Smith v. Jones
| Decision Date | 13 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 5:16cv247-LC/CAS |
| Parties | WILLIE ALBERT SMITH Petitioner, v. JULIE JONES, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS § 2254 PETITION
Petitioner Willie Albert Smith filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with this Court on August 29, 2016, by the Mailbox Rule. ECF No. 1. Petitioner sought leave to file an amended petition, which the Court granted on October 6, 2016. ECF No. 7. Petitioner filed an amended petition on October 31, 2016, by the Mailbox Rule. ECF No. 10. The Court ordered Respondent to file an answer or other responsive pleading. ECF No. 12. On January 3, 2017, Respondent moved to dismiss the petition. ECF No. 14.
The matter is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Northern District of Florida Local Rule 72.2(B). As explained in detail below, based on the pleadings and attachments before the Court, the undersigned has determined Respondent's motion to dismiss should be granted.
Petitioner was convicted in Florida's Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of one count of dealing in stolen property in violation of section 831.02, Florida Statutes, and one count of uttering a forged instrument in violation of section 812.019(1), Florida Statutes. ECF No. 14 at 26. On June 13, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to 15 years in prison with respect to Count I, with 206 days of credit for time served; and to 5 years with respect to Count II, with 208 days of credit for time served. Id. at 38, 56. The Second District Court of Appeal (hereafter "DCA") affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentences on August 23, 2002. Smith v. State, 827 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (table).
Petitioner's sentences were to run consecutively, for a total sentence of 20 years minus 414 days of county jail credit. ECF No. 14 at 39. Petitioner accrued a further 1,235 days of gain time while incarcerated, and forfeited 154 days of gain time due to disciplinary actions. Id. at 26. Florida law requires that a prisoner must serve at least 85 percent of the length of the sentence imposed, and limits the amount of gain time a prisoner may earn. § 944.275(4)(b)(3), Fla. Stat. (2001). Based on this calculation, Petitioner's tentative release date is May 5, 2017. ECF No. 14 at 27-28.
On February 4, 2016, the Florida Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus, which Petitioner had filed in that court on November 30, 2015. Smith v. Jones, No. SC15-2191, 2016 WL 462847, at *1 (Fla. Feb. 4, 2016). The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction "to pursue any possible sanctions against [P]etitioner." Id. On May 12, 2016, after Petitioner failed to show cause, the Florida Supreme Court sanctioned Petitioner "based upon the volume of [Petitioner's] meritless and inappropriate filings." Smith v. Jones, 191 So. 3d 445, 446 (Fla. 2016). Prior to the petition resulting in his sanction by the Florida Supreme Court, Petitioner had filed twenty-seven petitions for extraordinary writs and eight notices seeking discretionary review from that court. Id. The Florida Supreme Court barred Petitioner from making any further pro se filings, and forwarded a copy of its ruling to the Florida Department of Corrections pursuant to section 994.279(1), Florida Statutes. Id. at 448. That statute provides that a prisoner who files a frivolous or malicious claim in any Florida court or federal court "is subject to disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the Department of Corrections." § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2016).
On August 8, 2016, the Florida Department of Corrections (hereafter "DOC") staff at Gulf Correctional Institution, where Petitioner is incarcerated, received notice of the Florida Supreme Court's sanction. ECF No. 11 at 62. DOC charged Petitioner with a disciplinary infraction, and served Petitioner with notice on August 9, 2016. Id. DOC held a hearing on August 12, 2016, at which Petitioner gave a statement, and found Petitioner guilty of the disciplinary charge. Id. at 63. Petitioner received a sentence of sixty days disciplinary confinement on the same date. Id.
Petitioner filed his initial section 2254 petition with this Court on August 29, 2016, by the Mailbox Rule. ECF No. 1. On October 31, 2016, Petitioner filed an amended section 2254 petition. ECF No. 10. Petitioner raises four grounds for relief in his amended petition. Ground 1 claims that Petitioner should have been released in 2015, that DOC has miscalculated his sentence, and that Petitioner has suffered involuntary servitude as a result. Id. at 5, 12-15. In Ground 2, Petitioner claims that the Florida Supreme Court abused its discretion in sanctioning him. Id. at 15-17. In Ground 3, Petitioner claims that section 944.09,1 Florida Statutes, is "vindictive and [a]rbitrary [l]egislation and is [h]ighly unconstitutional." Id. at 17-18. In Ground 4, Petitioner contends that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (hereafter "Rule 3.850") is unconstitutional, because it supplants the common law writ of error coram nobis, which Petitioner contends is required by the Constitution.2 Id. at 18-22. Petitioner asks the Court to order his release "until this [i]ssue is settled," and to order DOC to pay Petitioner restitution of $300.00 per day. Id. at 22. Petitioner also asks the Court to declare both section 944.279(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 3.850 unconstitutional, and to "[r]e[i]nstate the [w]rit of [e]rror [c]oram [n]obis." Id.
On January 3, 2017, Respondent moved to dismiss the section 2254 petition on the grounds that Petitioner's claims exclusively pertain to questions of Florida law, and that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain them. ECF No. 14. Petitioner filed a reply, in which he attempts to rebut Respondent's jurisdictional argument by claiming that his sanction and disciplinary confinement were imposed without due process, and inviolation of equal protection of the law. ECF No. 20 at 1. Petitioner also contends that DOC's calculation of his sentence violates due process and equal protection. Id. at 2.
Insofar as Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus as relief from the judgment of a state court, his petition is governed by both 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. See Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1062 (11th Cir. 2003) ( ). A habeas petition "is the appropriate vehicle to bring challenges to the execution of sentence," not to the conditions or circumstances of confinement. Gorrell v. Hastings, 541 F. App'x 943, 944 (11th Cir. 2013). "So, when an inmate raises a challenge to the circumstances of his confinement rather than the execution of his sentence, the claim should be brought in a civil rights action rather than a habeas petition." Id. (quoting Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2006)). Habeas corpus is not an appropriate vehicle to seek an award of damages for claimed violations of constitutional rights. See Gwin v. Snow, 870 F.2d 616, 620 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973)). Therefore, the Court should dismiss Petitioner's claims to the extent he seeks restitution payments. See ECF No. 10 at 22.
Petitioner's contention that DOC miscalculated his release date is an issue of state law, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to review it. "It is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). The Eleventh Circuit has consistently held "that federal courts cannot review a state's alleged failure to adhere to its own sentencing procedures." Brannan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988). Petitioner's attempt to cast the alleged miscalculation as a violation of his Thirteenth Amendment rights is meritless. "[W]here a prisoner is incarcerated pursuant to a presumptively valid judgment and commitment order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction . . .the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude is not implicated." Omasta v. Wainwright, 696 F.2d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 1983); see U.S. Const. amend. XIII (). The Court should dismiss Ground 1 of the petition.
The Court should dismiss Grounds 2 and 3 of the petition for similar reasons. In Ground 2, Petitioner asks the Court to reverse the Florida Supreme Court for abuse of discretion. ECF No. 10 at 15. Petitioner claims in Ground 3 that various provisions of chapter 944, Florida Statutes, are "[a]rbitrary and [v]indictive [l]egislation" because under those provisions a prisoner may be sanctioned "on an [a]buse of [d]iscretion," as Petitioner contends he was. Id. at 18. Petitioner asks the Court to amend section 944.279(1), Florida Statutes, to provide that a prisoner may only be disciplined by DOC under that section if they violate a pre-existing sanction, rather than as a consequence of a newly-imposed sanction. Id.
Although federal habeas courts may review state courts' applications of federal law within the scope of review prescribed by Congress, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts may not review state court decisions which apply state law only. "[I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State's criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts." Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010). The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited both by the Constitution itself, and by statute. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,...
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