Smith v. Leake Cnty. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 28 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2015–CA–01056–SCT.,2015–CA–01056–SCT.
• Citation: 195 So.3d 771
• Parties: Yahenacy SMITH, a Minor, by and through Her Natural Mother and Next Friend, Felicia SMITH v. LEAKE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

195 So.3d 771

Yahenacy SMITH, a Minor, by and through Her Natural Mother and Next Friend, Felicia SMITH

v.LEAKE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT.

No. 2015–CA–01056–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

July 28, 2016.

Kurt A. Mord, Matthew Y. Harris, attorneys for appellant.

Michael J. Wolf, Jackson, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

WALLER, Chief Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. After a year of bullying and intimidation by a small group of students, Yahenacy Smith¹ was beaten and severely injured while riding the school bus home. Smith sued the Leake County, Mississippi, School District, alleging negligence and negligence per se. The circuit court found that the school district was entitled to discretionary-function immunity and granted the school district's motion for summary judgment. Smith appealed. Finding that the broad governmental function of the school district here is ministerial, we reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment and remand the case to the circuit court for Smith to proceed with her claims.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Smith, a special-education student in the sixth grade, attended Leake Central Junior High School, located in the Leake County, Mississippi, School District (“Leake Central”). Helen Luckett and four other girls had established a pattern and practice of bullying Smith which began during the previous, 2012–2013, school year and continued until the incident in this case. Smith's mother, Felicia Smith, had reported the bullying incidents and had asked the assistant elementary principal, the elementary principal, and the junior-high principal for help. On November 4, 2013, while riding the bus, Helen and her friends bullied Smith, including pulling Smith's hair. Smith's mother reported the incident to the school-bus driver. The bus driver then reported the incident to the school. For this incident, Helen received a five-day suspension from riding the school bus.

¶ 3. Even though the school had suspended Helen from riding the bus, the school principal placed Helen on the same bus as Smith on November 5, 2013. The principal stated that there was no other appropriate transportation available that day to take Helen home. The principal sat Helen down at the front of the school bus, away from Smith, and under the bus driver's supervision. Helen and the other four girls attacked Smith as the bus was on its after-school route. They broke Smith's wrist and punctured her scalp by beating her with a metal belt buckle until she lost consciousness. The bus driver stopped the bus and called a county resource driver. Smith then was transported to the Baptist Medical Center in Leake County for treatment. The school expelled Helen for the incident.

¶ 4. Smith sued Leake Central in September 2015. She alleged claims of common-law negligence and claims of negligence per se under Sections 37–9–69, 37–11–67, and 37–11–69 of the Mississippi Code.² See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 37–9–69, 37–11–67, 37–11–69 (Rev.2013). Smith affirmed that all claims were subject to the Mississippi Torts Claims Act (“MTCA”). Leake Central raised several defenses under Section 11–46–9 of the MTCA, including discretionary-function immunity. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11–46–9(1)(d) (Rev.2012).

¶ 5. Leake Central then filed a motion to dismiss under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or alternatively, under Rule 56. Both parties submitted briefs to the circuit court. Since Leake Central attached an affidavit from the school principal to its motion to dismiss, the circuit court found that Leake Central's motion had been converted into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 56.

¶ 6. In its order, the circuit court found that, when fully examined under the new paradigm established in Brantley v. City of Horn Lake, 152 So.3d 1106 (Miss.2014), Sections 37–9–69, 37–11–67, and 37–11–69 of the Mississippi Code did not create ministerial duties for Leake Central and that the actions taken by Leake Central were discretionary. The circuit court found that, collectively, the ministerial demand was that school districts create policies which address bullying. But the circuit court believed that Leake Central's handbook and the antibullying policy made the response of the school district to threats posed by potential bullies discretionary.³ Additionally, the circuit court noted that Sections 11–46–9(1)(x) and 37–11–57 of the Mississippi Code each separately provide immunity for school officials in maintaining control and discipline of students. Thus, the circuit court found Leake Central was entitled to immunity and granted Leake Central's motion for summary judgment.

¶ 7. Smith appeals and raises the following issues, which we restate as follows: (1) whether Leake Central's governmental function was ministerial or discretionary; (2) whether the immunity afforded to acts taken by school officials to maintain control and discipline of students applies only to claims by those students to whom school officials administered control and discipline; (3) whether Smith exhausted her administrative remedies; and (4) whether the circuit court erred in refusing to allow Smith to provide rebuttal testimony at the motion hearing in response to the school principal's affidavit.

ANALYSIS

¶ 8. The standard of review for a trial court's determination that a governmental entity is immune under the MTCA is de novo. Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville, 158 So.3d 1106, 1109 (Miss.2015). A de novo review also is applied to a trial court's award of summary judgment. Id. Appellate courts are to consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (quotation omitted). The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” and the nonmovant may not “simply rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” Id. (quotation omitted).

I. Whether Leake Central's governmental function is ministerial or discretionary.

A. The Mississippi Tort Claims Act

¶ 9. The MTCA “provides the exclusive civil remedy against a governmental entity ... for acts or omissions which give rise to a suit.” L.W. v. McComb Separate Mun. Sch. Dist., 754 So.2d 1136, 1138 (Miss.1999). “Any tort claim filed against a governmental entity or its employee shall be brought only under the MTCA,” and a school district is a governmental entity under the MTCA. Id. at 1139. Under the MTCA, sovereign immunity is waived for claims for money damages arising out of the torts of governmental entities and their employees, unless they are explicitly exempted from this waiver under Section 11–46–9(1) of the Mississippi Code. Id. at 1138–39. In pertinent part, Section 11–46–9–(1) of the Mississippi Code provides:

(1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim:

...

(b) Arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity exercising ordinary care in reliance upon, or in the execution or performance of, or in the failure to execute or perform, a statute, ordinance or regulation, whether or not the statute, ordinance or regulation be valid;

...

(d) Based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused;

Miss.Code Ann. § 11–46–9(1)(d) (Rev.2012) (emphasis added). Summary judgment was granted to Leake Central based on discretionary-function immunity under Section 11–46–9(1)(d) of the Mississippi Code. So the issue before this Court is whether the circuit court erred in finding that Leake Central was immune under subsection (d).

B. Discretionary–Function Immunity

¶ 10. The following test for reviewing discretionary-function immunity was established in Brantley v. City of Horn Lake:

The Court first must consider the broadest function involved in order to make a baseline determination of whether the overarching function is discretionary or ministerial. The Court then must examine any narrower duty associated with the activity at issue to determine whether a statute, regulation, or other binding directive renders that particular duty a ministerial one, notwithstanding that it may have been performed within the scope of a broader discretionary function.

Brantley, 152 So.3d at 1114–15.

¶ 11. Under the first step of the Brantley test, Smith argues that the broadest governmental function of Leake Central is ministerial, since school districts neither have discretion in establishing school systems nor in organizing and operating schools. That is because Mississippi's Constitution states that “[t]he Legislature shall, by general law, provide for the establishment, maintenance and support of free public schools upon such conditions and limitations as the Legislature may prescribe.” Miss. Const. art. 8, § 201. The Legislature also has enacted a series of statutes, which mandate: the establishment of a school district in every Mississippi county (Miss.Code Ann. § 37–5–1 (Rev.2013)); the governance of these school districts by a school board (Miss.Code Ann. § 37–6–7 (Rev.2013)); and that school boards shall organize a school in the counties of their jurisdiction. (Miss.Code Ann. § 37–7–311 (Rev.2013)) (emphasis added). Although school districts have discretion in deciding how to operate and maintain certain aspects of school systems, Smith argues that school districts have no discretion in deciding whether to establish, organize, operate, and maintain school systems.

¶ 12. Leake Central disagrees and argues that these statutes do not serve to create a ministerial function as to how school officials discipline students. It is undisputed that providing public schools was never left to the discretion of the county. It seems clear that the broadest governmental function of a school district is to provide free public education. See Miss. Const. art. 8, § 201. But the Constitution and the...