Smith v. Hospital Authority of Terrell County, 62922

• Decision Date: 02 March 1982
• Docket Number: No. 62922,62922
• Citation: 161 Ga.App. 657,288 S.E.2d 715
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: SMITH et al. v. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF TERRELL COUNTY.

Page 715

288 S.E.2d 715

161 Ga.App. 657

SMITH et al. v. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF TERRELL COUNTY.

No. 62922.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 2, 1982.

Certiorari Denied April 21, 1982.

Thomas W. Malone, Albany, for appellants.

G. Stuart Watson, Albany, James M. Collier, Dawson, for appellee.

SOGNIER, Judge.

Mrs. Peggy Smith was admitted to the emergency room of Terrell County Hospital in Dawson, Georgia complaining of vaginal bleeding and headache. Mrs. Smith was seven months pregnant and had been experiencing some spotting for a few days prior to her admission to the hospital. When Donald Smith, her husband, brought her to the emergency room, Mrs. Smith was not bleeding heavily but within an hour of her arrival, she began having contractions and bleeding profusely. Dr. Sheppard, the attending physician, determined that Mrs. Smith should have a cesarean section and was in need of a blood transfusion. Dr. Sheppard transferred Mrs. Smith to a hospital in Albany, Georgia, where she was taken by ambulance. The Smiths' child was delivered by cesarean section but the child was stillborn. Mrs. Smith recovered satisfactorily from the loss of blood and surgery.

Mr. and Mrs. Smith sued the Hospital Authority of Terrell County seeking damages for the wrongful death of their child and negligence in the treatment of Mrs. Smith, alleging that the hospital had failed to maintain adequate emergency room facilities and had failed to exercise reasonable care in the treatment of Mrs. Smith while she was in the hospital's emergency room. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Hospital Authority and the Smiths appeal.

Mr. Smith brought his wife to the emergency room of Terrell County Hospital at 6:25 A.M. on March 27, 1974. The evidence at trial disclosed that Mrs. Smith was examined by a nurse in the emergency room. Dr. Sheppard, the physician on call that morning, was summoned and arrived at the hospital at approximately 7:00 A.M. Mrs. Smith was experiencing slight vaginal bleeding at this time. Some twenty minutes to half an hour after Dr. Sheppard arrived and had examined Mrs. Smith, she began having labor contractions for which she was given medication; she began vomiting and bleeding heavily. At 7:55 A.M. an ambulance was called and at 8:00 A.M. Mrs. Smith was transported from Dawson to a hospital in Albany. The ambulance arrived at the Albany hospital at 8:30 A.M. and Mrs. Smith was taken into emergency surgery at that time.

The evidence disclosed that the fetal heart tones were normal and apparent when Mrs. Smith arrived at the Terrell County Hospital. Dr. Sheppard testified that he monitored the fetal heart tones periodically while Mrs. Smith was in his care and that the fetal heart tones were normal when Mrs. Smith left the Terrell County Hospital at 8:00 A.M. Dr. Sheppard testified that he suspected that Mrs. Smith was experiencing placenta praevia, that she needed immediate surgery and a blood transfusion, and that he made the decision to transfer her to the Albany hospital. There was no blood immediately available at the Terrell County Hospital. Dr. Sheppard testified that even if blood had been available at the Terrell County Hospital and he had been able to operate, there was no reasonable possibility that he could have saved the baby's life.

1. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in charging the jury as follows: "A hospital must possess the capability of exercising the usual and ordinary skill, care, and judgment through its officers, agents and employees as other comparable hospitals of like purpose and intent serving the local area ..." Appellants argue that appellee hospital had a duty to provide minimal facilities including an adequate supply of blood for a patient needing a cesarean section, and minimally competent personnel, and that minimal standards of care are not restricted to the "local area." Appellants contend the trial court's charge was too restrictive, and that this court, in reversing the instant case, should abandon the "locality rule" as it applies to hospitals. We do not agree.

The rule regarding the standard of care which applies to hospitals is found in Emory University v. Porter, 103 Ga.App. 752, 755, 120 S.E.2d 668 (1961): "A hospital owes to its patients only the duty of exercising ordinary care to furnish equipment and facilities reasonably suited to the uses intended and such as are in general use under the same, or similar, circumstances in hospitals in the area." We recognize that our courts have abandoned the "locality rule" with regard to the standard of care applicable to physicians. See Murphy v. Little, 112 Ga.App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965); Hogan v. Almand, 131 Ga.App. 225, 228, 205 S.E.2d 440 (1974); Fain v. Moore, 155 Ga.App. 209, 270 S.E.2d 375 (1980). However, we decline to follow appellants' request to abandon such rule with regard to hospitals. But see Evans, J., dissent in Steverson v. Hosp. Auth. of Ware County, 129 Ga.App. 510, 516, 199 S.E.2d 881 (1973).

The rationale for applying general standards to physicians was stated in Murphy v. Little, supra, at p. 522, 145 S.E.2d 760, "Reasons for the more narrow rule which might have obtained in times past, where transportation was difficult, medical schools and hospitals often inaccessible, and doctors licensed to practice with little or no formal training, no longer have any validity. Medical practitioners frequently receive a part or all of their education in States other than the one in which ...