Smith v. State

• Decision Date: 14 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. S96G1914,S96G1914
• Citation: 268 Ga. 196,486 S.E.2d 819
• Parties: , 97 FCDR 2590 SMITH v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 819

486 S.E.2d 819

268 Ga. 196, 97 FCDR 2590

SMITH v. The STATE.

No. S96G1914.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 14, 1997.

Elizabeth Lane, Macon, for Smith.

Fredric Daniel Bright, Dist. Atty., Stephen A. Bradley, Asst. Dist. Atty., Milledgeville, for the State.

James C. Bonner, Jr., Georgia Indigent Defense Council, Atlanta, Nicholas A. Lotito, Davis Zipperman Kirschenbaum & Lotito, Atlanta, Amicus Appellant.

THOMPSON, Justice.

Vernita Smith, charged with malice murder, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the shooting death of her husband. The Court of Appeals rejected defendant's assertion that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to give her requested jury instructions on the battered woman syndrome. Smith v. State, 222 Ga.App. 412(2), 474 S.E.2d 291 (1996). We granted certiorari to consider whether, and under what circumstances, a defendant is entitled to a charge on the battered person syndrome, separate and apart from the general charge on justification.

Defendant testified that her husband beat her repeatedly during the course of their eighteen-month marriage. He frequently held a gun to her head and threatened to kill her and abscond with her child. On one occasion he choked her until she lost consciousness and had to be revived. Another time he wrapped a lamp cord tightly around her neck and stopped choking her only when her brother appeared and pulled him away. Defendant summoned the police on a dozen occasions, and left her husband twice because of the abuse. She returned each time after he expressed remorse and promised he would not repeat the misconduct. Several other witnesses testified about defendant's relationship with her husband, his abusive conduct toward her, and the beatings and threats he inflicted upon her.

On the day of the shooting, defendant's husband became enraged with her because he had observed her out visiting with friends. When she returned home, he confronted her, they argued and he struck her in the face, bloodying her mouth. After he continued to hit her and held a metal can over his head in a threatening manner, she grabbed a pistol and fired one shot which entered his arm and lodged in his chest. The victim ran out of the house, and she followed. When she offered to help him get medical attention, he responded, "Bitch, you're dead." The victim died sometime later as a result of the gunshot.

An expert in the field of domestic violence testified on behalf of the defense concerning the group of symptoms comprising the battered woman syndrome. This expert had conducted a lengthy assessment of the defendant, determined that she exhibited each of the symptoms, and reached the conclusion that she suffered from the battered woman syndrome.

Smith requested three separate jury charges pertaining to the battered woman syndrome. At the conclusion of the charge conference, the court ruled that it would allow defense counsel to explain in closing argument how defendant's experiences as a battered woman affected her state of mind at the time of the shooting. But, in reliance on precedent from this Court, defendant's proposed jury instructions were rejected. ¹

The jury charge included instructions on both murder and voluntary manslaughter. The pattern instruction on justification was given tracking the language of OCGA § 16-3-21(a). The jury was charged that a person is justified in using force against another person "when and to the extent that she reasonably believes that such ... force is necessary to defend herself or a third person against the other's imminent use of unlawful force; [and that] a person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if that person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to herself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony." As for self-defense, the jury was instructed that "a defendant is justified to kill or use force against another person in defense of self or others," and that the "standard is whether the circumstances were such that they would excite not merely the fears of the defendant, but the fears of a reasonable person."

Traditionally, the defense of justifiable homicide by self-defense was available only in circumstances where a reasonable person would fear imminent great bodily harm or death--a defendant's particular characteristics were not taken into consideration in determining if his or her actions were reasonable. Bivins v. State, 200 Ga. 729, 38 S.E.2d 273 (1946). The jury could not consider the actual fears of the defendant, id.; instead, the fear of imminent danger had to be that of a reasonable person. Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662, 187 S.E.2d 277 (1972). Subsequently, juries were permitted to consider how a reasonable person in defendant's particular circumstances would react. In Daniels v. State, 248 Ga. 591, 285 S.E.2d 516 (1981), evidence that defendant was previously attacked by the victim was determined relevant to whether defendant had a reasonable and honest belief in the need for deadly force.

In Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981), this Court recognized the battered woman syndrome as a scientifically established theory. ² We announced the rule that an expert's testimony is admissible to assist the jury in evaluating the battered woman's defense of self-defense since the expert provided "an interpretation of the facts which differed from the ordinary lay perception...." ³ Id. at 619, 277 S.E.2d 678. Expert testimony was admitted to explain "why a person suffering from battered woman's syndrome would not leave her mate, would not inform police or friends, and would fear increased aggression against herself," because such conclusions are those which " jurors could not ordinarily draw for themselves." Id. The rule pronounced in Smith resulted from "the need to treat a unique and almost mysterious area of human response and behavior ... the complex subject of battered wife syndrome." Sinns v. State, 248 Ga. 385, 387, 283 S.E.2d 479 (1981). As we subsequently explained in Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706, 708, 386 S.E.2d 129 (1989), evidence of battered woman syndrome is admissible to show "that the defendant had a mental state necessary for the defense of justification although the actual threat of harm does not immediately precede the homicide." That is, evidence of past physical abuse is admissible for the limited purpose of illustrating that defendant had a reasonable belief in the imminence of additional physical abuse at the hands of the victim and that, therefore, she was presently justified in acting in self-defense.

Consistent with this concept of the battered person syndrome as an evidentiary component of the defense of justification, the legislature amended OCGA § 16-3-21 in 1993 (Ga.L.1993, p. 1716, § 2), by the addition of a new subsection (d). Under OCGA § 16-3-21(d), if a defendant in a prosecution for murder or manslaughter raises a defense of justification, "in order to establish the defendant's reasonable belief that the use of force or deadly force was immediately necessary," the defendant may offer: "(1) Relevant evidence that the defendant had been the victim of acts of family violence or child abuse committed by the deceased," and "(2) Relevant expert testimony regarding the condition of the mind of the defendant at the time of the offense, including those relevant facts and circumstances relating to the family violence or child abuse that are the bases of the expert's opinion." Thus, a defendant who was a prior victim of "family violence or child abuse," may offer battered person syndrome evidence to illustrate his or her reasonable belief in the imminence of the victim's use of unlawful force. Chester v. State, 267 Ga. 9, 471 S.E.2d 836 (1996). It has long been the position of this Court that the battered person syndrome is not a separate defense, but that evidence of battered person syndrome is relevant in a proper case as a component of justifiable homicide by self-defense. Smith v. State, 265 Ga. 495, 458 S.E.2d 347 (1995); Pugh v. State, 260 Ga. 874, 876(3), 401 S.E.2d 270 (1991); Chester, supra; Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198, 475 S.E.2d 892 (1996). See also Motes v. State, 192 Ga.App. 302, 384 S.E.2d 463 (1989). And we do not deviate from that principle today. We reiterate that evidence that a defendant suffered from battered person syndrome is only another circumstance which, if believed by the jury, would authorize a finding that a reasonable person, who had experienced prior physical abuse such as was endured by the defendant, would reasonably believe that the use of force against the victim was necessary, even though that belief may have been, in fact, erroneous.

Because a defendant is entitled to a charge explaining the theory of the defense, especially if it is the sole defense, specific instructions on the battered person syndrome are appropriate when warranted by the evidence and requested by defendant. Under the present pattern jury instructions, the jury is directed to apply a reasonable person standard in assessing self-defense. ⁴ And, as was charged in the present case, the circumstances must be such as would excite not merely the fears of the defendant, but the fears of a reasonable person. The issue in a battered person defense "is not whether the danger was in fact imminent, but whether, given the circumstances as [the defendant] perceived them, the defendant's belief was reasonable that the danger was imminent. " Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 12 (Okl.Cr.1992). Modification of the justification by self-defense charge is thus necessary both to comport with OCGA § 16-3-21(d), and "to permit juries to consider the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that the use of force was necessary in light of both [her] circumstances at the time [she] used force, and any psychological condition resulting...