Smith v. State
Decision Date | 30 March 1921 |
Docket Number | Criminal 489 |
Citation | 22 Ariz. 229,196 P. 420 |
Parties | CLIFFORD H. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE, Respondent |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. R. C. Stanford, Judge. Affirmed.
Mr Weldon J. Bailey, for Appellant.
The Attorney General of the State and Mr. L. M. Laney, County Attorney, for the State.
The defendant appeals from the judgment of the superior court of Maricopa county convicting him of the crime of grand larceny and from the order denying his motion for a new trial.
In the first place the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the judgment of conviction rests. From a careful review of the record we gather the following facts A. J. Peters purchased, and there was delivered to him, one $1,000, eight $100, and five $50 United States bonds, commonly known as, and called, Liberty Loan Bonds. He placed the bonds in a large envelope and deposited them in a safe in the office occupied by him for business purposes. The doors of this safe were left open in the daytime. Some time about the middle of April, 1919, Peters went to the safe to look for the bonds and they were gone. He could not say when the bonds were taken. Up to and for some time prior to April 3, 1919, the defendant was in the employ of Peters as a clerk and used a desk in the office where the safe was situated. He knew the bonds were in the safe. He voluntarily left the employ of Peters on April 3, 1919, and at the lunch hour of that day, before leaving, he was alone for a time in the office. About the middle of April, 1919, the defendant was intoxicated in a room in a hotel in Phoenix, and was being cared for or nursed by a lady to whom he gave three $100 United States Liberty Loan Bonds and one $50 United States Liberty Loan Bond. At this time he was in possession of a number of other United States Liberty Loan Bonds, and he told the lady that "he had gotten these bonds from Peters, but he said that Peters dare not say anything; that he had too much on Peters." It is proven that the defendant sold other United States Liberty Bonds to various parties in Phoenix. These bonds bore the same numbers of the bonds which Peters had purchased and deposited in the safe. In April of the same year the defendant went to San Diego, California, and deposited in the safe of the hotel in which he stopped a number of United States Liberty Loan Bonds. He subsequently withdrew these bonds and used them, as he said, in purchasing a diamond ring for $400, and also betting upon the result of the city election. Before it was positively known that the defendant had been disposing of the bonds, he was informed by one of the witnesses for the state that Peters suspected him of the theft, but he then disclaimed taking the bonds and denied that he knew anything about them. Upon being interrogated by the officers in reference to the theft, he again denied that he knew anything about the bonds and denied that he gave any Liberty Bonds to the nurse, and suggested that, if the bonds had been lost, that Peters' own son had stolen them. Upon the trial the defendant testified that while he was in the employ of Peters he became aware of irregularities on the part of Peters in the sale and delivery of hay to the United States government, whereby the government was defrauded out of large sums of money, and that he protested against such irregularities, and that Peters thereupon gave him the Liberty Bonds in question, and said, "Take these and go and keep your mouth shut." The defendant says that he took the bonds, and the next day left the employ of Peters. Peters positively denied that he gave the bonds to the defendant or that any such transaction as testified to by the defendant took place between them, or that he had been guilty of any irregularities in the sale of hay to the government. It was proven that prior to his arrest the defendant made no claim to the officers who interrogated him about the theft that Peters gave him the bonds as "hush money."
We think the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury and to justify the finding that the defendant is guilty as charged. The possession of property recently stolen is a fact from which the jury may infer that the possessor was concerned in the theft. Wharton on Criminal Evidence (10th ed.), par. 758. Mr. Wharton says:
Here the possession was recent, exclusive, and personal. The fact that the defendant on the day before he left Peters' employ was alone in the office where the safe was situated with its doors open gave him the opportunity to take the bonds unobserved. The false statement that he knew nothing about the bonds, the denial that he gave the nurse any Liberty Bonds, the failure to claim that Peters had given him the bonds at the time he was interrogated by the officers, and the suggestion that, if they were stolen, another person had committed the crime, coupled with the recent possession of the bonds, were sufficient facts to authorize the jury to infer that the defendant had stolen them. The defendant's explanation that Peters gave him the bonds as "hush money" must have been wholly unsatisfactory to the jury. The explanation of itself is inconsistent with an idea of honesty and integrity. It indicates that the defendant, for a money consideration was willing to compromise or conceal the commission of a crime by another. Peters denied that he gave the bonds to the defendant, and it was for the jury to determine whether they would credit or discredit the explanation in view of all the circumstances and facts proven in the case, and it is certain that they discredited it.
In the second place the defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial by the misconduct of the county attorney. On the trial of the case several witnesses were called on behalf of the defendant and testified that the general reputation of the defendant for honesty and integrity was good. On cross-examination these witnesses were questioned by the county attorney, over the objections of the defendant, and answered as follows:
Witness Thompson:
Witness Stauffer:
Witness Hyatt:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Michelson v. United States
...Holly, 155 N.C. 485, 492, 71 S.E. 450. The Arizona Supreme Court, which once followed the rule adopted by the Court today, Smith v. State, 22 Ariz. 229, 196 P. 420, more recently, in reversing a judgment because a character witness was cross-examined as to his knowledge of specific acts of ......
-
Allen v. State
...been connected with or concerned in the corpus delicti, whether burglary or larceny. Wharton, Criminal Evidence (10th ed.), par. 758; Smith v. State, supra. The giving this instruction or the rule embodied in it is almost as frequent as trials for larceny or burglary. We have not found any ......
-
Murphy v. State
... ... "fishy" that it evidently carried no weight with ... the jury. The actual unexplained possession of ... recently-stolen goods is a fact from which the ... possessor's guilt may be inferred. Taylor v ... State, 35 Ariz. 317, 277 P. 978; Smith v ... State, 22 Ariz. 229, 196 P. 420; Territory ... v. Casio, 1 Ariz. 485, 2 P. 755. So appellant's ... contention, that "there was no evidence to show that ... defendant was near the place said property was stolen," ... is not at all convincing or persuasive of his innocence or ... ...
- Worsley v. Cochise County