Smith v. St. Paul City Railway Company
| Decision Date | 02 April 1884 |
| Citation | 18 N.W. 827,32 Minn. 1 |
| Parties | Howard Taylor Smith v. St. Paul City Railway Company |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Ramsey county, refusing a new trial, after a trial before Wilkin J., and a jury, and a verdict of $ 3,000 for plaintiff.
Order affirmed.
H. J Horn, for appellant.
C. K Davis, for respondent.
This action is brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by a collision between two street cars of the defendant, on one of which plaintiff claims to have been a passenger. Defendant denies that he was a passenger, and insists that under the circumstances it is liable for the exercise of ordinary care only.
1. Upon this question plaintiff's evidence tends to show that he had reached the car, which had stopped for him at a crossing and was endeavoring to enter it by a single low step, in the rear and centre of the car, between the rails; that while he was on the step and in the act of opening the door, which opened with difficulty, he heard the noise of another car approaching, which was unexpectedly brought into collision with the one he was entering, and he was thereby struck, knocked down, and severely hurt. The defendant's evidence also tends to show that the forward car had stopped and was waiting for plaintiff, and that he had passed to the rear thereof and stood between the rails, where he was seen by the driver of the rear car before the accident. The court charged the jury that "if the plaintiff was not actually on the platform, but had hailed the car, and the car had stopped for the purpose of enabling him to take passage, and he was in the act of carefully and prudently attempting to step upon the platform, he is to be regarded as a passenger." This instruction was correct as a legal proposition, and also clearly within the evidence, which, taken together, is amply sufficient to support the finding that the plaintiff had accepted the defendant's invitation to take passage, which had been signified by its stopping the car and waiting for him to enter it; that he was in the act of entering it, and had so far placed himself in the charge of the defendant as to be entitled to the protection of a passenger. The rule is not inflexible that to entitle a person to such protection he must be actually within the vehicle or upon some portion of it. Otherwise he might in good faith, and in the exercise of due care, place himself in a position of peril while in the act of taking passage, upon the consent and invitation of the carrier, and the latter be bound to the exercise of ordinary care only. Brien v. Bennett, 8 C. & P. 724; Allender v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 37 Iowa 264; Gordon v. Grand St. & N. R. Co., 40 Barb. 546; Com. v. Boston & M. R. Co., 129 Mass. 500; Thompson's Carriers, 42; Hutchinson's Carriers, § 556; Shearman & Redf. on Negligence, § 262.
2. The defendant was a carrier of passengers for hire, owning and controlling the tracks and cars operated thereon. It is therefore subject to the rules applicable to passenger carriers. Thompson's Carriers, 442; Barrett v. Third Ave. R. Co., 1 Sweeny 568; 8 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 205. As respects hazards and dangers incident to the business or employment, the law enjoins upon such carrier the highest degree of care consistent with its undertaking, and it is responsible for the slightest negligence. Wilson v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 26 Minn. 278, 3 N.W. 333; Warren v. Fitchburg R. Co., 8 Allen 233; 43 Amer. Dec. 354, 356, notes and cases. This rule extends to the management of the cars and track, and to all the subsidiary arrangements necessary for the safety of passengers. Simmons v. New Bedford, etc., R. Co., 97 Mass. 361, 368; Meier v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 64 Pa. 225. It would, of course, also be applicable to the proper arrangements for running street cars upon the same track, in respect to risks and dangers of accidents from collision.
3. In support of the charge of negligence in the management of the rear car, (No. 26,) and the horses attached to it, plaintiff's evidence tended to prove that before he reached the forward car, (No. 8,) he saw car 26 approaching upon an up grade, about one-half block away, and moving at the usual rate of speed; that, while he was in the act of entering the car which stood waiting for him, hearing a noise on the track behind him, he looked around and saw the horses of car No. 26 approaching rapidly, and immediately the collision occurred in which he was injured. The horses and car 26 were turned to the right and run off the track, and immediately stopped in the street along-side of car No. 8, which was also thrown off the track. Assuming the testimony of plaintiff and his witnesses to be true, it is evident that the forward car must have been struck either by the horses or some part of car No. 26, and that plaintiff was struck and injured thereby. We think it is also evident that the horses must have started into a gait much more rapid than usual in such service, or proper, considering the proximity of the forward car; but plaintiff's evidence, however, failed to explain this, and, though it included the testimony of passengers in car No. 26 at the time, it did not appear as a part of plaintiff's case that the horses had in fact become unmanageable, or were actually "running away." The collision occurred in the evening, and during a storm, but the streets were sufficiently lighted, so that the plaintiff and car No. 8 were discernible by the driver of car No. 26. No adequate or satisfactory cause, therefore, for the happening of the accident and injury to plaintiff, consistent with due diligence on the part of the defendant, is disclosed by plaintiff's case.
The severe rule which enjoins upon the carrier such extraordinary care and diligence, is intended, for reasons of public policy, to secure the safe carriage of passengers, in so far as human skill and foresight can effect such result. From the application of this strict rule to carriers it naturally follows that where an injury occurs to a passenger through a defect in the construction or working or management of the vehicle, or anything pertaining to the service which the carrier ought to control, a presumption of negligence arises. The general rule is thus stated in Scott v. London Dock Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 596: "There must be reasonable evidence of negligence; but where the thing is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen, if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care."
The rule is therefore frequently stated, in general terms, that negligence on the part of the carrier may be presumed from the mere happening of the accident. The reason of...
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