Smith v. Kowalski, Docket No. 194354

• Decision Date: 23 May 1997
• Docket Number: Docket No. 194354
• Citation: 567 N.W.2d 463,223 Mich.App. 610
• Parties: Michael Carl SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark KOWALSKI, Thomas Goff, Louis Saunders, Tony Herman, William Bryant, Mark Eveleth, Warden Robert Redman, and Deputy Warden Cross, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 463

567 N.W.2d 463

223 Mich.App. 610

Michael Carl SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark KOWALSKI, Thomas Goff, Louis Saunders, Tony Herman William Bryant, Mark Eveleth, Warden Robert Redman, and Deputy Warden Cross, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 194354.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 2, 1997, at Grand Rapids.

Released for Publication Aug. 22, 1997.

Decided May 23, 1997, at 9:10 a.m.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Thomas A. Kulick, Assistant Attorney General, for Defendants-Appellees.

Law Offices of Jeffrey H. Feldman, P.C., Southfield, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Before TAYLOR, P.J., and HOOD and GRIBBS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The trial court granted summary disposition for defendants, ¹ finding that no special relationship existed between plaintiff and any of the defendants to obviate the "public-duty" doctrine. The trial court further found that none of defendants' actions or omissions, if proved, constituted gross negligence so as to overcome governmental immunity. The trial court also concluded that plaintiff's accident was not foreseeable.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from the order granting defendants summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.

Plaintiff, an inmate at Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF), was playing football on the prison grounds. Plaintiff went out for a pass that took him from the grassy football field onto the courtyard, a hard-surface area. There, moving rapidly, he collided with the metal frame of a window of Building 47. Building 47 is located at the back of a courtyard that has brick walls on three sides. The collision resulted in serious injury to plaintiff, including a closed head injury and quadriplegia.

Plaintiff subsequently filed an action against defendants, who are eight individuals employed at LCF, alleging that their gross negligence caused his injuries. Plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to promulgate and enforce safety rules to prevent the playing of football in a courtyard, on a hard surface, and without proper personal protective equipment, including, but not limited to, helmets. Plaintiff further alleged that defendants did not properly and adequately supervise, monitor, and protect him and others who were playing football in proximity to buildings, walls, structures, and on a hard and dangerous surface, without personal protective equipment, including, but not limited to, helmets.

Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). ² A motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone. Eason v. Coggins Memorial Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 210 Mich.App. 261, 263, 532 N.W.2d 882 (1995). This Court reviews the trial court's decision on a motion brought under this rule de novo to determine if the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could establish the claim and justify recovery. Id. Summary disposition under this rule is appropriate in a negligence action if it is determined that, as a matter of law, the defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff according to the alleged facts. Id.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that defendants owed no duty to him under the public-duty doctrine. We disagree.

An essential element of a negligence claim is the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Koenig v. City of South Haven, 221 Mich.App. 711, 562 N.W.2d 509 (1997); Chivas v. Koehler, 182 Mich.App. 467, 475, 453 N.W.2d 264 (1990). Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court. Koenig, supra. The Michigan Supreme Court recently affirmed the validity of the public-duty doctrine in White v. Beasley, 453 Mich. 308, 313, 552 N.W.2d 1 (1996). The public-duty doctrine provides

[t]hat if the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution. On the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual, then a neglect to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and may support an individual action for damages. [Id. at 316, 552 N.W.2d 1, quoting 2 Cooley, Torts (4th ed.), § 300, pp. 385-386.]

This Court has held that the public-duty doctrine applies to prison guards and prison officials. Harrison v. Director of Dep't of Corrections, 194 Mich.App. 446, 456-460, 487 N.W.2d 799 (1992); Chivas, supra at 476, 453 N.W.2d 264.

The special-relationship exception to the public-duty doctrine exposes a government employee to liability for the employee's actions whenever a court finds that the government employee has a "special-relationship" with the plaintiff. White, supra at 319, 552 N.W.2d 1. In White, the Supreme Court adopted a test for determining whether a special relationship had been created between a police officer and a private individual. Id. at 320, 552 N.W.2d 1. The elements of the test are:

(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured;

(2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agent that inaction could lead to harm;

(3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and

(4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking.... [Id. at 320-321, 552 N.W.2d 1, quoting Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937 (1987).]

The Supreme Court, however, declined to decide whether this test should be applied to other government employees. White, supra at 315, n. 3, 552 N.W.2d 1.

This Court has addressed the "special-relationship" exception to the public-duty doctrine with respect to prison officials and inmates where the prisoners injured third parties after being released, or escaping, from prison. For example, in Chivas, supra at 469-470, 453 N.W.2d 264, the estate of Chivas brought suit against prison administrators and guards after Chivas was murdered by two prison escapees. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants owed a duty to Chivas because a special relationship existed between the guards and the escapees. Id. at 475, 453 N.W.2d 264. This Court ruled that no special relationship existed because the defendant guards owed a duty to the general prison population, and no particular special relationship was alleged between the defendant guards and the escaped inmates that was different from the relationship between the guards and the inmate population. Id. at 476, 453 N.W.2d 264.

In Harrison, supra, a convict who was paroled earlier than he should have been under the statutes governing good-time credits murdered two boys and attempted to murder a third. The plaintiff brought suit against various state agencies, officials from the Department of Corrections, and members of the Parole Board. Id. at 448, 487 N.W.2d 799. This Court again held that no special relationship existed between the defendants and the parolee because no special relationship was alleged between the defendants and the parolee that was different from the relationship between the general population of parolees and the warden of a prison or members of a parole board. Id. at 460, 487 N.W.2d 799.

Following the rationale of Chivas, supra and Harrison, supra, we conclude that no special relationship existed between defendants and plaintiff. Defendants are prison guards or prison officials. Defendants were responsible for the prison population generally, and no particular special relationship was demonstrated between defendants and plaintiff that was different from the relationship between defendants and the general inmate population. Thus, we decline to find that a special relationship existed between defendants and plaintiff. The trial court properly granted defendants summary disposition. Even if we found a special relationship, we still would rule against plaintiff because gross negligence did not exist.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary disposition because a question of fact exists regarding whether defendants' actions or omissions constituted gross negligence under M.C.L. § 691.1407(2)(c); M.S.A. § 3.996(107)(2)(c). Again, we disagree.

Summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(7) for a claim that is barred because of immunity granted by law. When reviewing a grant of summary disposition on the ground that the claim is barred by governmental immunity, this Court considers all documentary evidence submitted by the parties. Codd v. Wayne Co., 210 Mich.App. 133, 134, 537 N.W.2d 453 (1995). All well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true and construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. To survive a motion for summary disposition, brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the plaintiff must allege facts warranting the application of an exception to governmental immunity. Codd supra at 134-135, 537 N.W.2d 453.

M.C.L. § 691.1407(2); M.S.A. § 3.996(107)(2) provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard to the discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each officer and employee of a governmental agency, each volunteer acting on behalf of a governmental agency, and each member of a board, council, commission, or statutorily created task force of a governmental agency shall be immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property caused by the officer, employee, or member while in the course of employment or service or volunteer while acting on...