Smith v. Iowa Employment Sec. Commission, 247

• Decision Date: 13 November 1973
• Docket Number: No. 247,247
• Citation: 212 N.W.2d 471
• Parties: Elvin L. SMITH, Appellant, v. IOWA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and Capital City Mills, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 471

212 N.W.2d 471

Elvin L. SMITH, Appellant, v. IOWA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and Capital City Mills, Appellees.

No. 247.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 13, 1973.

Naomi S. Mercer and James F. Fowler, Des Moines, for appellant.

Walter F. Maley, Des Moines, for appellees.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and RAWLINGS, LeGRAND, REES and REYNOLDSON, JJ.

LeGRAND, Justice.

This appeal presents only one question--the sufficiency of notice given plaintiff under section 96.6(2), The Code. The precise issue before us has not been heretofore considered, and this is a matter of first impression. The trial court held the notice sufficient. We reverse. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the 1966 Code.

On April 2, 1971, one of the Commission's deputies (who are now called representatives) ruled plaintiff had left his employment voluntarily and was therefore disqualified from receiving benefits under the Iowa Employment Security Law. The Commission asserts a notice of disqualification was mailed to plaintiff on that same date at his last known address, advising him both of the disqualification and of the time within which an appeal was permitted. The present controversy centers around that notice and the plaintiff's subsequent attempted appeal as permitted by sections 96.6(2) and 96.6(3), The Code.

Section 96.6(2) provides in part as follows:

'The deputy shall promptly notify the claimant and any other interested party of the decision and the reasons therefor. Unless the claimant or other interested party, within five calendar days after the delivery of such notification, or within seven calender days after such notification was mailed to his last known address, files an appeal from such decision, such decision shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith.'

We accept for present purposes the Commission's argument that the five-day delivery provision applies only to notices served personally on a claimant by a Commission representative. We are concerned here only with the alternative method of notification by mail, which directs that an appeal must be taken 'within seven calendar days after such notification was mailed to (claimant's) last known address.'

We agree with the trial court there is substantial support for the deputy's conclusion that this statutory provision was complied with and is therefore binding on us as a finding of fact. Section 96.6(10), The Code; Iowa Malleable Iron Co. v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 195 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Iowa 1972).

This alone, however, does not dispose of plaintiff's appeal. He raises also a constitutional issue, alleging the statute deprives him of due process under both the 5th and 14th Amendments to the federal constitution and presumably section 9, article I of the Iowa constitution. This poses a legal question which we must review and decide.

The difficulty of framing an all-inclusive definition of due process has long been recognized. 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, page 936 (1964); 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 567, pages 536--541 (1956). This trouble arises from the very dilemma which confronts us now--what may be constitutionally permissible under some circumstances becomes patently unfair and intolerable under others.

It has been said that 'due process is an elusive concept (whose) exact boundaries are undefinable and (whose) content varies according to specific factual contexts.' (16 Am.Jur.2d, supra, at pages 937, 938.) It has also been held that due process 'is not susceptible of exact or comprehensive definition. Its meaning has been developed in the cases by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.' (16A C.J.S., supra, at page 536.)

It is clear, however, that when a hearing is afforded due process demands contestants be given notice thereof sufficient to permit a reasonable opportunity to appear and assert their rights. 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, pages 966--969; 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 628, pages 861--867; Eves v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, Iowa, 211 N.W.2d 324, filed October 17, 1973, and authorities there cited; cf. Davis, Administrative Law (one volume edition) pages 162--164 (1972).

Our Iowa Employment Security Law was enacted in 1936 for the avowed purpose of minimizing the crushing burden of involuntary unemployment which so often falls upon the unfortunate worker and his family. Section 96.2, The Code; Iowa Malleable Iron Co. v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, supra, 195 N.W.2d at 716. Clearly the chapter should be interpreted liberally to achieve that legislative goal whenever possible.

The notice provisions of section 96.6(2) remain as they appeared in the original act. Until now that section has not been subjected to constitutional attack; and until lately it is doubtful if such an assault would have been considered valid. However, we have recently taken judicial notice of the 'continuing breakdown in United States mail deliveries (assuming) proportions of national disaster.' Eves v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, Iowa, 211 N.W.2d 324, filed October 17, 1973. For discussion of a somewhat related problem, see Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Florida Dept. of Commerce, Fla.App.1971, 252 So.2d 396.

Our task now is to apply the notice provisions of section 96.6(2) to the facts before us in the light of present day conditions. We assume the statute is not unconstitutional on its face; we assume too it did not operate unconstitutionally when enacted. However, we hold the intent and purpose of the notice provisions of section 96.6(2) fail now because of circumstances beyond the control of any interested party--the Commission, the employer, or the claimant.

A reading of the statute discloses the legislature intended a claimant to have five days to appeal from an adverse decision rendered under section 96.6(2). In case of notice delivered to him personally, he is given five days to take an appeal. If...