Smith v. Raparot

• Decision Date: 18 January 1967
• Docket Number: No. 78,78
• Citation: 101 R.I. 565,225 A.2d 666
• Parties: Emma SMITH v. Ruth H. RAPAROT. Appeal
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 666

225 A.2d 666

101 R.I. 565

Emma SMITH v. Ruth H. RAPAROT.

Appeal No. 78.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 18, 1967.

[101 R.I. 569] Kirshenbaum & Kirshenbaum, Alfred Factor, Providence, for plaintiff.

Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Kenneth P. Borden, Joseph V. Cavanagh, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

JOSLIN, Justice.

This is a civil action to recover damages for the injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the negligent operation of the motor vehicle owned by the defendant and operated by her servant. The defendant pleaded specially as a defense that the plaintiff's admitted release of the servant from liability for those injuries discharged her as well, and she advanced the substance of that plea as the ground for her motion for summary judgment filed under Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure of the superior court. That motion was granted by a justice of the superior court who ruled that an injured third party's valid release of a servant from liability for a tort committed within the scope of his authority will also discharge the master. The case is now here on the plaintiff's appeal.

While it is universally recognized that a master is liable to a third person for an injury suffered at the hands of his servant, whether done at the direction of the master or in the course of the servant's employment, there is no such unanimity as to the manner of enforcing that liability where it is based solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior. On this issue most jurisdictions consider the liability joint and several and permit the joinder of master and servant in a single proceeding. Sherwood v. Huber & Huber Motor Exp. Co. 286 Ky. 775, 151 S.W.2d 1007, 135 A.L.R. 263; Goodman v. Grace Iron & Steel Corp., 125 N.J.L. 28, 13 A.2d 228; Bernheimer-Leader Stores, Inc. v. Burlingame, 152 Md. 284, 136 A. 622; Skala v. Lehon, 343 Ill. 602, 175 N.E. 832. A few courts which require each to be proceeded against separately reason that a master who is neither guilty of nor a paricipant in the commission of a tort should not be deemed a joint tort-feaser merely because he has become liable for the wrong of another by operation of law. Jones v. Valisi, 111 Vt. 481, 18 A.2d 179. Reversed, Daniels v. Parker, 119 Vt. 348, 126 A.2d 85, 59 A.L.R.2d 1060; Karcher v. Burbank, 303 Mass. 303, 21 N.E.2d 542, 124 A.L.R. 1292. See, however, Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Building Corp., 331 Mass. 366, 119 N.E.2d 169.

The solution of this case, however, does not lie in the selection of one of the conflicting views as preferable, but in whether master and servant are deemed to be joint tort-feasors within the purview of the uniform contribution among tortfeasors act, G.L.1956, chapter 6 of title 10, hereinafter referred to as 'the act.' It defines the term 'joint tort-feasors' in § 10-6-2 as follows:

'For the purposes of this chapter the term 'joint tort-feasors' means two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.' (italics ours)

That language is plain and unambiguous. It declares its own sensible meaning and leaves no room for judicial construction. Allen v. Rhode Island State Board of Veterinarians, 72 R.I. 372, 52 A.2d 131;...