Smith v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 19 March 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 2018-CA-01544-SCT,2018-CA-01544-SCT
• Citation: 292 So.3d 231
• Parties: Rhonda J. SMITH v. MISSISSIPPI TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

292 So.3d 231

Rhonda J. SMITH

v.MISSISSIPPI TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

NO. 2018-CA-01544-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 19, 2020

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: THOMAS L. TULLOS, Bay Springs

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: MARK D. MORRISON, Ridgeland

BEFORE RANDOLPH, C.J., MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ.

RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Rhonda Smith appeals the Smith County Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC). The MTC argued that Smith’s claims were preempted by the MTC’s discretionary-function immunity under Mississippi Code Section 11–46–9(1)(d) (Rev. 2015). As the Court of Appeals noted recently, "the precedent governing that question has evolved even during the pendency of this case ...." Bailey v. City of Pearl , 282 So. 3d 669, 671 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). In Bailey , our Court of Appeals correctly applied the public-policy function test articulated in the recent decision Wilcher v. Lincoln County Board of Supervisors , 243 So. 3d 177 (Miss. 2018). Similar to Bailey , in the case sub judice, not all of Smith’s theories of recovery are disposed of by summary judgment. As in Wilcher and Bailey , issues of material fact remain regarding the MTC’s liability, vel non. The Smith County Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed to the extent Smith’s claims are grounded in the MTC’s decision-making processes, but it is reversed concerning Smith’s claims unrelated to the MTC’s decision-making processes.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On the morning of April 12, 2010, Smith collided with a loaded logging truck. The truck was driven by Shelby Colson on Highway 28 in Smith County. Colson testified that he began slowing his vehicle because Joe Blackwell, an MTC employee, approached the truck from the side of the highway. He said Blackwell approached from under a tree canopy carrying a stop sign.

¶3. Colson further said he had not seen any warning signs indicating that road work was occurring ahead or that he needed to slow his vehicle down before spotting Blackwell. Colson said Blackwell made no effort to wave the sign or to get his attention. He stopped because he was unsure what Blackwell was doing. The MTC disputes multiple aspects of Colson’s testimony regarding Blackwell’s location and actions. The MTC’s version has Blackwell standing within inches of the fog line and actively directing traffic.

¶4. Regardless of what prompted Colson to stop, Smith’s car rear ended Colson’s truck. Smith has no recollection of most of the events that occurred that morning. In June 2011, she brought suit against the MTC. The suit alleged that both Blackwell and the MTC were negligent in Blackwell’s posting, the sign placement, as well as Blackwell’s signaling.

¶5. During the pendency of this case, this Court utilized differing tests to determine discretionary-function immunity in Mississippi. In 2014, a special judge denied the MTC’s motion for summary judgment based on discretionary-function immunity, citing Little v. Mississippi Department of Transportation , 129 So. 3d 132 (Miss. 2013). Following discovery, the MTC renewed its motion for summary judgment. The parties prepared briefs addressing Little , then were directed to supplement their briefs after Brantley v. City of Horn Lake , 152 So. 3d 1106, 1112 (Miss. 2014), overruled by Wilcher , 243 So. 3d 177, was handed down. For reasons unrelated to today’s controversy, the special judge’s appointment was vacated in 2017. After Judge Stanley Sorey began presiding in November 2017, the parties addressed Wilcher in additional briefs. Smith now appeals the ruling granting the MTC’s motion for summary judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. This Court reviews both challenges of grants of summary judgment and defenses of discretionary-function immunity de novo. Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. Montgomery , 80 So. 3d 789, 794 (Miss. 2012) (citing Patterson v. Tibbs , 60 So. 3d 742, 753 (Miss. 2011) ), overruled by Brantley , 152 So. 3d 1106. A motion for summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

ISSUES ON APPEAL

¶7. The issues on appeal follow:

I. Are decisions by the MTC regarding placement of traffic-control devices discretionary?

II. Does Smith’s allegation that Blackwell was negligent for failing to do his job implicate discretionary-function immunity?

ANALYSIS

I. Are decisions by the MTC regarding placement of traffic-control devices discretionary?

¶8. To determine if actions are covered by discretionary-function immunity, we apply the public-policy function test resurrected in Wilcher . Wilcher , 243 So. 3d at 187 (citing Montgomery , 80 So. 3d at 795 ). It has two prongs: first, whether the alleged wrongful act involves an element of choice or judgment and, if so, then, second, whether the choice or judgment had a bearing on public policy. Id. Decisions that bear on public policy are decisions made by individuals charged with responsibility for making those decisions that consider economic, political, or social grounds. Wilcher , 243 So. 3d at 182 (citing United States v. Gaubert , 499 U.S. 315, 335, 111 S. Ct. 1267, 113 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1991) ). The purpose of this test is to discern between actual policy decisions of government made by policymakers versus simple acts of negligence by government employees or agents. Wilcher , 243 So. 3d at 188 (quoting Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Reg’l Airport Auth. , 97 So. 3d 68, 76 (Miss. 2012) (Waller, C.J., dissenting)).

¶9. The duty to place and maintain traffic-control devices, as the MTC characterizes the wrongful action here, has long been covered by discretionary-function immunity, as this Court acknowledged in Wilcher . Wilcher , 243 So. 3d at 187–88. Smith’s argument to the contrary is unavailing. The MTC’s duty to place and maintain traffic-control devices is set forth in Mississippi Code Section 63–3–303. That statute provides that traffic-control devices shall be placed and maintained as deemed necessary by the relevant entities. Miss. Code Ann. § 63–3–303 (Miss. 2013). As we stated in Wilcher , and even earlier in Jones v. Mississippi Department of Transportation , 744 So. 2d 256 (Miss. 1999), the statute’s assignment of authority clearly meets the first prong of the test because it is phrased as a choice or decision. We further reiterate that "installing warning lights or signs at dangerous intersections" and other instances of installation of traffic-control devices do carry with them economic, political, or social concerns. Wilcher , 243 So. 3d at 187. Therefore, any claims Smith brings that the MTC through its policymakers erred in its decision regarding placement of traffic-control devices are ineffective because the MTC can invoke discretionary-function immunity. Summary judgment on those issues, therefore, is affirmed.

II. Does Smith’s allegation that Blackwell was negligent for failing to do his job implicate discretionary-function immunity?

¶10. But Smith does not only allege the MTC incorrectly determined placement of traffic-control devices. Separately, Smith argues that Blackwell was negligent for failing to signal the traveling public at all. Smith argues that Blackwell breached a duty to act as a reasonably prudent person would in the situation and that this breach was the proximate cause of her injuries. Here, she does not challenge the MTC’s discretion to place traffic-control devices in certain areas or not. Rather, she challenges the conduct of Blackwell, the flagman, and argues that the MTC is vicariously liable for his negligence. Just as in Wilcher and Jones , we hold that such a claim clearly falls outside the ambit of placement of traffic-control devices contemplated in Section 63–3–303. Therefore, we engage in a separate analysis to determine if this action is subject to discretionary-function immunity.

¶11. Blackwell’s alleged failure to perform his assigned duty to warn the traveling public was a decision or choice, just as state employees can choose to run over manhole covers with lawnmowers, Crum v. City of Corinth , 183 So. 3d 847, 853–54 (Miss. 2016) (Randolph, P.J., concurring in result only), choose to place just two strips of non-stick tape on a step, Pratt , 97 So. 3d at 76 (Waller, C.J., dissenting), or choose not to put up a sign warning of a large hole in the middle of a road, Wilcher , 243 So. 3d at 188. Just like those actions, it is alleged that Blackwell elected to stand in the shade next to a pickup truck and not to perform the job he was placed in the field to do. If that is true, the defendants are not entitled to immunity protection. This conduct, if true, was not made by a policymaker considering social, economic, or political concerns. This allegation, if proved, does not fall within the ambit of discretionary-function immunity.

¶12. But even if Smith successfully navigates around discretionary-function immunity, that alone is not enough to insure recovery. The MTC avers that by following too closely behind the logging truck, Smith was herself the sole cause of her damages. The proximate cause of Smith’s injuries is a disputed question of material fact, as Smith asserts that it is the MTC’s derivative negligence that is to blame. Both parties have produced substantial evidence to support claims of the other’s negligence, but it is the exclusive province of the finder of fact, not this Court, to discern the proximate cause of an accident and assess relative fault. Spann v. Shuqualak Lumber Co. , 990 So. 2d 186, 190 (Miss. 2008). Given that there are multiple disputes of material fact relating to this case, we reverse the decision of the Smith County Circuit Court and remand this case for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION

¶13. The MTC is entitled to immunity protection for its decisions regarding placement of traffic-control devices. Smith’s allegation of Blackwell’s failure to perform his job, however, does not fall under the umbrella of...