Smith v. Pullman Inc., 6 Div. 188

Decision Date10 February 1966
Docket Number6 Div. 188
Citation193 So.2d 516,280 Ala. 295
PartiesJ. D. SMITH, Tax Collector v. PULLMAN INCORPORATED.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Wingo, Bibb, Foster & Conwell, Birmingham, for appellant

Huey, Stone & Patton, Bessemer, for appellee.

Richmond M. Flowers, Atty. Gen., Willard W. Livingston and Wm. H. Burton, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State Department of Revenue, amicus curiae.

SIMPSON, Justice.

Pullman Incorporated appealed to the Circuit Court under the provisions of Title 51, § 110(1), Code, which is known as 'The Expeditious and Economical Tax Appeals Act' (now applying to Jefferson County alone), from an assessment made by the Board of Equalization of Jefferson County fixing the value of Pullman's real estate for the tax year 1962. As a result of this appeal the Circuit Court rendered its judgment on September 11, 1964, fixing the assessed value of Pullman's real estate for the tax years 1962, 1963, and 1964 at $950,000, which was consistent with the value placed upon the property by the Commissioners appointed by the court under the provisions of Title 51, § 110(1).

There is no controversy with respect to the assessed value as made by the court.

Subsequent to the judgment, the Tax Assessor of Jefferson County corrected the value of Pullman's property in accordance with the judgment. Thereupon the appellant, Tax Collector J. D. Smith, computed ad valorem taxes in accordance with the judgment but advised Pullman that he would not accept payment of the taxes for the tax years 1962 and 1963 unless interest was paid upon these amounts.

On October 30, 1964, the court below rendered its judgment holding that Pullman was not liable for interest for the tax years 1962 and 1963 and further holding that Pullman had fully discharged its liability for the payment of the taxes by paying the sum of $68,400 into court. The appeal was taken by the Tax Assessor from this judgment.

As we see it, the issue to be decided is when do taxes become delinquent when an appeal is taken under Title 51, § 110(1) from an assessment made by the Board of Equalization. Subsection (12) of § 110(1), Title 51, provides that after a judgment is entered by the court following an appeal taken under 'The Expeditious and Economical Tax Appeals Act':

'The clerks of the circuit court shall furnish the tax assessor and tax collector a certified copy of the judgment entered by said court and the said tax assessor and tax collector shall forthwith enter said corrected value and Ascertain the correct amount of taxes due on separate parcel or unit of property. Upon failure of the taxpayer to pay said taxes and any costs of said appeal within 30 days from the date of the rendition of said judgment the said property shall be subject to sale as other real property is subject to sale in the event said taxes are delinquent.' (Emphasis added.)

The appellant admits that the above Act does not specifically provide for the payment of interest and further admits that interest does not accrue on ad valorem taxes until they become delinquent, and that such interest as is imposed is provided for by § 196, Title 51, Code, which is as follows:

'All taxes Becoming delinquent, bear interest at the rate of six percent per annum; and such interest must be added to and collected as part of the taxes, and reported in such manner as the comptroller may prescribe.' (Emphasis added.)

It is the appellant's contention, however, that ad valorem taxes become due and payable on the first day of October each year and if not paid before the first day of January next succeeding, they are delinquent and bear interest at 6% From that date. The position taken by appellant totally fails to give any effect to the provisions of Title 51, § 110(1), other than its procedural aspects. It seems perfectly clear to us that taxes determined to be payable following an appeal under these sections become delinquent unless aid 'within 30 days from the date of the rendition of said judgment' in the Circuit Court. To adopt any different construction would be to wholly fail to give effect to the quoted words as used in the statute. There is a further compelling reason why we must affirm the judgment appealed from. Under the provisions of § 110(1), Title 51, there can be no final assessment until the court renders its judgment. The appeal...

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6 cases
  • Thorn v. Jefferson County
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • September 7, 1979
    ...similar laws relating to most other counties in the State. Phillips v. Hinkle, 262 Ala. 330, 78 So.2d 800 (1955); Smith v. Pullman, Inc., 280 Ala. 295, 193 So.2d 516 (1966); State v. Kennedy, 52 Ala.App. 470, 294 So.2d 439 "After consideration of the pleadings, arguments of counsel, and the......
  • Densmore v. Jefferson County
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • September 21, 2001
    ...authorizing circuit courts in counties with populations over 300,000 to consolidate common causes of action), and Smith v. Pullman, Inc., 280 Ala. 295, 193 So.2d 516 (1967)(law precluding the accrual of property taxes while owner's appeal is pending). In the present case, however, the purpo......
  • Densmore v Jefferson County, 1000264
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • September 20, 2001
    ...authorizing circuit courts in counties with populations over 300,000 to consolidate common causes of action), and Smith v. Pullman, Inc., 280 Ala. 295, 193 So. 2d 516 (1967)(law precluding the accrual of property taxes while owner's appeal is pending). In the present case, however, the purp......
  • Beecher v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • October 6, 1966
    ... ... STATE of Alabama ... 8 Div. 208 ... Supreme Court of Alabama ... Oct. 6, 1966 ... Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1967 ... ...
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