Smith v. Eagle Const. Co., Inc., 22116

• Decision Date: 16 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 22116,22116
• Parties: Arthur F. SMITH, Jr., Respondent, v. EAGLE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. and Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Company, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 8

318 S.E.2d 8

282 S.C. 140

Arthur F. SMITH, Jr., Respondent, v. EAGLE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. and Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Company, Appellant.

No. 22116.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard April 16, 1984.

Decided May 25, 1984.

William E. Shaughnessy of Haynsworth, Perry, Bryant, Marion & Johnstone, Greenville, for appellant.

Walter Bedingfield and Agnes Dale Moore, Barnwell, for respondent.

NESS, Justice:

This is a worker's compensation case. Appellants, Eagle Construction Company, Inc., and Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company, contend the trial court erred in affirming the Industrial Commission's determination that respondent, Arthur F. Smith, Jr., was entitled to lifetime replacement of his prosthetic device under S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-60 as it existed prior to the 1980 amendment. We agree but affirm on other grounds.

In August 1977, while performing duties in the scope of his employment, Smith lost his right leg, and part of his pelvis and trunk as a result of an accident involving a backhoe. After hospitalization and a period of convalescence, he was fitted with a prosthetic device to facilitate his recovery. Within a relatively short period of time the prosthetic device proved to be unsatisfactory and was replaced, by agreement of the parties, with a new prosthesis. Smith then actively resumed his rehabilitation, which has since been impeded on several occasions by the frequent wearing out of various component parts of the prosthesis. Additionally, Smith has undergone a number of physiological changes, attributable to both normal growth and the effects of the accident, which have necessitated the replacement of the prosthesis, at a rate of approximately once every three to five years for the remainder of his life.

In November 1980, Smith, having been denied additional relief by appellants, filed a worker's compensation claim requesting lifetime repair and replacement of his prosthetic device. This request was granted by a single commissioner in January 1981, and affirmed by both the full commission and the circuit court in June 1981 and May 1982, respectively, on the basis that lifetime prosthesis replacement constituted treatment "tend[ing] to lessen the period of disability" within the meaning of S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-60, which allows the Commission to provide this additional treatment indefinitely.

Appellants maintain the trial court erred in affirming the Industrial Commission's decision, contending the legislature did not intend prosthetic devices to be construed as treatment "tend[ing] to lessen the period of disability" within the meaning of this section. We agree.

S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-60 (1976, as amended) reads in pertinent part:

Medical, surgical, hospital and other treatment, including medical and surgical supplies as may reasonably be required, for a period not exceeding ten weeks from the date of an injury to effect a cure or give relief and for such additional time as in the judgment of the Commission will tend to lessen the period of disability and, in addition thereto, such original artifical members as may be reasonably necessary at the end of the healing period shall be provided by the employer.

In construing a statute, the words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Merchants Mutual Insurance Company v. South Carolina Second Injury Fund, 277 S.C. 604, 291 S.E.2d 667 (1982); Gambrell v. Travelers Insurance Companies, 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814 (1983). Our review of the above-quoted section indicates the legislature did not intend to include the replacement of...