Smith v. Myatt

• Decision Date: 28 February 1927
• Docket Number: 26205
• Citation: 146 Miss. 388,111 So. 590
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: SMITH v. MYATT et al. [*]

111 So. 590

146 Miss. 388

SMITH v. MYATT et al. ^[*]

No. 26205

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 28, 1927

Division B

On Motion to Correct Judgment, March 14, 1927.

TAXATION. Uncultivated land, owned by charitable organization, from which a few loads of wood only were taken, held not exempt from taxation (Hemingway's Code Supp. 1921, section 6878).

Uncultivated land, owned by charitable organization, only use of which was the taking of a few loads of wood therefrom to burn in hospital, held not used exclusively for purposes of charitable institution, authorizing exemption from taxation under Laws 1918, chapter 183 (Hemingway's Code Supp 1921, section 6878).

APPEAL from chancery court of Forrest county, HON. T. P. DALE Chancellor.

Suit by George P. Smith against P. J. Myatt and others. Decree of dismissal; and complainant appeals. Reversed and decree rendered in part and in part reversed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded. Sustained in part, and overruled in part.

F. C. Hathorn and Anderson & Anderson, for appellant.

Chapter 183, Laws of 1918 (section 6878, Hemingway's 1921 Supplement) deals with these exemptions. The rule is well settled in Mississippi that persons or corporations claiming exemption from taxation must bring themselves strictly within the letter of the statute; and all reasonable doubts are resolved against the exemption. See Greenville Ice & Coal Co. v. Greenville, 69 Miss. 86, 10 So. 574; Currie-Finch Co. v. Miller, 123 Miss. 850, 86 So. 579; Yazoo R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 65 Miss. 563, 5 So. 108; State v. Simmons, 70 Miss. 485, 12 So. 477; New Standard Club v. McRaven, 111 Miss. 92, 71 So. 289; Morris v. Riley, 99 So. 466. The case of Enochs et al. v. City of Jackson, 109 So. 861, is decisive against the contention of appellees here.

It is nowhere claimed that this property was occupied by the hospital or charitable institution. The most they claim is that at some indefinite period--whether before or after February 1, 1919, is not shown--that the King's Daughters hauled some wood from the land; and that when they finally sold the land to French, long after it was assessed for taxes, and sold for taxes, that they appropriated the proceeds of that sale in part payment for the land and the other assets acquired from the Hattiesburg Hospital. We submit that under this state of facts the appellees are not entitled to make the claim that the property was exempt from taxation under paragraph (f) of the Statute of Exemptions.

If the Whatsoever Circle of the King's Daughters and Sons was, as claimed by the defendants in their answers, a religious and charitable organization, then under the provisions of section 934, Code of 1906, it was unlawful for them to hold and own the lands. It would necessarily follow that they could not claim the same as exempt from taxation. A religious organization cannot own any property except that specifically set out in section 934, Code of 1906. See Methodist Church v. Meridian, 126 Miss. 780, 89 So. 650; Gunter v. City of Jackson, 130 Miss. 686, 940, 842.

Currie & Currie and Currie, Smith, Stevens & Currie, for appellees.

The court found as a fact that the land was not subject to taxes under the law at the time of the assessment and sale and that the assessment and sale were illegal and void and that Smith, the appellant, acquired no title thereto at said sale.

In order for the King's Daughters to retain the title to and operate and maintain the hospital as a charitable institution it was absolutely necessary and indispensable that the purchase price should be paid. The proof in the case is absolute that every penny of the purchase price of the sale of this tract of land which had been bought at the same time in connection with and as a part of the Hattiesburg Hospital and its assets, when sold by the King's Daughters, was applied to the payment of the unpaid purchase price of the hospital.

The use of the land for taking wood therefrom to be burned in the hospital to produce the necessary heat and steam was, within the meaning of the law, a use of said land for hospital purposes. Monticello Female Seminary v. People, 106 Ill. 398, 46 Am. Rep. 702; White v. Britton, 75 S.C. 428, 56 S.E. 232.

The words "occupied and used," on which title by adverse possession is based, certainly ought to be as strictly construed in taking the title of land from the true and real owner and giving it to another as are the same words "occupied and used," as used in subdivision F, section 6878 of said Code. On the contrary, we submit that the words "occupied and used," as used in subdivision F, section 6878 of the Code should be as liberally construed in order to exempt the land of charitable institution from taxation as are the same words in the rule of law providing for the acquisition of the legal title of the land by adverse possession. And if anything like the same import or same meaning is to be given these words in this statute, then under the present rule of law regulating the acquisition of title to land by adverse possession, as it now exists in this state, this forty-acre tract of land was exempt in the hands of the King's Daughters and was not subject to taxation.

Under subdivision D of said section of said Code the actual occupation of the land was not necessary in order to exempt it from taxation. Its exclusive use for: (1) religious, or (2) charitable purposes, (3) and not for profit, rendered it exempt from taxation, and the proof in this case is absolute that this forty acre tract of land was used exclusively for charitable purposes and not for profit.

It was proved as a fact, by testimony, that the land was used exclusively for charitable purposes and upon proof of that fact the court found that it was exempt from taxation. Counsel for the appellant makes the contention in his brief that the King's Daughters waived their right to claim this land as exempt from taxation by their failure to appear and make that claim before the board of supervisors when it was reviewing and correcting the assessment roll.

It is further contended that the only remedy which the King's Daughters had to get rid of this unlawful assessment would have been an appeal from the action of the board of supervisors in refusing to strike it from the list. In reply to this argument we cite City of Meridian v. Phillips (1888), 65. Miss. 362, 4 So. 119, in which the exact point was expressly decided contrary to the contention of the appellant.

The mere fact that the King's Daughters did at times, when there was room, receive for accommodation and accommodate in said hospital paying patients did not, as a matter of law, change the nature of the hospital from that of a charitable to a profit making hospital. Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n, 96 N.E. 1089, 85 Ohio St. 90, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 427; Noble v. Hahnemann Hospital of Rochester, 98 N.Y.S. 605, 112 App. Division 663; Carter v. Whitcomb, 69 A. 779, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 733.

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