Smith v. State ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Oklahoma State University

Decision Date19 January 1993
Docket NumberNo. 77199,77199
Citation846 P.2d 370
PartiesPatrick M. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel., the BOARD OF REGENTS OF OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY, a constitutional state agency, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellee, Patrick M. Smith has moved to dismiss the appeal of Defendant-Appellant, Board of Regents of Oklahoma State University. Upon consideration of the briefs of the parties we hold that Plaintiff-Appellee's motion to dismiss this appeal for mootness should be GRANTED.

It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant-Appellant's appeal be and the same is DISMISSED.

HODGES, C.J., and SIMMS, ALMA WILSON, KAUGER, WATT, JJ., concur.

LAVENDER, V.C.J., and HARGRAVE, OPALA and SUMMERS, JJ., dissent.

OPALA, Justice, with whom HARGRAVE and SUMMERS, Justices, join, dissenting.

The court dismisses for mootness this appeal from a preliminary decree of injunction 1 that (1) bars Oklahoma State University [University or OSU] from denying Patrick M. Smith's [Smith] re-enrollment for the 1991 spring semester, (2) compels OSU to "accommodate his learning disability" in conformity with the provisions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [Act] 2 by giving him additional time to complete the course work in two of his 1990 fall classes and (3) requires OSU to reconsider his grades in those courses.

I cannot join today's decision which accedes to Smith's argument that the issues on appeal have been mooted by after-occurring facts and after-enacted legislation. 3 The court's dismissal order gives no reason for today's declaration that the appeal is moot. There is, in my view, no legal warrant for ascribing mootness to the issues sought to be presented. In an effort to so demonstrate, my dissent tests and rejects each of the grounds Smith has advanced for dismissal.

Midappeal developments do not moot this controversy because the court's disposition of this case can be effective. The court may either affirm the interim (pendente lite) injunction, and thus leave Smith's present academic situation unaffected, or reverse that decision, in which (latter) event the case would stand as if it had never been decided. 4 On reversal Smith would stand in his pre-suit status.

I would hold today that OSU's appeal presents a lively "case or controversy" between antagonistic demands. Assuming the tendered issues to be moot, this case nonetheless falls within the well-defined public-law and likelihood-of-recurrence exceptions to the general mootness doctrine. It calls upon us to define, in a setting likely to resurface frequently, the outer limit of effective Congressional encroachments on OSU's academic autonomy. Today's dismissal allows Smith to complete a substantial part of his education under the protective umbrella of an unreviewed temporary injunction, which leaves unsettled a very important public-law question well capable of repetition.

I

THE CASE IS NOT MOOTED BY AFTER-OCCURRING EVENTS AND

AFTER-ENACTED LEGISLATION

Smith rests his mootness argument on the notion that certain material midappeal developments preclude this court from affording OSU any effective relief. His motion to dismiss informs us of the following events: (a) he was permitted (by pendente lite relief) to be enrolled in the Spring 1991 semester at OSU and achieved a grade point average of 2.4, (b) thanks to the interim injunction, he is enrolled for the 1992-1993 school year and (c) new federal legislation, the Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA], 5 which applies to all state institutions of higher education, affords him anti-discrimination protection similar to, if not indeed more extensive than, the invoked Rehabilitation Act.

I find no merit in Smith's approach. His reliance on midappeal events rests on an unartful quest to supplement the appellate record. 6

A. The Nature Of A Preliminary Injunction

A litigant's quest for a preliminary injunction is distinguishable from one for permanent injunctive relief. A suit--such as this--to enjoin a university from expelling a student for academic deficiency is commenced by filing a petition that raises issues to be reached on the merits. Issues on the merits, which are those that affect the claim or any available defenses against it, 7 can be raised only by a pleading. 8 If, as here, temporary relief is sought to prevent a university from barring a plaintiff-student's re-enrollment for academic deficiencies before the merits of litigation can be decided, the plaintiff must apply for an interim injunction. 9 The latter operates pendente lite to restrain a university as well as to preserve the status quo (i.e., the student's pre-expulsion standing) until the merits have been decided. 10 An application for interim injunctive relief does not raise issues on the merits of the case. 11 Neither appellate affirmance nor reversal of an interlocutory injunction decree could, without more, become an adjudication on the merits of the action. Issues resolved at this interim stage are never res judicata of the claim. 12 When they are retendered on trial of the plaintiff's quest for permanent injunction, both parties are free to offer different or additional proof.

B.

Issues Tendered By This Appeal From An Interim Injunction

Are Statutorily Reviewable Before A Trial On The

Merits Of This Action

Smith asserts that some of the questions OSU presses in this appeal should not be reached for appellate settlement at this stage; rather, they should await the nisi prius decision on the petition for permanent injunction. It is only then, Smith urges, the court could give full consideration to certain material midappeal developments. Moreover, he contends that no practical relief may be afforded OSU if this court were to reverse the interlocutory injunction decree now before it.

Even if this argument were correct, I could not ignore the terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 993(A)(2), 13 which confer in absolute terms an unqualified right to appeal from a nisi prius temporary injunction. Neither the claim of prematurity nor some other, purely prudential considerations can defeat this court's statutory reviewing cognizance over interlocutory injunctions.

Smith's suggestion that a premature decision of this appeal would be unwise challenges legislative wisdom in including temporary injunctions under the rubric of appealable decisions. 14 In essence, Smith's argument against "premature" review is an attack on OSU's undeniable statutory right to interim review. His position is unsustainable. Courts do not concern themselves with, and hence do not question, the merits, wisdom or advisability of legislative norms for appealability of judicial actions. Only the meaning and validity of statutes may be subjected to judicial scrutiny. 15

C. What Would Happen If The Preliminary Injunction Were Reversed?

Smith asks rhetorically in his motion whether OSU would be legally free to sever Smith's status as a student if the preliminary injunction were reversed. The answer to this question would not hinge on the disposition of this appeal but on the outcome of the trial court's ultimate decision on permanent injunction issues. That controversy has not yet been reached. On remand after our pronouncement adverse to Smith, the lower court would be called upon to decide what status Smith will occupy between the effective date of reversal and the time disposition is made on the merits of this action--i.e., whether he could remain in school until the case is finally decided.

Smith also questions whether, on reversal of the interim injunction, OSU would be legally free to withhold from him the benefits of the federal act's reasonable academic accommodations. My answer to this question is that unless OSU's claim to academic autonomy were to prevail in this appeal so as to free the University from its duty of "reasonable accommodation" commanded by the federal law Smith invoked, he could not be foreclosed from claiming these benefits in his quest for permanent injunction. It is fair to add in this connection that extant federal precedent appears to militate against OSU's success in freeing itself entirely from the impact of Congressional requirements. 16

D. The ADA Does Not Affect Interim Injunction Issues

Smith asserts that the appeal should be dismissed and the cause remanded for consideration of his rights under the ADA, a comprehensive federal act governing rights and remedies of persons with disabilities, which, we are urged, was made applicable during the pendency of this appeal (in 1992) to state institutions of higher education. This course, Smith counsels, is indicated by Oklahoma's extant jurisprudence. 17

I cannot accede to Smith's position. His dismissal plea is for nothing more or less than the opportunity to recast his action by invoking a newly-enacted regime of federal remedies that was not in existence when Smith sought the preliminary injunction below. Smith is bound here by the law and theories he previously advanced before the nisi prius court. OSU has a statutory right in this case to corrective relief, if any be due, from the resolution of the interlocutory injunction issues tendered below. If OSU should prevail here, Smith would nonetheless be free to invoke once again--in the post-remand process on the merits of the case--any additional or new remedies then affordable to him by after-enacted legislation. In sum, an appellate disposition unfavorable to Smith would at this juncture not bar him, when the case is reached for trial on the merits, from amending his original petition by invoking the ADA remedies. 18

E.

An Appellate Pronouncement On OSU's Defense Based On

Inadequate Notice Of Smith's Learning Handicap

Should Not Be Deferred Past Nisi Prius

Adjudication Of Permanent Injunction

Smith asserts that this court's resolution "at this late date"--two years after the preliminary injunction--of the key issue of whether OSU had timely "notice" of his learning disability...

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