Smith v. Pure Oil Co.
| Decision Date | 16 May 1939 |
| Citation | 278 Ky. 430 |
| Parties | Smith v. Pure Oil Co. et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
1. Libel and Slander. — A written publication is "libelous" where it falsely charges or imputes dishonesty, or engagement in fraudulent enterprises of such a nature as reflects on the character and integrity of a person, and to subject him to the loss of public confidence and respect.
2. Libel and Slander. — If a charge, affecting professional or official capacity, imputes want of integrity, malfeasance, or misfeasance, or is calculated to diminish public confidence in the one against whom it is made, the publication is actionable per se.
3. Libel and Slander. — Statements accusing officers of official oppression and misuse of office to extort fees from members of the public are actionable per se, though fair, reasonable, and good-faith comment on and criticism of public men is privileged.
4. Libel and Slander. — Defamatory matter complained of should be construed as a whole.
5. Libel and Slander. — Language employed in defamatory matter should receive its common and ordinary acceptation in the light of the conditions and circumstances under which it was published.
6. Libel and Slander. — Defamatory matter, printed or spoken, charging an officer with neglect of his official duties, so as to disqualify him for their punctual performance and to render him unfit to discharge them, is actionable per se, particularly when the defamation is printed and circulated.
7. Libel and Slander. — In libel action by county attorney against those who erected a sign directing travelers to take certain road for the reason that constables and "fee grabbers" might get them in certain county, and that the county attorney of that county got a certain per cent. of the fines, that portion of the sign stating that the county attorney got a certain percentage of the fines would not be regarded independently of other portions of the sign (Ky. Stats., sec. 133a-1).
8. Libel and Slander. — Though the words "crook" or "crooked" have a harmless meaning, they are deemed injurious where applied to the conduct of an individual, since, as so used, the common understanding of mankind imputes a defamatory meaning to them, which is dishonesty.
9. Libel and Slander. — Where defendants in libel action had placed the allegedly libelous matter on a large billboard, malice would be imported.
10. Evidence. — It is common knowledge that in many places the automobile speed laws are loosely enforced or not enforced at all.
11. Libel and Slander. — A statement on a large billboard that travelers should take certain highway, that constables and "fee grabbers" might get them in certain county, and that the county attorney of that county got a certain per cent. of the fines plus costs, was, if false, libelous per se.
Appeal from Laurel Circuit Court.
W.R. HENRY and FINLEY HAMILTON for appellant.
TUGGLE & TUGGLE, WALTER B. SMITH and N.R. PATTERSON for appellees.
Before W.E. Begley, Judge.
Reversing.
This is an action for libel by Walter Ray Smith against Pure Oil Company, H.D. Sanders and James Adams. The petition was dismissed on demurrer and the plaintiff appeals.
It charges that in March, 1938, the defendants erected or caused to be erected and displayed a large sign board at "Sanders Servistation," the company's property, on U.S. Highway No. 25, in Laurel County, containing the following false and malicious statements:
"WARNING
Turn Left. U.S. 25-E
Constables & Fee Grabers
May Get You in Whitley County
Ray Smith County Attorney Gets
40% of Fine Plus $5.00 Cost."
The plaintiff was and is the County Attorney of Whitley County. His petition states that he is the person named and referred to in the publication; avers that it means that he as a "fee grabber" would corruptly accept or receive a percentage of fines and costs being wrongfully assessed against persons traveling in Whitley County through their arrest by constables, thereby imputing his unfitness for the office; that it was intended to prejudice the public against plaintiff and to subject him to disgrace, obloquy and ridicule in the performance of his official duties and in his profession as a lawyer; that the defendants intended and meant by the statements to charge him with the crime of unlawfully, feloniously and wrongfully receiving and accepting as County Attorney a percentage of fines and costs derived from the conviction of persons who were not guilty of violating any law; and that the statements were and are false and known to the defendants and each of them to be so concerning the plaintiff. It is further alleged that the sign was intended to and did convey to the many people passing the place on the highway that persons who operated automobiles through the county would be unlawfully and wrongfully arrested by constables, fined in the courts in which the plaintiff, as County Attorney, represented the Commonwealth of Kentucky, upon false charges and contrary to law, and that those persons were being forced by the officers and the courts to pay fines for offenses of which they were not guilty, and the plaintiff was unlawfully, wrongfully and corruptly receiving 40% of the fines plus $5.00 costs. It is charged that the statements were maliciously made and false "as to this plaintiff." There are other appropriate allegations of defamation, injury and damage. In addition an injunction was asked requiring the removal and discontinuance of the sign. It was later removed and that part of the case became moot.
It has always been the law that a written publication is libelous which falsely charges or imputes dishonesty or engagement in fraudulent enterprises of such a nature as reflects upon the character and integrity of a person and to subject him to the loss of public confidence and respect. Hart v. Reed, 40 Ky. 166, 1 B. Mon. 166, 35 Am. Dec. 179. Because of the public interest this rule finds a more extensive application where the false defamatory charge or imputation affects the professional or official capacity of the person of whom it is written. If it imputes want of integrity, malfeasance or misfeasance, or is calculated to diminish public confidence in him the publication is actionable per se. Williams v. Riddle, 145 Ky. 459, 140 S.W. 661, 36 L.R.A., N.S., 974; Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1151; Spears v. McCoy, 155 Ky 1, 159 S.W. 610, 49 L.R.A., N.S., 1033; Shields v. Booles, 238 Ky. 673, 38 S.W. (2d) 677; 17 R.C.L. 301; 36 C. J., 1187, 1188. Therefore, "statements accusing officers of official oppression and misuse of office to extort fees from members of the public have repeatedly been held actionable per se." 17 R.C.L. 303. This, obviously, is...
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Doe v. Coleman
...and integrity of a person and to subject him to the loss of public confidence and respect.” Id. (Quoting Smith v. Pure Oil Co., 278 Ky. 430, 128 S.W.2d 931, 932 (1939)). A defamatory statement about a public figure is actionable only if the statement is shown to have been made with actual k......