Smith v. State of Fla.

• Decision Date: 15 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. SC09-555,SC09-1249.,SC09-555
• Citation: 45 So.3d 444
• Parties: Dolan DARLING a/k/a Sean Smith, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Dolan Darling a/k/a Sean Smith, Petitioner, v. Walter A. McNeil, etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

45 So.3d 444

Dolan DARLING a/k/a Sean Smith, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Dolan Darling a/k/a Sean Smith, Petitioner,

v.Walter A. McNeil, etc., Respondent.

Nos. SC09-555, SC09-1249.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 15, 2010.

Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Mark S. Gruber and Maria Perinetti, Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Barbara C. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying the successive postconviction motion of Dolan Darling (a/k/a Sean Smith) filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Through this motion, Darling challenges the constitutionality of lethal injection as administered in Florida and the constitutionality of sections 945.10 and 27.702, Florida Statutes (2007). Darling also requests this Court to recede from those portions of our prior decisions that have interpreted chapter 27, Florida Statutes, and held that Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCRC) attorneys cannot assist capital defendants in challenging the State's intended method of execution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). We reject each of Darling's claims and affirm the circuit court's denial of the successive postconviction motion. However, based upon recent developments with regard to the litigation of challenges to methods of execution we agree with Darling as to statutory construction and hold that CCRC attorneys are permitted to file section 1983 claims on behalf of capital defendants if, and only if, they are challenging and seek to enjoin an integral part of the judgment and sentence, the State's intended method of execution.

Background

Dolan Darling is an inmate under sentence of death. As of June 2010, the Governor has not signed a death warrant for Darling. Through our prior opinions addressing Darling's direct and postconviction appeals, we have detailed the facts and procedural background surrounding the offense. See Darling v. State, 808 So.2d 145 (Fla.2002) (“ Darling I ”); Darling v. State, 966 So.2d 366 (Fla.2007) (“ Darling II ”).

Most recently, in November 2007, Darling filed a successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, which he claims is based on “newly discovered evidence.” In this motion, Darling (1) assails the constitutionality of lethal injection as currently administered in Florida; (2) asserts that section 27.702, Florida Statutes (2007), as interpreted by this Court, is unconstitutional facially and as applied because it prohibits CCRC from filing lethal-injection challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) claims that section 945.10, Florida Statutes (2007), as interpreted by this Court, is unconstitutional because it prohibits him from discovering the identities of his executioners, which precludes him from determining the adequacy of their qualifications and training; and (4) alleges that the American Bar Association's (ABA) report entitled, “Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in the State Death Penalty Systems: The Florida Death Penalty Assessment,” reveals that Florida's death-penalty system is seriously flawed and unconstitutional. ¹

In February 2008, the trial court issued an order holding Darling's successive motion in abeyance pending issuance of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008). In June 2008, following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Baze, the trial court lifted its stay holding the case in abeyance and granted the State's motion for rehearing. In his amended rule 3.851 successive motion to vacate sentence filed in February 2009, Darling reexamined three of the four claims raised in his initial motion in light of Baze, but chose to abandon the ABA report claim. The trial court denied Darling's amended motion to vacate sentence, and Darling subsequently appealed that decision to this Court. In June 2009, Darling filed a petition to invoke our all writs jurisdiction, challenging this Court's interpretation of section 27.702, Florida Statutes (2007).

Constitutionality of Lethal Injection as Administered in Florida

In Ventura v. State, 2 So.3d 194 (Fla.2009), this Court articulated the appropriate standard of review for a successive postconviction motion:

Rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) permits the denial of a successive postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.” A postconviction court's decision regarding whether to grant a rule 3.851 evidentiary hearing depends upon the written materials before the court; thus, for all practical purposes, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law and is subject to de novo review. See, e.g., Rose v. State, 985 So.2d 500, 505 (Fla.2008). In reviewing a trial court's summary denial of postconviction relief, we must accept the defendant's allegations as true to the extent that they are not conclusively refuted by the record. See Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla.2000). The Court will uphold the summary denial of a newly-discovered-evidence claim if the motion is legally insufficient or its allegations are conclusively refuted by the record. See McLin v. State, 827 So.2d 948, 954 (Fla.2002).

Id. at 197-98.

In his postconviction motion and brief, Darling has simply re-alleged the criticisms of Florida's revised protocol that have been presented in previous postconviction motions filed by the CCRC. This Court has repeatedly rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to Florida's August 2007 lethal-injection protocol. See, e.g., Marek v. State, 8 So.3d 1123, 1130 (Fla.), cert denied, --- U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 40, 174 L.Ed.2d 625 (2009); Ventura, 2 So.3d at 202; Sexton v. State, 997 So.2d 1073, 1089 (Fla.2008); Schwab v. State, 995 So.2d 922, 933 (Fla.2008); Tompkins v. State, 994 So.2d 1072, 1081 (Fla.2008) (concluding that the Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So.2d 326 (Fla.2007), decision is further supported by the performance of the Schwab and Henyard ² executions “with no subsequent allegations of any newly discovered problems with Florida's lethal injection process”); Power v. State, 992 So.2d 218, 221 (Fla.2008); Woodel v. State, 985 So.2d 524, 533-34 (Fla.2008); Lebron v. State, 982 So.2d 649, 666 (Fla.2008); Lightbourne, 969 So.2d at 350-53; Schwab v. State, 969 So.2d 318, 325 (Fla.2007) (“Given the record in Lightbourne and our extensive analysis in our opinion in Lightbourne v. McCollum, we reject the conclusion that lethal injection as applied in Florida is unconstitutional.”).

Further, Darling's contention that this Court's recent lethal-injection decisions, including Lightbourne, have not applied the standard articulated by the Baze plurality was considered and rejected by this Court in Ventura. See Ventura, 2 So.3d at 198-201. Although Darling claims that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Baze warrants a reassessment of Florida's lethal injection protocol, this Court has made it abundantly clear that “[n]othing contained within the various opinions of Baze v. Rees affects the validity of our decisions upholding Florida's current lethal-injection protocol.” Id. at 202.

This Court has previously considered and rejected each of Darling's constitutional challenges to Florida's lethal-injection protocol. We decline to recede from our prior precedent.

Constitutionality of Section 945.10

Darling's constitutional challenge against section 945.10, Florida Statutes (2007), which prevents a defendant sentenced to death from discovering the identities of his or her executioners, is procedurally barred because of his failure to assert it in prior postconviction proceedings. Moreover, this Court has consistently rejected similar claims on the merits. See Ventura, 2 So.3d at 197 n. 3 (“This Court has already addressed and rejected similar claims with regard to sections 27.702 and 945.10, Florida Statutes (2007).”); Henyard, 992 So.2d at 130 (“[Appellant] alleges section 945.10, Florida Statutes, which exempts the disclosure of the identity of an executioner from public records, is unconstitutional. We previously found section 945.10 facially constitutional and decline to recede from our decision now.” (citing Bryan v. State, 753 So.2d 1244, 1250 (Fla.2000); Provenzano v. State, 761 So.2d 1097 (Fla.2000))).

Furthermore, even if the Court were willing to recede from this precedent, as of this date the Governor has not signed a death warrant for Darling; thus, even if ordered to do so, the Department of Corrections could not state with any certainty who Darling's eventual executioners will be. Cf. Lightbourne, 969 So.2d at 343 (“This Court previously stated that there is a presumption that the members of the executive branch will properly perform their duties in carrying out an execution.” (quoting Provenzano v. State, 761 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla.2000) (brackets omitted))).

Darling simply requests that we recede from prior precedent so that he may engage in an in-depth review of his executioners' qualifications and training. We refuse to do so.

Method of Execution Challenges Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Through his postconviction motion and all-writs petition, Darling makes numerous challenges to our prior decisions that preclude CCRC attorneys from pursuing section 1983 claims that challenge the State's intended method of execution, which, contrary to the view of the dissent, is an integral part of the judgment and sentence. We begin our analysis with an overview of the comprehensive state and federal statutory schemes governing the representation of capital defendants.

Section 27.702, Florida Statutes provides:

(1) The capital collateral regional counsel shall represent each person convicted and sentenced to death in...