Smith v. University of Mississippi, 2000-CA-00281-SCT.

• Decision Date: 10 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2000-CA-00281-SCT.,2000-CA-00281-SCT.
• Citation: 797 So.2d 956
• Parties: M. Kent SMITH v. The UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI by and through the Board of Trustees for State Institutions of Higher Learning.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

797 So.2d 956

M. Kent SMITH v. The UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI by and through the Board of Trustees for State Institutions of Higher Learning.

No. 2000-CA-00281-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 10, 2001.

Michael Lee Knapp, Jackson, Attorney for Appellant.

Mary Ann Connell, L. Lee Tyner, Jr., University, Attorneys for Appellees.

Before PITTMAN, C.J., COBB and DIAZ, JJ.

PITTMAN, Chief Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Lafayette County, Mississippi, the Honorable R. Kenneth Coleman presiding. M. Kent Smith filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Lafayette County seeking reinstatement to his position as Head Engineer at the University, and in the alternative, money damages. In response, the University filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment Based on Res Judicata. The chancery court never ruled upon the University's motion, but, on its own motion transferred the case to the Circuit Court of Lafayette County. The circuit court conducted a telephonic hearing on the University's motion. Following oral argument, the circuit court granted the University's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment based on Res Judicata. The present appeal followed.

FACTS

¶ 2. M. Kent Smith ("Smith") was formerly a Head Engineer at the University of Mississippi's Teleproduction Resource Center. In September of 1997, Smith's immediate supervisor, Dr. Edwin E. Meek, Assistant Vice Chancellor for Public Relations and Marketing at the University, notified Smith that he had decided to terminate Smith's employment. The reasons for Smith's termination are not relevant to resolve the issues presented by Smith's appeal. However, the record reflects that Dr. Meek decided to terminate Smith's employment because of excessive absenteeism and because of Smith's failure to timely perform the tasks required for his particular job title, among other reasons.

¶ 3. The appellate procedure for the review of employment termination decisions was published in the University's Handbook for Faculty and Staff. Utilizing the handbook procedure, Smith appealed Dr. Meek's termination decision to Dr. Andrew Mullins, the Executive Assistant to the Chancellor. After meeting with Smith and considering his appeal, Dr. Mullins affirmed the decision to terminate. Smith then appealed the termination decision to the University's Personnel Action Review Board ("PARB") for a full administrative hearing.

¶ 4. On November 5, 1997, the PARB conducted a hearing on Dr. Meek's termination decision and Smith's request for reinstatement. The PARB is a quasi-judicial administrative panel that has the authority to review and overturn staff employment decisions. At Smith's hearing, the PARB panel included Rex Deloach, Interim Vice Chancellor for Administration and Finance, Bonnie Brown, representing the Staff Council, and D. Russell Cooper, an employee-at-large. Gene Hartley, Director of Human Resources, served as the presiding officer at the hearing, but did not vote as a member of the PARB.

¶ 5. At the hearing, Smith appeared before the PARB on his own behalf. Smith's attorney, John Luckett, also attended the hearing to counsel Smith. Smith's counsel was not allowed to speak or present evidence at the hearing, but he was allowed to advise Smith concerning Smith's presentation and the hearing process itself.

¶ 6. On November 12, 1997, the PARB issued its decision denying Smith's appeal and affirming the termination of his employment. Approximately eighteen months later, Smith filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Lafayette County seeking reinstatement to his position as Head Engineer and in the alternative, money damages. In his complaint, Smith alleged that Dr. Meek's decision to terminate him was without just cause and that the University's appeal process was constitutionally insufficient.

¶ 7. The University moved to dismiss because Smith had not appealed the University's termination decision to the circuit court by writ of certiorari, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-51-93 & -95 (1972 & Supp.2000). The University argued that appeal to the circuit court by writ of certiorari was the only way for Smith to seek judicial review of the PARB's termination decision. The University also argued that because Smith did not properly appeal, the PARB's decision was final so that Smith's claims were barred by res judicata. ¶ 8. Without ruling on the University's motion, the chancery court transferred the case to the Circuit Court of Lafayette County. The circuit court conducted a telephonic hearing on the University's motion on January 18, 2000. Following oral argument, the circuit court granted the University's motion and dismissed Smith's claims. Smith subsequently filed the present appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO APPELLEE BECAUSE OF APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO SEEK A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

A. Whether the statutory method for seeking review is University employment decisions is the exclusive remedy.

¶ 9. The statutory method for seeking review of University employment decisions is by writ of certiorari. The two statutes applicable to the University's employment decision are Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-51-93 & -95 (1972 & Supp.2000). Section 11-51-93 provides in pertinent part:

All cases decided by a justice of the peace, whether exercising general or special jurisdiction, may, within six months thereafter, on good cause shown by petition, supported by affidavit, be removed to the circuit court of the county, by writ of certiorari, which shall operate as a supersedeas, the party, in all cases, giving bond, with security, to be approved by the judge or clerk of the circuit court, as in cases of appeal from justices of the peace; and in any cause so removed by certiorari, the court shall be confined to the examination of questions of law arising or appearing on the face of the record and proceedings.... Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-93 (1972). Further, § 11-51-95 provides that "[l]ike proceedings as provided in section § 11-51-93 may be had to review the judgments of all tribunals inferior to the circuit court, whether an appeal be provided by law from the judgment sought to be reviewed or not." In Hall v. Board of Trs. of State Insts. of Higher Learning, 712 So.2d 312 (Miss.1998), this Court held that hearing panels at state universities are such "tribunals inferior," whose employment decisions may be reviewed by writ of certiorari pursuant to § 11-51-95.

¶ 10. In reviewing an administrative agency's findings of fact, the circuit court and this Court afford great deference to an administrative agency's construction of its own rules and regulations and the statutes under which it operates. Board of Supervisors v. Waste Mgmt. of Miss., Inc., 759 So.2d 397, 400 (Miss.2000) (citing McDerment v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm'n, 748 So.2d 114, 118 (Miss. 1999)). When appeal is taken to the circuit court through writ of certiorari, § 11-51-93 provides that "[t]he court shall be confined to the examination of questions of law arising or appearing on the face of the record and proceedings...." Smith argues that because of the "inadequate record" before the Personnel Action Review Board, his sole meaningful remedy was to seek de novo review by filing an original lawsuit. Smith's claim raises the issue of whether the statutory appeal method is the exclusive method for seeking relief.

¶ 11. In analyzing whether the statutory appeal method was Smith's exclusive remedy, the University points out that judicial deference to administrative decision-making is firmly rooted in this State's constitutional jurisprudence. The State's public universities are considered a part of the executive branch of State government. Van Slyke v. Board of Trs. of State Insts. of Higher Learning, 613 So.2d 872, 879 (Miss.1983). State universities, like other executive branch agencies, have adopted appellate procedures for employees who wish to contest an adverse employment decision and have formed administrative, quasi-judicial tribunals to hear and rule upon employee appeals. The University's Personnel Action Review Board is one such tribunal.

¶ 12. This Court has repeatedly recognized the availability of the writ of certiorari under § 11-51-95 for the review of decisions of inferior state administrative tribunals. In Hall, this Court held that hearing panels at state universities are such "tribunals inferior," whose employment decisions may be reviewed by writ of certiorari pursuant to § 11-51-95. Hall, 712 So.2d at 324. Hall also held that:

Where a decision of an administrative agency is appealed to the circuit court pursuant to a writ of certiorari as provided by Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-93, the circuit court's review of the decision of state agencies is to "be confined to the examination of questions of law arising or appearing on the face of the record and proceedings."

Hall, 712 So.2d at 324 (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-93 (1972)). Moreover, Smith contests neither the wording nor the applicability of § 11-51-95. Smith argues, rather, that his case warrants an exception to the statutory method because his procedural due process rights were violated.

¶ 13. Smith argues that he is entitled to bring an independent suit and seek de novo review of the University's employment decision for two reasons. First, Smith argues that since this Court allowed a former University of Mississippi football coach trial de novo in Board of Trs. of State Insts. of Higher Learning v. Brewer, 732 So.2d 934 (Miss.1999), that he also is entitled a trial de novo. Second, Smith argues that the PARB hearing was constitutionally infirm and that, to address the hearing's constitutional flaw, the Court must consider matters outside the record before the PARB. Smith claims that if his sole remedy is by writ of certiorari, and if the reviewing court is confined...