Smith v. Flynn
| Decision Date | 16 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-CV-9242 (NSR),16-CV-9242 (NSR) |
| Parties | ROBERT F. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. RITA FLYNN, JENNIFER ARMSTRONG, CARL DUBOIS, PAUL PACHECO, CORI RESCIGNO, FAITH WATSON, and TINA STANFORD, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Robert Smith, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on November 28, 2016 against Defendants Rita Flynn, Jennifer Armstrong, Paul Pacheco, Cori Rescigno, Faith Watson, and Tina Stanford, employees of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") ("State Defendants"), and Defendant Carl Dubois, Sherriff of Orange County, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently before this Court is a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by State Defendants and a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) by Defendant Dubois. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motions are GRANTED.
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's complaint filed on November 28, 2016 (the "Complaint") or matters of which the Court may take judicial notice and are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion.
After serving five years for a parole violation, stemming from a warrant executed by Parole Officer Defendant Rita Flynn on May 27, 2010,1 Plaintiff was released on parole on May 27, 2015. (Compl. p. 6.) On October 31, 2015, at approximately 7:30 AM, Defendant Flynn entered Plaintiff's residence, handcuffed the Plaintiff, and conducted a search of Plaintiff's residence, with assistance from five other parole officers. (Id.) Upon completion of the search, Defendant Flynn seized items that she had "reasonable cause to believe [caused] [P]laintiff [to be] in violation of conditions of his parole." (Id. pp. 6-7.) Defendant Flynn then called Senior Parole Officer Defendant Jennifer Armstrong to report her findings and to request that Defendant Armstrong issue a warrant authorizing Defendant Flynn to arrest Plaintiff and place Plaintiff in custody to await action from the DOCCS Board of Parole ("Board of Parole"). (Id. p. 7.) At approximately 8:15 AM, the Plaintiff was removed from his residence and taken to the Orange County Correctional Facility ("OCC"), where Defendant Flynn lodged a certified version of the warrant and the Plaintiff was detained in the custody of Orange County Sheriff Defendant Carl Dubois. (Id.) Notary Public Defendant Cori Rescigno is listed as the notary on the certified copy of the 2015 warrant.
Plaintiff had questions about the 2015 "certified warrants [sic] validity" and requested and received a certified copy of the warrant.2 (Id.) On February 8, 2016, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Dubois to inform him that Plaintiff's detention was illegal and to request immediate release. (Id. pp. 7-8.) Sargent William Proscia, on behalf of Defendant Dubois, responded on February 11, 2016 and stated that Plaintiff's detention was legal; the parole warrant had been confirmed by theOCG records staff and, pursuant to New York law, the OCC was authorized to detain the Plaintiff.3 (Id. p. 8, Ex. C.) On February 12, 2016, Plaintiff replied to Sgt. Proscia and reiterated that his detention was illegal. Neither Sgt. Proscia nor Defendant Dubois responded. (Id. p. 8.)
On February 24, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a FOIL request for, and obtained, a copy of the certified warrant executed by Defendant Flynn on the Plaintiff on May 27, 2010 and lodged with Defendant Dubois on May 28, 2010. (Id.) Notary Public Defendant Faith Watson is listed as the notary on the 2010 warrant.
On April 5, 2016, Plaintiff's parole revocation hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Edward Mevec. (Id. pp. 8-9.) According to Plaintiff, at that proceeding, Defendant Flynn testified that she called Defendant Armstrong requesting that Defendant Armstrong issue a warrant to authorize Defendant Flynn to take the Plaintiff into custody and detention awaiting action from the Board of Parole. (Id. at 9.) Defendant Flynn testified that she both prepared and signed the warrant herself and stated that the warrant had been notarized while it was still blank. (Id.) Judge Mevec "did not vacate the warrant," despite Plaintiffs claim that the 2015 warrant executed by Defendant Flynn and lodged with Defendant Dubois contained forgery and invalid certification.4 (Id.)
On April 11, 2016, Plaintiff wrote to the DOCCS Peekskill Area Office SupervisorDefendant Paul Pacheco, copying Chairperson Defendant Tina Stanford, with a description of his complaints against Defendants Flynn, Armstrong, Rescigno, and Watson. (Id. p. 11.) Neither Defendant Pacheco nor Defendant Stanford responded. (Id. pp. 11-12.)
On April 29, 2016, the Plaintiff received the Board of Parole's decision finding him guilty of violating the conditions of his parole and imposing a time assessment to December 19, 2016. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff was scheduled to be conditionally released to parole supervision on August 2, 2016. (Id.) However, Plaintiff, a convicted sex offender, was detained beyond his August 2, 2016 conditional release date because he was unable to attain housing compliant with the residency requirements under the 2005 amendments to the Sexual Assault Reform Act ("SARA"). (Id.)
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,5 a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content pleaded allows a court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqhal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. In considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must take all material factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor, but the Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor must the Court credit "mere conclusory statements" or"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Id.
Further, a court is generally confined to the facts alleged in the complaint for the purposes of considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6). Cortec Indus. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991). A court may, however, consider documents attached to the complaint, statements or documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, matters of which judicial notice may be taken, public records, and documents that the plaintiff either possessed or knew about, and relied upon, in bringing the suit. See Kleinman v. Elan Corp., plc. 706 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2013).
Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must construe the Complaint liberally and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests, Askew v. Lindsey, No. 15-CV-7496(KMK), 2016 WL 4992641, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2016) (citing Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013)). Yet, " 'the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.' " Id. (quoting Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiffmust allege "(1) the challenged conduct was attributable to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution." Castilla v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-5446(SHS), 2013 WL 1803896, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 25, 2013); see Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). Therefore, a Section 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) as a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff suffered a denial of his federal statutory rights, or his constitutional rights or privileges. See Annis v. County of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998); Quinn v. Nassau Cty. Police Dep't, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ().
Plaintiff's § 1983 complaint is that he was subject to a warrantless search as well as false arrest and false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens' "persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The general contours of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment are well-defined. A search occurs when " 'the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.' "...
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