Walther v. FLIS Enters., Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 March 2018
• Docket Number: No. CV–17–240,CV–17–240
• Parties: Larry WALTHER, Director, Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration, Appellant v. FLIS ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellee
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

540 S.W.3d 264

Larry WALTHER, Director, Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration, Appellant
v.
FLIS ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellee

No. CV–17–240

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: March 1, 2018

Nina Samuel Carter, Revenue Legal Counsel, and Joel DiPippa, Revenue Legal Senior Counsel, Office of Revenue Legal Counsel, for appellant.

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, Little Rock, by: John R. Tisdale and Michael A. Thompson, for appellee.

RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice

Larry Walther, as the Director of the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DFA), appeals the circuit court's order granting FLIS Enterprises, Inc.'s (Burger King) motion for summary

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judgment in an action seeking relief from a tax assessment pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 26–18–406 (Supp. 2017). DFA argues the circuit court erroneously construed the relevant statutes and promulgated rules to find that Burger King was only required to pay taxes on the wholesale value of the food ingredients removed from stock as opposed to the retail value of the meals. We hold the circuit court's interpretation was in error. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss.

Burger King purchases individual food ingredients used to create its menu items from third-party suppliers. The ingredients are stored separately and utilized only as needed to complete specific orders. At each location, Burger King employs managers to "oversee the operations of [its] restaurants." As an additional "perk," Burger King allows its managers to consume one meal (manager meal) per shift at no cost to the manager. The manager selects the meal from the same menu available to Burger King's customers.

DFA conducted a sales-and-use-tax audit on Burger King's sixteen central-Arkansas restaurants for a three-year period and determined it underreported taxes by failing to account for the manager meals. Burger King did not dispute owing taxes on the manager meals, only the basis for the calculation. Burger King paid the full amount assessed but filed a protest with DFA's Hearing and Appeals Office. Following a hearing, the administrative law judge sustained the full assessment. Subsequently, Burger King filed a complaint in circuit court for judicial relief seeking a refund of the taxes paid pursuant to provisions of the Arkansas Tax Procedure Act. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and agreed that all the material facts were undisputed. After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order granting Burger King's motion for summary judgment and reversing the decision of the administrative law judge. DFA appealed.

For reversal, DFA argues the circuit court erroneously granted Burger King's motion for summary judgment because (1) withdrawals from stock of processed goods are subject to tax at the full retail value, and (2) the circuit court erroneously relied upon law and argument not raised by the parties. Additionally, DFA contends that the circuit court erred by not following the principle of stare decisis and that Burger King failed to meet its burden of proof.

Part I. Sovereign Immunity

After briefing was completed, DFA filed a notice under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 5–1 that it intended to cite the recent decision of Board of Trustees v. Andrews , 2018 Ark. 12, 535 S.W.3d 616 and Koonce v. Mitchell , 341 Ark. 716, 19 S.W.3d 603 (2000). This court ordered supplemental briefing by both parties to allow them an opportunity to fully brief their positions on the impact, if any, of Andrews on this matter.¹

The general rule is that we will not address an issue raised for the first time on appeal. See Technical Servs. of Ark., Inc. v. Pledger , 320 Ark. 333, 896 S.W.2d 433 (1995). DFA did not raise the issue of sovereign immunity at the trial court level nor is it asserting it as a defense on appeal. Our discussion would normally end there. However, due to this court's previous language that "subject-matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity is an issue that is always open and it is the duty

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of an appellate court to raise the issue on its own volition," DFA claims that the court could, on its own initiative, dismiss the case on sovereign immunity citing Dep't of Fin. & Admin. v. Staton , 325 Ark. 341, 942 S.W.2d 804 (1996).² The parties cite five cases in which this court has referenced this duty. In each cited case, with one exception, this court used this language but did not actually raise and address sovereign immunity sua sponte. See id. ; Carson v. Weiss , 333 Ark. 561, 972 S.W.2d 933 (1998) ; Ark. Dep't of Fin. & Admin. v. Tedder , 326 Ark. 495, 932 S.W.2d 755 (1996) ; and Pitcock v. State , 91 Ark. 527, 121 S.W. 742 (1909). As such, the language expressed in those cases was dicta as it was extraneous to the pending matters. In the exception, McCain v. Crossett Lumber Co. , 206 Ark. 51, 174 S.W.2d 114 (1943), the court sua sponte raised and discussed sovereign immunity and determined at the end of the opinion that it was inapplicable. However, the order of the sovereign immunity discussion within the opinion is significant because the language contradicts the court's treatment of the issue. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a "threshold issue" that the court must consider first—not last. Hunter v. Runyan , 2011 Ark. 43, at 8, 382 S.W.3d 643, 648. Therefore, if the McCain court truly considered the issue as one of subject-matter jurisdiction, it should have considered it at the outset of the opinion. In other words, McCain said one thing but did another. McCain , 206 Ark. at 61, 174 S.W.2d at 120.

Subject-matter jurisdiction is the "court's authority to hear and decide a particular type of case." Hunter , 2011 Ark. 43, at 10, 382 S.W.3d at 649. It relates more to the nature of the matter than to the identity of the litigants. Whether the court has jurisdiction over a suit against the State of Arkansas or whether the defendant has raised a defense of sovereign immunity, are not matters of subject-matter jurisdiction. Although sovereign immunity certainly has jurisdictional qualities, this court historically has treated it like an affirmative defense that must be preserved. See Ark. Lottery Comm'n v. Alpha Mktg. , 2012 Ark. 23, at 6, 386 S.W.3d 400, 404 (concluding that the trial court's failure to rule on sovereign immunity prevented appellate review). For example, our rules permit interlocutory appeals from a denial of a motion to dismiss based on the defense of sovereign immunity. Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 2(a)(10). However, we will not consider such an interlocutory appeal without a clear ruling from the circuit court on sovereign immunity. See id. While one could contend that requiring a specific ruling gives us appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals, if one also accepted the proposition that sovereign immunity deprives the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction, remanding cases for sovereign immunity rulings would be illogical. This is why continuing to treat sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense is consistent with our precedent.

Therefore, we hold that sovereign immunity is not a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction, as it is not a limit on the court's authority to hear a particular type of case. As the parties did not raise the issue below, it is not proper for us to address it further in this case.³ Although

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counsel and others may desire guidance on the impact of Andrews, it would be imprudent of this court to delve into the constitutional doctrine further without full development before the circuit court and when neither party is asserting it.

Part II. Tax Assessment

As to the merits of the case, we review a circuit court decision in a tax case de novo. Baker Refrigeration Sys., Inc. v. Weiss , 360 Ark. 388, 201 S.W.3d 900 (2005). We also review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, as it is this court's responsibility to determine what a statute means. Ryan & Co. AR, Inc. v. Weiss , 371 Ark. 43, 263 S.W.3d 489 (2007). Pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1–2(b)(6) (2017), we have jurisdiction over this appeal because it involves a substantial question of law concerning the construction and interpretation of statutes and the rules of an administrative agency.

The "cardinal" rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Miller v. Enders , 2013 Ark. 23, 425 S.W.3d 723. To do so, we first construe the statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in the common language. Id. We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant; and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute. Ozark Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n , 342 Ark. 591, 29 S.W.3d 730 (2000). When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to result to the rules of statutory construction, but when the meaning is not clear, we look to "the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to the served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject." Miller , 2013 Ark. 23, 425 S.W.3d 723.

In general, a sales tax is imposed on all sales of tangible personal property unless an exemption applies. Ark. Code Ann. §...