Smith v. State, 60463

• Decision Date: 15 October 1980
• Docket Number: No. 60463,60463
• Citation: 273 S.E.2d 918,156 Ga.App. 102
• Parties: SMITH v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 918

273 S.E.2d 918

156 Ga.App. 102

SMITH v. The STATE.

No. 60463.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Submitted Sept. 8, 1980.

Decided Oct. 15, 1980.

Thomas M. Finn, Dalton, for appellant.

Stephen A. Williams, Dist. Atty., for appellee.

DEEN, Chief Judge.

Shirley Smith was indicted and convicted for possession of phencyclidine (PCP), a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. Briefly, the evidence reveals that pursuant to search warrant a trailer rented to the defendant's husband was searched. The defendant and one Phillips, a friend who had been staying with the Smiths for two or three weeks while job hunting, were present, along with the Smiths' two young children. Smith himself was absent. The trailer had a living room containing a couch where Phillips slept, three bedrooms and one bathroom. The drug was found in the bathroom in the pocket of a bathrobe hanging in plain view. The defendant claimed ownership of the bathrobe but denied knowing anything about the drug. The adults were arrested under the mistaken impression that Phillips was Smith; when his identity was discovered he was released. Two days later he stated that he had purchased the drug for his own use and had placed it in the pocket of the robe while using the bathroom, without the defendant's knowledge, intending to recover it later. He also testified to this effect on the trial of the case. The defendant was convicted and her motion for new trial denied.

1. The first four enumerations of error are considered together. In the first place, it is obvious that while the testimony of the peace officers that they found the glassine bag with the drug tablets in a pocket of a bathrobe hanging in the bathroom is direct evidence of the location of the pellets, it is only indirect evidence that the defendant possessed the pills. Since this is the only evidence in the record upon which the defendant might be convicted, it must, to be sufficient "not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis." Code § 38-109. Smith was not present at the time of the search and there is no contention by the state that he possessed the drug, so as to invoke the rule that the husband is the head of the household and presumed to possess any contraband found therein. Cf. King v. State, 145 Ga.App. 789(2), 245 S.E.2d 310 (1978). This leaves the equal access rule where, as here, two persons not husband and wife share the use of the same room. Even the presumption that contraband belongs to the head of the house "is not sufficient to support a verdict of guilty, where the occupancy of the premises is maintained by him and his family jointly with others," and this is true although there are unexplained and suspicious circumstances aliunde. Russell v. State, 132 Ga.App. 35(1), 207 S.E.2d 619 (1974), and see Judge, now Justice Marshall's concurrence in Greeson v. State, 138 Ga.App. 572, 575, 226 S.E.2d 769 (1976). As was held in Moreland v. State, 133 Ga.App. 723, 212 S.E.2d 866 (1975), following Gee v. State, 121 Ga.App. 41, 172 S.E.2d 480 (1970), constructive knowledge that drugs are located on one's premises predicated only upon the discovery of the drugs in that location, cannot be assumed where others than the head of the house live on the same premises. Further, in Moreland the sister of one of the defendants testified positively that the drugs were hers and were on the premises without the knowledge of the Morelands, and such evidence, unimpeached and unrebutted, makes it affirmatively appear that this witness had equal opportunity to commit the crime. Id., 133 Ga.App. p. 725, 212 S.E.2d 866. To the same effect see McCann v. State, 137 Ga.App. 445, 224 S.E.2d 99 (1976); Braden v. State, 135 Ga.App. 827(1), 219 S.E.2d 479 (1975). The distinction is drawn in Wright v. State, 154 Ga.App. 400, 268 S.E.2d 378 (1980), where drugs found in a child's room were equally available to those living in the home, while those in Robert Wright's bedroom, occupied solely by himself, would be presumed to belong to him.

Phillips' testimony is within this category. The trial court erred first in denying the defendant's request to charge the equal access theory and secondly in denying the motion for new trial based on the physical evidence. Nothing to the contrary is held in Tuggle v. State, 149 Ga.App. 634(7), 255 S.E.2d 104 (1979) where the drugs were found in a chest of drawers in the bedroom which was under the sole control of the defendant. (In Tuggle the defendant's mother attempted to claim the drug as one having been prescribed for her by her physician, but she offered no explanation of why, if this were so, they were in the defendant's bedroom drawer and why they were in a matchbox instead of a prescription bottle, circumstances which in themselves rebutted the testimony and created a jury issue.) These grounds show reversible error.

2. Enumerations 8, 9 and 10 are considered together. A search warrant may be issued only to allow a search and seizure of evidence authorized by statute or by the common law. Ellenburg v. State, 113 Ga.App. 585, 149 S.E.2d 173 (1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 973, 87 S.Ct. 512, 17 L.Ed.2d 436. Property seized under a valid warrant is admissible in evidence without further testimony. McCrary v. State, 229 Ga. 733(4), 194 S.E.2d 480 (1972). If the defendant wishes to contest the legality of the obtention of such evidence he may file a motion to suppress which must be heard by the trial judge outside the presence of the jury. Code § 27-313(b); Cook v. State, 141 Ga.App. 241, 242, 233 S.E.2d 60 (1977). It follows from the above that if the search warrant is valid, that is, either it is not contested, or a motion to suppress heard outside the presence of the jury has been properly denied, then the evidence is admissible without further reference to the facts contained in the original affidavit, application for, or warrant granting the right to search described premises. If this were not so there would not be a specific statutory provision for exclusion of the jury from the presentation of evidence relating to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the search. Two reasons stand out as supporting this elementary principle: The statements contained in the application for warrant are frequently hearsay and have no probative value as to the case on trial, and since they relate to facts occurring prior to the state's securing the evidence offered on the trial in most cases they relate to prior criminal activity not admissible on the trial of the case. Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952).

The search under which the phencyclidine tablets were obtained was conducted without contest under a valid warrant. There was no objection to their admission in evidence. Nevertheless, the state's attorney almost immediately asked its first witness what led him to take out the search warrant, and he replied, "I had received information from a confidential informant who stated that within the last 72 hours my informant had been at the residence and purchased a quantity of phencyclidine." On objection the court ruled that the...