Smith v. Kemp, Civ. A. No. 86-8-ATH.
Decision Date | 10 July 1987 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 86-8-ATH. |
Citation | 664 F. Supp. 500 |
Parties | William Alvin SMITH, Petitioner, v. Ralph KEMP, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Center, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
J. Robert Daniel, Macon, Ga., Stephen H. Glickman, Zuckerman, Spaeder, Goldstein, Taylor & Kolker, Washington, D.C., Stephen B. Bright, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.
Dennis R. Dunn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent.
This case is before the court on Petitioner's motion for a writ of habeas corpus. Because the court has concluded that Petitioner's habeas should be granted on one count contained in Petitioner's petition, the court will not address all of the other counts in the petition. The facts relevant to the count on which the habeas is granted are set forth below. The ground on which the court has decided to grant Smith's habeas concerns his waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
On September 14 and 15, 1981, in the Superior Court of Oglethorpe County, Georgia, Petitioner William Alvin Smith was tried on charges of malice murder and armed robbery. He was convicted on both counts and sentenced to death by electrocution for the offense of murder, and life imprisonment for the offense of armed robbery. The subsequent history of the case is set forth in Paragraphs 8 through 10 of Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner has properly followed all procedural prerequisites before filing in this court. See Document 4, filed January 29, 1986.
The death penalty sentence was based on the sole statutory aggravating circumstance that the murder "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1982). The circumstances of Petitioner's offense and trial were recently summarized by the United States Supreme Court as follows:
Smith v. Francis, 474 U.S. 925, 106 S.Ct. 260-261, 88 L.Ed.2d 266 (1985) ( ).
It is undisputed that petitioner is mentally retarded, with an overall IQ that places him in the bottom 2.2% of the population. Fisher affidavit at 17. He has a mental age equivalent to that of a ten or eleven-year-old child. At the evidentiary hearing held in this court on October 30, 1986, Petitioner presented the testimony of two expert witnesses who stated that, given the totality of circumstances, Petitioner could not possibly have "knowingly" or "intelligently" waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and have retained or appointed counsel. See Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (1966). The expert witness whom Respondent called did not disagree with the express findings of Petitioner's two experts.
Smith confessed to the crime after being read his Miranda rights, but also after several other events transpired.
Smith was arrested late at night after hiding from the authorities all day in a wooded area. He emerged from the woods only after his father asked him, over a loudspeaker, to turn himself in. He was transported to another county from that of his residence and held incommunicado in a private cell overnight. He was not allowed to speak with his family or friends, nor did he request counsel. The next morning, Smith was allowed to eat breakfast, his first meal in almost twenty-four hours, and the custodial interrogation began. Sheriff Gene Smith, who was known to Petitioner, and a Deputy received Smith's confession. During the interrogation, the Sheriff called Smith by his nickname, "Noodle."
Petitioner's first witness, Dr. Everett Clark Kuglar is a board certified psychiatrist with professional credentials encompassing general, administrative and forensic psychiatry. Kuglar testified that after evaluating Smith, Kuglar concluded that Smith had an IQ of 65, which places Smith within the range of mental retardation. Tr. of Evid. hearing, Oct. 30, 1986, p. 33. Smith's IQ is "significantly subaverage." Id. at 34. Kuglar testified that:
... I think behavioral impairments or the inability to cope or adapt are related to the intellectual deficiency, but individuals who are retarded have a great deal of difficulty with adapting behavior, they have flawed judgment, flawed impulse control, they usually fairly easily become anxious and somewhat confused, they are usually rather dependent individuals who do not cope well in stressful situations.... I think Smith's mental handicaps substantially impaired his capacity to conform under situations, especially where he would be under stress.
I think that this individual's intellectual limitations seriously question whether this man understood the consequences of confessing and whether or not he understood what his rights are. In our work with this man, you had to be very slow and very patient in describing things to him. It certainly appeared to me both from my evaluation of him and his testing that he understood that what he was doing was confessing, but I don't believe the man had an intellectual appreciation of what this confession would mean to him, nor do I think most people with an IQ in this range would have such an appreciation unless it was very carefully explained to them. What I can't comment on, because I wasn't there, is how carefully it was explained to him, how slow they went with this, but unless this was done very patiently and very slowly, I don't believe he has the intellectual capacity to understand what it would mean to him.
Id. at 70-71 (emphasis added).
Petitioner's counsel questioned Kuglar on whether or not the testimony from the Sheriff and Deputy who examined petitioner indicated that the appropriate precautions had been taken. Kuglar responded that:
I didn't see anything in there to indicate they had taken this amount of time. They just indicated they had told him about it.
Dr. Kuglar did not testify that a mentally retarded person can never waive his Miranda rights. However, in Smith's case, his dependency needs would be such that "he would have a very hard time not just fulfilling the request of an individual that had known him for many years." Id. at 72. The custodial interrogation was, of course, performed by an individual who had known Smith for many years and even had a nickname for him.
Petitioner's second expert, Dr. Brad Fisher, is a clinical correctional psychologist who has testified extensively in death penalty cases on the sides of both petitioners and respondents. Fisher has also done extensive research in the area of death row inmates.
Dr. Fisher agreed with Dr. Kuglar that Smith was a "person who was more dependent than the next, he could not have held down any sort of sophisticated job, he had poor impulse control ..." Dr. Fisher's testimony with regard to Smith's waiver under Miranda is as follows:
Id. at 152-153 (emphasis added).
Respondent's expert, Dr. Marcelo Delaserna, did not expressly disagree with Dr. Kuglar and Dr. Fisher as to their opinions of Smith's ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. Id. at 223. In fact, Dr....
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