Smith v. Jones

• Decision Date: 23 August 2001
• Docket Number: Docket No. 215460.,Docket No. 215459
• Citation: 246 Mich. App. 270,632 N.W.2d 509
• Parties: Joseph SMITH, Bessie Smith, Francesca Smith, by her next friend, Bessie Smith, and Angelus Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Officer Victor JONES and Officer Shontae Jennings, each in their individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

632 N.W.2d 509

246 Mich. App. 270

Joseph SMITH, Bessie Smith, Francesca Smith, by her next friend, Bessie Smith, and Angelus Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Officer Victor JONES and Officer Shontae Jennings, each in their individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket Nos. 215459, 215460.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 12, 2001, at Detroit.

Decided June 5, 2001, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication August 23, 2001.

Arnold E. Reed & Associates, P.C., (by Arnold E. Reed), Southfield, for the plaintiffs.

City of Detroit Law Department, (by Sharon D. Blackmon, Assistant Corporation Counsel), Detroit, for the defendants.

Before RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN, P.J., and JANSEN and GAGE, JJ.

RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN, P.J.

In these consolidated appeals, defendant Detroit Police Officers Victor Jones and Shontae Jennings appeal as of right a judgment totaling $3,808,500 entered for damages allegedly sustained by plaintiffs as a result of a firebombing of their home. We reverse and remand and hold that pursuant to the public-duty doctrine defendants owed no duty to plaintiffs.

I

The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint was that plaintiff Joseph Smith made a 911 call reporting suspicious activity in the alley near plaintiffs' home and, in response to the call, defendant police officers detained several suspects and placed them in the defendants' patrol car. In the process of investigating the matter, defendants took the suspects by plaintiffs' house, allegedly parking the patrol car across from plaintiffs' home while defendant Jones engaged in a brief conversation with plaintiff Angelus Williams at her front door. No evidence of a crime was ever found and defendants released the suspects in the same neighborhood. That evening, plaintiffs' home was firebombed, allegedly causing plaintiffs to suffer psychological injury and property damage. Plaintiffs averred that it was the suspects detained by defendants who returned and firebombed their home, purportedly as an act of retaliation against plaintiffs for making the 911 call. It was alleged that defendants' actions in bringing the suspects by plaintiffs' home alerted the suspects regarding the complainants' address. However, no persons were ever charged with or convicted of the firebombing.

Plaintiffs brought the instant lawsuits against defendants alleging gross negligence falling outside the immunity afforded by the governmental tort liability act, M.C.L. § 691.1407. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants were grossly negligent in parking their patrol car, with the suspects in it, in front of the plaintiffs' house and asking plaintiffs to identify the suspects, thereby creating, in violation of department regulations, an otherwise nonexistent opportunity for the suspects in the defendants' custody to determine the identity of plaintiffs as the persons who had reported the suspects' activities to the authorities and ultimately resulting in the retaliatory firebombing. Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants had a duty to protect them, based on defendants' verbal assurances of safety and plaintiffs' reliance thereon, and failed to do so.

Following a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict of $720,000 in favor of plaintiff Joseph Smith, $908,500 in favor of Bessie Smith, $1,274,000 in favor of Francesca Smith, and $906,000 in favor of Angelus Williams. Defendants now appeal the judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs.

II

On appeal, defendants argue that their motions for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, based in pertinent part on the absence of a duty to plaintiffs and insufficient evidence of proximate cause, were erroneously denied by the trial court. We agree.

Motions for a directed verdict are reviewed de novo. Jenkins v. Southeastern Michigan Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich.App. 785, 792, 369 N.W.2d 223 (1985). In reviewing a denied motion for a directed verdict, this Court must determine whether the party opposing the motion offered evidence on which reasonable minds could differ. Id. The test is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the adverse party, reasonable persons could reach a different conclusion. If so, the case is properly left to the jury to decide. Id. The same standard applies in review of motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 449 Mich. 550, 557-558, 537 N.W.2d 208 (1995). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 437 Mich. 75, 80, 467 N.W.2d 21 (1991).

Defendants first assert that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs by virtue of the public-duty doctrine set forth in White v. Beasley, 453 Mich. 308, 552 N.W.2d 1 (1996). Duty is an essential element of a claim of negligence or gross negligence. Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 437, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977); Flones v. Dalman, 199 Mich.App. 396, 402-403, 502 N.W.2d 725 (1993); Madley v. Evening News Ass'n, 167 Mich.App. 338, 341, 421 N.W.2d 682 (1988). As explained by our Supreme Court in Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 131-132, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999):

Whether a duty exists to protect a person from a reasonably foreseeable harm is a question of law for the court. Murdock v. Higgins, 454 Mich. 46, 53, 559 N.W.2d 639 (1997); Trager v. Thor, 445 Mich. 95, 105, 516 N.W.2d 69 (1994). "A negligence action may only be maintained if a legal duty exists which requires the defendant to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm." Riddle v. McLouth Steel Products Corp., 440 Mich. 85, 96, 485 N.W.2d 676 (1992).

In determining whether the relationship between the parties is sufficient to establish a duty, the proper inquiry is "`whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff....'" Buczkowski v. McKay, 441 Mich. 96, 100, 490 N.W.2d 330 (1992), quoting Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 22, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981). This analysis concerns whether the relationship of the parties is of a sort that a legal obligation should be imposed on one for the benefit of another. Id.

See also Krass v. Tri-County Security, Inc., 233 Mich.App. 661, 668-669, 593 N.W.2d 578 (1999); Terry v. Detroit, 226 Mich.App. 418, 424, 573 N.W.2d 348 (1997); Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 215 Mich.App. 198, 203, 544 N.W.2d 727 (1996); Flones, supra at 403, 502 N.W.2d 725.

As a general rule, there is no legal duty that obligates one person to aid or protect another. Krass, supra at 668, 593 N.W.2d 578. Moreover, there is no duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third party in the absence of a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff or the defendant and the third party. Id.; Phillips v. Deihm, 213 Mich.App. 389, 397, 541 N.W.2d 566 (1995)

; Papadimas v. Mykonos Lounge, 176 Mich.App. 40, 46-47, 439 N.W.2d 280 (1989). The underlying rationale for this rule is the fact that "[c]riminal activity, by its deviant nature, is normally unforeseeable." Id.

In this vein, a special rule, the public-duty doctrine, determines the existence of a police officer's duty to protect an individual, rather than the general public, from harm. In White, supra, at 322, 552 N.W.2d 1, a plurality of our Supreme Court (opinion by Brickley, C.J.), held that this doctrine "is a part of the law of this state." The public-duty doctrine provides

"[t]hat if the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution. On the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual, then a neglect to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and may support an individual action for damages." [ Id. at 316, 552 N.W.2d 1, quoting 2 Cooley, Torts (4th ed.), § 300, pp. 385-386.]

Applied to police officers, as it was in White, the public-duty doctrine "insulates officers from tort liability for the negligent failure to provide police protection unless an individual plaintiff satisfies the special-relationship exception." White, supra at 316, 552 N.W.2d 1. The rationale for the public-duty doctrine was summarized by the White plurality as follows: "Police officers must work in unusual circumstances. They deserve unusual protection." Id. at 321, 552 N.W.2d 1. This doctrine is a doctrine of tort law, not governmental immunity; the public-duty doctrine determines whether a duty in tort exists, not whether an individual is immune from an otherwise existing tort duty. Id. at 323, 552 N.W.2d 1.

The White Court adopted the test provided in Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937 (1987), to determine whether a special relationship has been formed in cases alleging the negligent failure to provide police protection. Under the Cuffy test, a special relationship exists between a police officer and an individual plaintiff when there is:

(1) an assumption by the [police officer], through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured;

(2) knowledge on the part of the [police officer] that inaction could lead to harm;

(3) some form of direct contact between the [police officer] and the injured party; and

"(4) that party's justifiable reliance on the [police officer's] affirmative undertaking...." [White, supra at 320-321, 552 N.W.2d 1, quoting Cuffy, supra at 260, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937.] See also Gazette v. City of Pontiac (On Remand), 221 Mich.App. 579, 561 N.W.2d 879 (1997).

In the instant case, we conclude that the public-duty doctrine shields defendants from liability because sufficient evidence of a special relationship between defendants and plaintiffs is lacking. Only one of the four Cuffy factors is supported by the proofs. First, the evidence...