Smith v. Hubbard

• Decision Date: 18 July 1958
• Docket Number: No. 37304,37304
• Citation: 91 N.W.2d 756,253 Minn. 215
• Parties: Raymond F. SMITH, Respondent, v. Stanley HUBBARD, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 756

91 N.W.2d 756

253 Minn. 215

Raymond F. SMITH, Respondent, v. Stanley HUBBARD, Jr., Appellant.

No. 37304.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 18, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In the absence of a warrant, a peace officer's power of arrest in nonfelony cases is limited to public offenses committed or attempted in his presence and within his jurisdiction. Held that whether the offenses of speeding and careless driving were committed in plaintiff's jurisdiction presented questions of fact and a jury's decision that they were committed within his jurisdiction should not be set aside.

2. An offense is committed within an officer's presence when he becomes aware of certain acts as a result of his sensory perception and then infers from them that they are sufficient to constitute the offense. Held that the trial court's instruction that plaintiff was acting properly under M.S.A. § 629.34(1) if he 'had reasonable ground for believing that the defendant had violated the law in his presence' was correct and must be sustained.

3. A peace officer who sees a criminal offense committed outside his jurisdiction may still make an arrest without a warrant as a private citizen under § 629.37. Held that plaintiff acted either as a peace officer or as a private citizen in arresting defendant and that in either case the arrest was lawful.

4. A peace officer's power to arrest without a warrant is not limited by § 629.31, which prohibits arrests without warrants on Sunday for misdemeanors, because this section is not intended to relate to arrests for crimes committed in the arresting officer's presence.

5. The verdict of $7,500 is excessive and a new trial is granted unless plaintiff consents that it be reduced to the sum of $3,500 in which event a new trial is denied.

Benedict S. Deinard, Leonard, Street & Deinard, Minneapolis, for appellant.

James P. Miley, Swenson & Miley, Thomas J. Burke, St. Paul, for respondent.

DELL, Chief Justice.

In this action plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory damages for personal injuries and mental pain and suffering and punitive damages as the result of an assault and battery alleged to have been committed upon him by defendant. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $5,000 compensatory damages and $2,500 punitive damages. Defendant appeals from an order denying his alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.

On Sunday, October 7, 1956, at about 2 p.m., defendant, then 23 years of age, drove his automobile through the village of St. Croix Beach on his way to his home in the village of St. Mary's Point. Plaintiff, then 34 years of age, testified that at that time in his capacity as constable he was parked in his official car in St. Croix Beach at the 'Trading Post'; that he first had seen defendant's car come around a nearby corner 'pretty fast'; that he had then watched defendant drive it on a side road to a stop sign about two blocks away where it had stopped; that defendant had then started off 'very fast' and that he had followed him; that in making a right turn defendant's car 'threw dirt and dust all over the place'; that when defendant had driven over a hill crest he was then about a block to the rear; that as he went over the same hill crest he had observed defendant turning a corner to the right; that he continued after defendant for two more blocks, at which time defendant had made a left turn; that after another block defendant had turned into a private driveway; and that he was then one-half block to defendant's rear and had followed him up the driveway to defendant's house.

At some point while plaintiff followed defendant, as described, the cars crossed the line which separated the two villages, but the record does not establish when or where this occurred. Plaintiff testified that at times he had driven his car up to 45 or 50 miles an hour in the 30-mile-an-hour speed zones but he did not testify that this was in St. Croix Beach.

Plaintiff testified further that after he had stopped at defendant's residence he left his car and walked toward defendant and that at the same time defendant had left his car and walked toward plaintiff; that defendant had then asked him 'What in the h-e-l-l (he) wanted there' and that when he replied that defendant had 'violated the law,' the latter 'used some profane language' and ordered him 'to get off his land' and said that 'he was going to throw (him) off'; that plaintiff then informed him that he had 'absorbed enough of his abuse and * * * was putting him under arrest'; that he took a few steps toward defendant and the latter had grabbed him by the shirt and pushed him against a building; that he had then pushed defendant away and that defendant had called to his brother for assistance; that the latter came from the house and separated the two parties; and that defendant then withdrew and entered the house. He admitted that defendant had not struck him at any time, and it is not disputed that the only result of the fracas was that buttons were torn from his shirt; two buttonholes thereon were ripped; and his badge had fallen to the ground and was broken in the scuffle. Defendant's version of the dispute was that plaintiff was the aggressor throughout.

Plaintiff testified that he then left the premises and shortly thereafter proceeded to the office of the justice of the peace in St. Croix Beach where he had caused warrants to be issued against defendant on charges of a traffic violation and assault. A few days later defendant procured a warrant from a justice of the peace of St. Mary's Point charging plaintiff with 'assault in the third degree.'

Plaintiff testified that, following newspaper and television publicity relating to the incident, he had been subjected to a good deal of 'kidding' from employees at Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company where he worked the day shift; that they had referred to him as 'the law' and 'Wyatt Earp' and other like designations which had caused him much embarrassment; and that a traffic offender whom he had arrested had been insolent to him after the publicity described. One newspaper article contained the item that plaintiff had said that he planned to file charges against defendant in municipal court in Stillwater. At defendant's preliminary hearing on the charge of second-degree assault in justice court on October 17, 1956, plaintiff caused an affidavit to be read wherein he stated that he had received two calls from Miles Lord, attorney general, in which the latter had suggested that the trial of Stanley Hubbard, Jr., be postponed, and further stated that he desired the court and the people of St. Croix Beach to know that, regardless of pressure of any kind exerted upon him, it was his object to discharge his duties as constable without favoritism to any party.

On the following day this affidavit received considerable publicity in the Minneapolis and St. Paul newspapers. Plaintiff testified that about 10 days later, at the request of Mr. Keith Kennedy, who was Mr. Lord's opponent in the forthcoming state election for attorney general, he had appeared with Mr. Kennedy on a television program where he repeated the statements made in the affidavit. Mr. Lord replied to the affidavit, stating that he had suggested a postponement of defendant's trial for a 'cooling-off' period and that plaintiff should not 'use the court to settle a personal score'; that he investigated a number of justice courts on complaints that they were conducting 'speed traps' for monetary income rather than for protection of life and property and that the greatest number of complaints had come from St. Croix Beach. These charges and countercharges received substantial publicity.

Plaintiff testified further that on one occasion he had been followed from his employment at Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company by a man in an automobile belonging to KSTP television and radio station of which defendant was vice president and that he had talked to the driver of such car, but it does not appear that the latter made any statement or admission that he was pursuing plaintiff at defendant's request or suggestion. Plaintiff testified that on other occasions he had been followed by cars of the state highway department and by other private cars, but again there was nothing to connect defendant therewith. He admitted that he was familiar with methods used by police departments and that on one occasion he had been followed in connection with his commission of a traffic violation.

Some evidence was submitted that there had been antagonism between plaintiff and members of defendant's family for over a year prior to the present incident. Defendant stated that during this period members of his family had been arrested or given tickets for traffic violations in St. Croix Beach on at least seven different occasions. Plaintiff admitted he had given traffic tickets to various members of defendant's family on at least five different occasions for such offenses as 'leaving car keys in the ignition'; 'backing onto a roadway'; and like charges.

On appeal defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for dismissal of the action at the close of plaintiff's testimony and his motion for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence, both based on the ground that the evidence failed to establish that defendant had committed an offense within plaintiff's jurisdiction in the village of St. Croix Beach on October 7, 1956, so as to justify plaintiff's presence upon defendant's property; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that, if it found that plaintiff 'had reasonable ground for believing that the defendant had violated the law in his presence' (italics supplied), then he was acting within the statutes and lawfully upon the Hubbard premises; and (3) the awards for both compensatory damages and punitive damages were not justified by the...