Smith v. State
| Decision Date | 10 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D11–3579.,1D11–3579. |
| Citation | 113 So.3d 1058 |
| Parties | Patrick Joseph SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Glenn M. Swiatek, Shalimar, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bond, Attorney General, and Donna A. Gerace, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Patrick Joseph Smith appeals an order denying his motion filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which he asserted that his life sentence for felony murder was illegal under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Subsequent to the filing of this appeal, the United States Supreme Court released Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and we ordered supplemental briefing as to the effect of Miller on this appeal. Subsequently, a panel of this court held that Miller should not be applied retroactively, relying upon Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375, 2012 WL 4448860 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). Gonzalez v. State, 101 So.3d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Gonzalez controls the case under view. See also Falcon v. State, 111 So.3d 973, 2013 WL 1809742 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Johnson v. State, –––So.3d ––––, 2013 WL 1809685, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D953 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Accordingly, we affirm. We also certify the same question of great public importance certified by the Falcon panel:
WHETHER THE RULE ESTABLISHED IN MILLER V. ALABAMA, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), “THAT MANDATORY LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR THOSE UNDER THE AGE OF 18 AT THE TIME OF THEIR CRIMES VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT[ ],” SHOULD BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT?
Because I conclude that Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), is a constitutional determination of fundamental significance, it should be applied retroactively. Accordingly, in my view, Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375, 2012 WL 4448860 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), and Gonzalez v. State, 101 So.3d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), are wrongly decided and the order before us should be reversed. Nevertheless, this panel is bound by our decision in Gonzalez.See Falcon v. State, 111 So.3d 973, 2013 WL 1809742 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); and Johnson v. State, ––– So.3d ––––, 2013 WL 1809685, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D953 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Accordingly, I specially concur. I also concur on the certified question. In my view, if Miller applies here, at a minimum Smith's sentence must be vacated, and the cause remanded for resentencing with Smith's age at the time of the offenses taken into account in the reconsideration of the appropriate sentence.
In 1998, Patrick Joseph Smith was convicted of first-degree felony murder and robbery with a firearm. He was 17 years of age when the offenses were committed. The evidence adduced at trial showed that Smith brought a gun to the residence of the man he and his associates planned to rob. Another pulled the trigger that launched the fatal shot. Smith's convictions and his sentence of life imprisonment were previously affirmed by this court. Smith v. State, 746 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
Thereafter, Smith moved for post-conviction relief on the authority of rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, raising two issues. The lower court granted relief as to the first alleged sentencing error raised on the authority of Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000), but denied relief as to the claim that the life sentence for felony murder is illegal under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010).
In Graham, the United States Supreme Court held that a person may not be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense committed while a juvenile. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court extended the reasoning in Graham and held that, even when a juvenile has committed a homicide, the juvenile cannot automatically be given a life sentence without the possibility of parole; instead, a life sentence can only be imposed following a deliberation which takes into account the defendant's youth at the time of the offense. In writing for the majority in Miller, Justice Kagan explained the scope of the Miller decision:
[t]he mandatory penalty schemes at issue here prevent the sentencer from taking account of these central considerations. By removing youth from the balance—by subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult—these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender. That contravenes Graham's (and also Roper's ) foundational principle: that imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.
* * *
In light of Graham's reasoning, these decisions too show the flaws of imposing mandatory life-without-parole sentences on juvenile homicide offenders. Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it....
* * *
We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.... By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment. Because that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not consider Jackson's and Miller's alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger. But given all we have said in Roper,Graham, and this decision about children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between “the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1;Graham, 560 U.S. at ––––, 130 S.Ct. at 2026–2027. Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.
132 S.Ct. at 2465–469 (footnotes omitted).
This court has held that Miller is not retroactive. Gonzalez v. State, 101 So.3d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). In so holding, we relied on Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375, 2012 WL 4448860 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). In my opinion, Geter was wrongly decided and, therefore, we erred in relying on that decision.
In Geter, the Third District considered the question of whether Miller has retroactive application by applying the test set forth in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980). The Witt test is the appropriate test; however, the Geter court misapplied the test as set forth in Witt.
In balancing the important consideration of finality in criminal cases against the equally important considerations of fairness with respect to an individual conviction and sentence and uniformity with all comparable convictions and sentences, the Florida Supreme Court set forth in Witt a three-part test which must be satisfied before a decisional change in law will be deemed to have retroactive application. The change of law must (a) emanate from the United States Supreme Court or the Florida Supreme Court; (b) be constitutional in nature, and (c) constitute “a development of fundamental significance.”
Subpart (c) of the Witt test is obviously the only subpart at issue with regard to the retroactive application of Miller v. Alabama as Miller emanated from the United States Supreme Court and is constitutional in nature. This third subpart ensures that mere “evolutionary refinements” in the law are not given retroactive application so as to prevent both the unjust disturbance to the finality of a case and the intolerable overburdening of the judicial system. See Witt 387 So.2d at 929–30.
Before setting out this three-part test, the Witt court noted the “relative unsatisfactory body of law” regarding the retroactivity of a new rule of law and, without discussing this body of law in detail, the Witt Court observed that three essential considerations could be gleaned from this “unsatisfactory” case law when passing on the question of whether a new rule of law should be applied retroactively: “(a) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (b) the extent of reliance on the old rule; and (c) the effect on the administration of justice.” Id. at 926. These considerations derive primarily from two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) (hereafter, the Stovall and Linkletter considerations).
After discussing these considerations, the Court in Witt set forth its analysis noting that only cases of major constitutional significance would be subject to retroactive application. The Witt court explained that such major or fundamentally significant constitutional changes generally fall within one of two categories. The first category of major or fundamentally significant constitutional changes
are those changes of law which place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties. This category...
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