Smith v. State
| Decision Date | 29 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. S95A1004,S95A1004 |
| Parties | SMITH v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Martin S. Jackel, Savannah, for Smith.
Dupont K. Cheney, Dist. Atty., J. Thomas Durden, Asst. Dist. Atty., Atlantic Judicial Circuit, Hinesville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Michael D. Groves, Asst. Atty. Gen., State Law Dept., Atlanta, for the State.
After a jury trial, Mrs. Marguerite Smith was found guilty of the malice murder of her husband. She appeals from the judgment of conviction and life sentence entered by the trial court on the jury's guilty verdict. 1
1. After her arrest and consultation with counsel, Mrs. Smith gave a statement to police officers. Citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990), she urges that this post-arrest statement was erroneously admitted into evidence.
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484(II), 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the Supreme Court of the United States held that an accused who has invoked his right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, "unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." In Minnick, supra 498 U.S. at 150, 111 S.Ct. at 489, it subsequently was held that the "protection of Edwards is not terminated or suspended by consultation with counsel." In so holding, however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that "Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth Amendment protections after counsel has been requested, provided the accused has initiated the conversation or discussions with the authorities...." Minnick v. Mississippi, supra at 156, 111 S.Ct. at 492.
At the Jackson-Denno hearing that was held to determine the admissibility of Mrs. Smith's statement, the State produced undisputed evidence that the statement was a mere spontaneous utterance and had not been elicited by any interrogation. It follows that the trial court correctly held that Mrs. Smith's statement was admissible. Ward v. State, 262 Ga. 293, 298(9), 417 S.E.2d 130 (1992).
2. The trial court's failure to give specific charges with regard to the "battered woman syndrome" is enumerated as error.
No written requests to charge on the "battered woman syndrome" were submitted. Moreover, that syndrome Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706, 707(4), 386 S.E.2d 129 (1989). Evidence of the syndrome is admissible as relevant to the defense of justification and here "[t]he trial court gave a full and fair charge on [Mrs. Smith's] justification defense, thus there was no error." Chapman v. State, supra at 708(4), 386 S.E.2d 129.
3. Citing Head v. State, 262 Ga. 795, 798(5), 426 S.E.2d 547 (1993) and Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865(2), 414 S.E.2d 463 (1992), Mrs. Smith enumerates as error the trial court's charge on manslaughter as a lesser included offense.
Neither Head nor Edge have any applicability here, since Mrs. Smith was tried for and found guilty of malice, rather than felony, murder. McGill v. State, 263 Ga. 81, 82(3), 428 S.E.2d 341 (1993). No written requests to charge on manslaughter as a lesser included offense were submitted and, even if such requests had been made, a review of the charge as given shows that there was no error. See generally Mullis v. State 248 Ga. 338, 340(7), 282 S.E.2d 334 (1981); White v. State, 242 Ga. 21, 22(6), 247 S.E.2d 759 (1978).
4. The testimony of an eyewitness, as well as Mrs. Smith's own post-arrest statement, would authorize a finding that she fatally shot her husband under such circumstances as would constitute malice murder. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof of her guilt of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
5. Mrs. Smith urges that "the evidence was sufficiently close to warrant a retrial."
An appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence, not its weight. The trial court found that the verdict of Mrs. Smith's guilt of malice murder was not against the weight of the evidence and, as discussed in Division 4, the evidence was sufficient to authorize that verdict. Accordingly,...
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