Gunter v. City of Jackson

• Decision Date: 02 January 1923
• Docket Number: 22889
• Citation: 94 So. 842,130 Miss. 686
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: GUNTER v. CITY OF JACKSON

94 So. 842

130 Miss. 686

GUNTER v. CITY OF JACKSON

No. 22889

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 2, 1923

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Collection of taxes is proceeding on behalf of public.

A municipality is only a political subdivision of the state and the assessment and collection of taxes by the municipality is as much a proceeding on behalf of the public as a like proceeding in the name of the state for the collection of its taxes.

2. TAXATION. That property claimed to be exempt is illegally owned may be shown, though there has been no escheat.

In a proceeding by the state or any of its political subdivisions to fix or enforce a tax charge on property of a church, whose right of exemption depends on whether the title is held in violation of the public policy of the state as contained in Code 1906, section 934 (Hemingway's Code, section 4110) prescribing the property which may be owned by a religious society, congregation, or ecclesiastical body, it is competent to show that the title is so held, though there has been no proceeding by the state to escheat the title.

3 TAXATION. Property owned by church not exempt when it has no right to own it.

When a church owns real estate which it is not entitled to own under Code 1906, section 934 (Hemingway's Code, section 4110), such property is subject to all taxes to which other property of like character owned by others is subject, and is not exempt under Code 1906, section 4252 (Hemingway's Code, section 6883).

HON. W H. POTTER, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Hinds county, HON. W. H. POTTER, Judge.

Action by the City of Jackson against R. B. Gunter, Corresponding Secretary and Treasurer of Mississippi Baptist State Convention Board. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

George Butler, for appellant.

The statutes exempting property devoted to religious, charitable and educational uses are liberally construed. Mattern v. Canevin, 213 Pa. St. 588; State v. Platt, 24 N. J. L. 109; M. E. Church v. Hinton, 92 Tenn. 188, 19 L. R. A. 289; Preston v. City of Jackson, 83 Miss. 366; Adams County v. Diocese of Natchez, 110 Miss. 890; State v. Fisk University, 87 Tenn. 341, 10 S.W. 286; Holly Springs v. Marshall County, 104 Miss. 761, 61 So. 703.

And let it be noted that Mississippi is not alone in this construction. The same rule is announced in Mattern v. Canevin, 213 Pa. St. 588; State v. Platt, 24 N. J. L. 109; State v. Fisk University, 87 Tenn. 241; M. E. Church v. Hinton, 92 Tenn. 188, 19 L. R. A. 289; Commonwealth v. Y. M. C. A., 115 Va. 745, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1197; Vanderbilt University v. Cheney, 116 Tenn. --; Cumberland Lodge v. Nashville, 127 Tenn. 248; Sisters of Charity v. Chathan, 52 N. J. L. 273; Firemen's Association v. Johnson, 62 N. J. L. 625.

Even where the statutes do not in express terms exempt the revenues of such societies, the court quite frequently holds that where the revenues are devoted to the purposes of the societies, the property remains exempt. New Orleans Female Orphanage v. Houston, 37 La. Ann. 68; Scott v. St. Johns Academy, 86 Vt. 172 (lands bought out of endowment funds); People ex rel. v. Doling, 39 N.Y.S. 765; Old South Association v. Boston, 112 Mass. 299; State v. Bishop of Seberry, 90 Minn. 92 (endowment funds exempt); Liddle v. U. S. Theological Seminary, 72 Ohio St. 417; State v. Johnson, 62 N. J. L. 625; Stonebaum v. Mary Seminary, 99 Va. 653; New Haven v. Scientific School, 69 Conn. 163; Female School v. Louisville, 100 Ky. 470; State v. Silverhorn, 52 N. J. L. 72 (endowment funds exempt); Northwestern University v. Illinois, 99 U.S. 309, 25 L.Ed. 387, 37 Cyc., page 939; Brown University v. Gardner (R. I.), 36 L. R. A. 847; Ellisworth College v. Emmet County, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 530.

The property stands in lieu of the funds and is exempt. Kuhn Bros. v. Warren County, 98 Miss. 769; Ellsworth College v. Emmet County (Iowa), 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 530; Norton v. Louisville, 118 Ky. 836; Watson v. Johnson, 62 N. J. L. 625; Scott v. St. Johns Academy, 86 Vt. 172; Brown University v. Granger, 19 R. O. 704, 36 L. R. A. 847; Preston v. City of Jackson, 93 Miss. 366; St. Johns Military Academy v. Edwards, 143 Wis. 551, 139 A. S. R. 1123; Gould v. Taylor Orphans Asylum, 46 Wis. 106, 50 N.W. 422; Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70, 1 N.W. 92, 50 N.W. 1103; Pearson v. Lane, 17 Ves. Jr. 101; Montgomery v. Wyman, 130 Ill. 17, 22 N.E. 845; Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229; Norton v. Louisville, 118 Ky. 836, 82 S.W. 621; Williston Seminary v. Hampshire County, 147 Mass. 427, 18 N.E. 210; State v. Watkins, 108 Minn. 114, 121 N.W. 390; Litz v. Johnson, 65 N. J. L. 169, 46 A. 776; Masonic Education & Charity Trust v. Boston, 201 Mass. 320, 87 N.E. 602; People ex rel. Crook v. Wells, 179 N.Y. 257, 71 N.E. 1126.

The work is religious, benevolent and charitable in character and within the terms of the statutes. M. E. Church v. Hinton, 92 Tenn. 188; 19 L. R. A. 289; Bispham, Eq., secs. 112, 119; Story Eq. Jur., sec. 1164.

The principles announced in the Meridian Methodist Church case are unsound. Children's Home v. Atlantic City, not authority for Meridian Methodist Church case. Children's Home v. Atlantic City, is authority for, rather than against the exemption. A careful analysis of the opinion will show that the court of errors and appeals expressly held that the fact that the corporation held property in excess of that authorized by its character, would not defeat the exemption.

The holding of the court in Meridian Methodist Church case leads to absurd results. Moreover, in the Methodist Church case this court held or assumed that all religious societies were to be deemed incorporated under section 933 of the Code of 1906, and incapable of holding property except as authorized by section 934 of that Code or else that section 934 was a restriction upon unincorporated as well as incorporated religious societies. 27 Cyc. 740; Peoples v. Barton, 63 A.D. 581; People v. Feitner, 33 Misc. (N. Y.) 712; M. E. Church S. v. Hinton, 92 Tenn. 188, 37 Cyc. 942.

The provision of the statute for exempting revenue producing property is meaningless if section 934 is applicable to all church property. It is a fundamental rule of construction of statutes that all of the words and all parts of the statutes are to be given some meaning. McKenzie v. Boykin, 111 Miss. 266; Adams County v. Diocese of Natchez, 110 Miss. 890; Preston v. City of Jackson, 93 Miss. 366; Adams v. Railroad, 75 Miss. 275; Lemonius v. Mayer, 71 Miss. 514; Fitzgerald v. Rees, 67 Miss. 473; Swan v. Ruck, 40 Miss. 268; and Martin v. O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21. Yet, if the opinion of the court is to be adhered to in the Methodist Church case, no property which is revenue-producing is exempt, and this for the very obvious reason that, under section 934 of the Code, a religious society cannot own income-producing property. The property there enumerated is church buildings, pastor's home, cemetery, colleges, etc., none of which produce revenue.

Yet section 4252 expressly exempts all real and personal property and the revenues derived therefrom belonging to these religious and charitable institutions. If this provision of the statute is to be given any meaning at all, it must of necessity be implied that the exemption is not limited to the non-revenue producing property mentioned in section 934. These provisions of the statutes ought to receive a just, fair and reasonable construction, and should not be pared away and rendered altogether non-operative by reference to section 934.

The public policy of the state is not infringed by upholding the exemption. Methodist Church v. Hinton, supra; Harrison County v. Gulfport Military Academy, 126 Miss. 729.

Conclusion. In conclusion, we desire to say that the statutes should have a fair, just, broad and reasonable construction and one calculated to effectuate the legislative intent. It should also be construed to apply to incorporated as well as unincorporated societies and so as not to discriminate between those incorporated under the general law or under section 933 of the Code.

The property of all devoted to religious and charitable purposes should be exempted alike. There should be no discrimination in favor of property held by organizations similar to the Catholic Dioceses of Natchez, and against the property held in the manner involved in this case. It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the court in Nos. 22889 and 22890, should be reversed and affirmed in 22891.

Reed, Brandon & Brandon, for appellant.

We respectfully submit and contend that Code 1906, sec. 4252 (Laws 1900, ch. 52), had the effect of enlarging and extending Code 1906, sec. 934, so as to authorize and permit a religious society (even though not incorporated), to own in addition to the property described in section 934, revenue-producing property where the revenues from such property are used for benevolent purposes and no dividends are declared.

In Holly Springs v. Marshal County, 104 Miss. 761, this court said: "In construing statutes, we must look to the intention of the legislature, the spirit of the law, and the policy and purpose of the same."

In Adams County v. Catholic Diocese, 110 Miss. 896, this court said: "It is well-settled law that in construing statutes, the letter must yield to the spirit and intent of the act, and where there is a conflict, the intent will control the construction."

Following these well-recognized rules, and in response to the argument of opposing counsel in the case of Adams Co. v. Catholic Diocese, to the effect that sections 4251 and 4252 were in conflict and could not be harmonized, this court said "In this we disagree with the learned counsel for appellant, as it is clear that section 4252 of...