complaint, Daniel did name

452 S.W.3d 580

“the Department of Behavioral Sciences serving the Arkansas State Hospital.” Moreover, in full compliance with Rule 9 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Daniel fully pleaded her employment relationship with a public employer—the “Department of Human Services AND DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES at the Arkansas State Hospital, an instrumentality of the State of Arkansas,” as well as Smith in his official capacity. Appellants make no argument why the circuit court, or this court on appeal, should not consider those entities as named plaintiffs and, as...