Smith v. Freedman

• Decision Date: 26 June 1929
• Citation: 167 N.E. 335,268 Mass. 38
• Parties: SMITH v. FREEDMAN et al. (two cases).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

268 Mass. 38

167 N.E. 335

SMITH

v.FREEDMAN et al. (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

June 26, 1929.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Essex County; John D. McLaughlin, Judge.

Separate actions by May E. Smith and by Frank E. Smith against E. Freedman and others. Verdict for plaintiffs, and defendants bring exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

1. Statutes k263-Generally statutes will not be given retroactive effect, unless required by necessary implication from language or object to be accomplished.

As a general rule statutes are prospective in operation, unless intention that they shall be retroactive appears by necessary implication from language used or object sought to be accomplished.

2. Automobiles k6-Statute placing burden of proof on registered owner of motor vehicle to show absence of responsibility for driver's negligence held applicable to all cases tried after effective date of act (G. L. c. 231, s 85A, added by St. 1928, c. 317).

St. 1928, c. 317, effective September 1, 1928, adding section 85A to G. L. c. 231, and providing that in personal injury cases arising out of accident or collision involving motor vehicle, evidence that motor vehicle was registered in name of defendant as owner shall be prima facie evidence that it was being operated by and under control of person for whose conduct defendant only to the burden of proof, and applicable lating only to the burden of proof, and applicable to all causes coming on for trial after effective date of act, and is not limited to those in which cause of action arises after such date.

3. Statutes k264-In determining whether remedial practice act is retroactive, date on which act becomes effective held immaterial (G. L. c. 4, s 1; Const. Amend. art. 48, referendum, I, II, III).

In determining whether a remedial statute relating to conduct of the trial and not to substantive rights is retroactive or prospective in effect, it is of no consequence whether such statute takes effect on its passage or in accordance with G. L. c. 4, s 1, and Const. Amend. art. 48, referendum, I, II, III, or at some other specified date.

R. L. Sisk, of Lynn, for plaintiffs.

S. Parsons, of Lynn, for defendants.

CROSBY, J.

The first action is to recover for personal injuries caused by a collision between the defendants' truck, which was duly registered by them as owners, and an automobile in which the plaintiff May E. Smith (herein referred to as the plaintiff) was riding as a guest. The second action is brought by her husband to recover for consequential damages. The writ in each action was dated December 29, 1926.

There was no evidence relating to the question whether the driver of the truck at the time of the accident was acting within the scope of his employment, other than the answers of the defendant Freedman to interrogatories propounded by the plaintiff. At the close of the evidence the defendants filed a motion that a verdict be directed in their favor, on the ground that there was no evidence that the driver of the truck was upon the master's business. The trial jduge denied the motion and instructed the jury that the burden was upon the defendants to prove that their employee was not upon their business. To the denial of the motion and to the instruction given the defendant excepted.

The principal question presented is whether St. 1928, c. 317, applies to cases pending when it went into effect. The statute is entitled ‘An act to facilitate the recovery of damages in certain motor vehicle accident cases.’ The pertinent parts of the statute are as follows:

‘Section 1. Chapter two hundred and thirty-one of the General Laws is hereby amended by inserting after section eighty-five the following new section: Section 85A. In all actions to recover damages for injuries to the person or to property or for the death of a person, arising out of an accident or collision in which a motor vehicle was involved, evidence that at the time of such accident or collision it was registered in the name of defendant as owner shall be prima facie evidence that it was then being operated by and under the control of a person for whose conduct the defendant was legally responsible, and absence of such responsibility shall be an affirmative defense to be set up in the answer and proved by the defendant. * * *

‘Section 3. This act shall become operative on September first of the current year.’

[1] The act was approved May 11, 1928. The accident occurred on November 6, 1926. The cases were tried in January, 1929. It is a general rule of interpretation that all statutes are prospective in their operation, unless an intention that they shall be retroactive appears by necessary implication from the language used, or the object sought to be accomplished. It was said in Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Gaslight Co., 220 Mass. 1, at page 3, 107 N. E. 426, 427 (Ann. Cas. 1917A, 145): ‘Doubtless and legislation commonly looks to the future, not to the past, and has no retroactive effect unless such effect manifestly is required by unequivocal terms. It is only statutes regulating practice, procedure and evidence, in short, those relating to remedies and not affecting substantive rights, that commonly are treated as operating retroactively, and as applying to pending actions or causes of action.’ The statute in question does not purport to change the substantive law of negligence in any manner...