Smith v. State
| Decision Date | 19 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. S-07-0160.,S-07-0160. |
| Citation | 2008 WY 98,190 P.3d 522 |
| Parties | Aaron Eugene SMITH, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellee: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Smith.
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.
[¶ 1] Aaron Eugene Smith was convicted after a jury trial of possession, manufacture or disposition of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent, use of a firearm while committing a felony and first degree murder. The district court denied his motion for a new trial in which he asserted that a juror was biased against his defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness and did not honestly answer questions about that bias during voir dire. He appeals from the district court's denial of his motion. Finding no error, we affirm.
[¶ 2] Mr. Smith presents the following issue on appeal:
By express admission, Juror Hanschen had an actual bias at the time of trial against the defendant's mental illness defense. Because he failed to disclose this bias during voir dire, Mr. Smith is entitled to a new trial before 12 impartial jurors. The district court's conclusion that Juror Hanschen was not biased at the time of trial should be reversed for clear error.
The State articulates two issues:
I. Did the trial court have authority to hear appellant's motion for new trial under Wyo.R.Cr.P. 33(b)?
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it determined that Juror Hanschen was not biased at the time of Appellant's trial?
[¶ 3] On August 4, 2005, Mr. Smith shot and killed Henry McCone in Laramie, Wyoming. The State charged him with possession, manufacture or disposition of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103 (LexisNexis 2007); use of a firearm while committing a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-101 (LexisNexis 2007); and first degree murder, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 (LexisNexis 2005). Mr. Smith pleaded not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency to all counts. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305 (LexisNexis 2007).
[¶ 4] The district court convened a jury trial. During voir dire, the defense made it clear that Mr. Smith was not contesting the fact that he had killed Mr. McCone; instead, his entire defense was that he was not legally responsible for the crimes because he was mentally ill when he committed them. Not surprisingly, defense counsel's questions during jury selection focused on the venire's opinions about, and contact with, mental illness. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Smith guilty of all three counts and the district court sentenced him to serve the remainder of his life in prison without the possibility of parole.
[¶ 5] Shortly after he was sentenced, an article was published in the Wyoming State Bar magazine, the Wyoming Lawyer. It was written by Mary Angell and titled "A Juror's Oath, A Juror's Responsibility." The article examined juror experiences in Wyoming trials. In researching her article, Ms. Angell interviewed people who had served on Wyoming juries. One of the people she interviewed was Juror Michael Hanschen, who served on Mr. Smith's jury. In the resulting article Ms. Angell described her discussion with Juror Hanschen as follows:
Because the defense in Smith's trial planned to argue he was not guilty by reason of mental illness, jurors in the pool were asked whether they had any relatives with a mental illness. One juror, Michael Hanschen, indicated that his brother, now deceased, was paranoid schizophrenic. Asked if he thought that would impair his ability to be objective, Hanschen said he thought it would likely make him more sensitive to Smith's condition. More pertinent to the case, however, was his fierce opposition to the use of the insanity plea, which was not revealed.
said Hanschen.
"At that point, I actually wanted to be on the jury," he said.
[¶ 6] Mr. Smith filed a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence of Mr. Hanschen's bias as revealed in the article. The district court held a hearing and denied Mr. Smith's new trial motion.1
[¶ 7] Initially, we must consider the State's argument that Mr. Smith's allegation of juror misconduct was not properly raised in a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 governs new trial motions and states in relevant part:
(a) In General. — The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice.
(b) Any Grounds Except Newly Discovered Evidence. — A motion for a new trial based on any grounds, except newly discovered evidence, shall be made within 15 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during the 15 day period; but the time for filing of motion may not be extended to a day more than 30 days from the date the verdict or finding of guilty is returned.
(c) Newly Discovered Evidence. — A motion for a new trial based on the grounds of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after final judgment but if an appeal is pending, the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case.
Mr. Smith presented his motion pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 33(c), the newly discovered evidence provision, presumably because the time limit under Rule 33(b) had expired when he filed his motion.
[¶ 8] The State argues that only newly discovered evidence concerning the merits of the criminal case may be presented under Rule 33(c). It claims that Mr. Smith's complaint about juror misconduct should have been brought in a petition for post-conviction relief, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101, et. seq. (LexisNexis 2007).
[¶ 9] First, we note that, although typically the newly discovered evidence will pertain to the merits of the case, Rule 33(c) does not state that it only applies to such evidence. Thus, the plain language of the rule does not prohibit use of subsection (c) for claims of juror misconduct. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)2 is similar to Wyo.R.Cr.P. 33(c). As we have recognized in the past, when a federal rule of criminal procedure is similar to our corresponding rule, we look to federal case law for guidance in interpreting our rule. Hoos v. State, 2003 WY 101, ¶ 10, 75 P.3d 609, 611 (Wyo.2003).
[¶ 10] There are numerous federal court cases interpreting Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b)(1) as allowing a motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence for assertions of juror misconduct. Many of the cases assume, without discussion, that such a complaint may be brought pursuant to Fed. R.Crim.P. 33(b)(1), provided the evidence is truly "newly discovered." See, e.g., United States v. McKinney, 952 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bolinger, 837 F.2d 436 (11th Cir.1988) (per curiam); United States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dean, 667 F.2d 729, 732-34 (8th Cir.1982) (en banc); United States v. Desir, 273 F.3d 39 (1st Cir.2001). Our own Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals allows a party to file a motion for a new trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b)(1), alleging that a juror lied during voir dire. United States v. Apperson, Nos. 04-3375, 04-3376, 153 Fed. Appx. 507, 2005 WL 2982282 (10th Cir. Nov.8, 2005) (unpublished).
[¶ 11] The district court relied on United States v. Wander, 465 F.Supp. 1013 (D.C.Pa. 1979), in concluding that an allegation of juror bias may be brought under the newly discovered evidence provision of Rule 33. That case specifically addressed whether only newly discovered evidence on the merits of the case was relevant under the rule. The court held:
We further considered that "newly discovered evidence" which will support a new trial motion is not limited to evidence going to the merits of the case. It has been held "[s]imilar motions founded upon newly discovered evidence affecting the integrity of the jury's verdict have been treated as based upon newly discovered evidence within the meaning of the procedural rule ([i].e., Rule 33)".... Of course, the evidence tendered as "newly discovered" must have, in fact, been found after the close of the trial, and there is an obligation to bring such matters diligently before the trial court.
Id. at 1020-21 (some citations omitted). See also, United States v. Ramos, 481 F.Supp.2d 717 (W.D.Tex.2006).
[¶ 12] The State points to cases from Maine and Vermont for authority that we should refuse to allow a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence for allegations of juror bias. See, State v. Sheppard, 155 Vt. 73, 582 A.2d 116 (1990); State v. Gatcomb, 478 A.2d 1129 (Me.1984). The legal rationale provided in those decisions is sparse. The Maine Supreme Court simply stated:
We decline to adopt ... an expansive definition of "newly discovered evidence." Although we are aware other courts have taken a different view, it has always been our position that the kind of evidence contemplated by the rule is solely that which bears on the guilt or innocence of the accused.
[¶ 13] In deciding this issue, it is helpful to consider Braley v....
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