Smith v. State
Decision Date | 23 January 1947 |
Docket Number | No. 31431,31431 |
Citation | 41 S.E.2d 541 |
Parties | SMITH . v. STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
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Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 1947.
[COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTDE]
Syllabus by the Court.
1. (a) Bias or prejudice is not cause for disqualification of a judge, under the provisions of our Code. A public prosecutor, with the consent of the court, may enter into an agreement with a confederate in crime that if he will testify fully and truthfully, against the other confederate or confederates, the witness will be granted immunity from prosecution. The judge who approves such an agreement does not thereby disqualify himself to try the other confederates.
(b)
2. The provisions of the Code, section 38-1806 that the testimony of a witness who swears wilfully and knowingly falsely is to be disregarded unless corroborated, where applicable, is required to be charged in the absence of a written request. But to make it applicable, it must appear, among other things, that the witness admit, on the trial, that he had wilfully and knowingly sworn falsely, or the testimony must be such as to render the purpose to falsify manifest.
3. "The prosecution here elected to charge a particular congruous offense at a particular time in each count, and the words in each count, 'the date herein alleged being an essential averment as to this transaction, ' make the date in each count essential to identify the particular transaction described in that count."
4. "Attorneys should be allowed all reasonable latitude in the argument of cases to the jury, provided they do not go outside the facts legitimately appearing from the trial, and lug in extraneous matters as if they were a part of the case."
5. The assignment of error in special ground 5 is without merit for the reasons given in the opinion.
6. The allowance of a leading question to be propounded to a witness, as a general rule, rests within the sound discretion of the court. There is nothing in the instant case to remove it from the general rule.
7. A witness may be sworn to testify in the trial of a case even though his name does not appear on the indictment at the time the case is called for trial, and where such witness did not testify before the grand jury and his name was not furnished on demand by the prosecuting attorney to the defendant.
8. Where the court fails to charge the jury as requested in writing, or after having given a written reqeust to charge withdraws such request, and afterwards in a recharge fairly and correctly gives to the jury substantially the law along the lines requested as far as applicable to the evidence, the failure to give the written request or its withdrawal after having given it, is not cause for a reversal.
9. Where the court in a recharge withdraws a portion of a previous charge and thereafter in recharge submits to the jury the law applicable to the facts of the case, and where the charge as a whole contains no repugnancy, the case will not be reversed.
10. There is no error in the assignment under special ground 11.
11. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction, as to the general grounds.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; A. L. Etheridge, Judge.
Claude Smith was convicted of operating a lottery, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Case transferred from Supreme Court to Court of Appeals, 39 S.E.2d 313.
The defendant was indicted on fifteen counts. The charges were for violationof the lottery statute, generally known as "the numbers game." On the trial of the case the defendant was found guilty on counts 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, and not guilty on the other counts. The counts on which the defendant was convicted were identical except as to the dates. Omitting the formal parts, count 10 alleges that the defendant "in the County of Fulton, State of Georgia on the 14th day of June, 1944, with force and arms, did keep, maintain, and operate a lottery, known as the number game, for the hazarding of money: the date herein alleged being an essential averment as to this transaction, --contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof."
Count 12 on the 19th day of July; count
13 on the 9th day of August, 1944; count
14 on the 6th day of September, 1944; count 15 on the 9th day of October, 1944. The evidence is quite lengthy and we will not attempt to narrate it, but will, during the course of our opinion, refer to such portions of it as are necessary to discuss the questions involved.
Geo. G. Finch, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
E. E. Andrews, Sol. Gen., Durwood T. Pye and Lindley W. Camp, all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.
1. (a) When the case was called for trial and before pleading to the merits, the defendant filed a motion to disqualify judge Jesse M. Wood, judge of the criminal court of Fulton County. The motion to disqualify is:
The order referred to is as follows:
It is alleged in the certiorari that the trial judge was without authority of law to release Seals by such order or in any other manner; that this authority is vested exclusively in the Prison Board of the State of Georgia. It does not appear from the motion to disqualify or from the order of Judge Wood, copied above, (1) in what court Seals was convicted; (2) if he was convicted in the criminal court of Fulton County, it does not appear that the term of court at which he was convicted had expired and the case had passed out of th*: breast of the court; (3) it does not appear that Seals was released under the order of Judge Wood; (4) it does not appear that he (Seals) testified in the instant case (5) there was no testimony introduced on the motion to disqualify.
We will therefore not discuss these features, but will direct our remarks to the question as to whether the motion to disqualify and the certified order of the court attached thereto is sufficient as a matter of law to disqualify Judge Wood. The only statutory...
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