Van Slyke v. Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning

• Decision Date: 11 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. 89-CA-0007,89-CA-0007
• Citation: 613 So.2d 872
• Parties: 81 Ed. Law Rep. 382 J.B. VAN SLYKE, Jr. v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF STATE INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING, Charles C. Jacobs, Jr., President, Denton Rogers, Jr., Vice-President, William H. Austin, Jr., Thomas D. Bourdeaux, Frank O. Crosthwait, Jr., Martha H. Gill, Bryce Griffis, Will A. Hickman, William J. Jones, John R. Lovelace, M.D., Sidney L. Rushing, George T. Watson, and Betty A. Williams, its Members.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 872

613 So.2d 872

81 Ed. Law Rep. 382

J.B. VAN SLYKE, Jr. v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF STATE INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING Charles C. Jacobs, Jr., President, Denton Rogers, Jr. Vice-President, William H. Austin, Jr., Thomas D. Bourdeaux Frank O. Crosthwait, Jr., Martha H. Gill, Bryce Griffis Will A. Hickman, William J. Jones, John R. Lovelace, M.D., Sidney L. Rushing, George T. Watson, and Betty A. Williams, its Members.

No. 89-CA-0007.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 11, 1993.

J.B. Van Slyke, Jr., Hattiesburg, pro se.

Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Gail W. Lowery, Asst. Atty. Gen., Mitzi E. Dease, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before HAWKINS, P.J., and McRAE and ROBERTS, JJ.

McRAE, Justice, for the Court:

This appeal arises from a November 30, 1988, order of the Chancery Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County granting the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning's motion for summary judgment, following our ruling on interlocutory appeal, Board of Trustees v. Van Slyke, 510 So.2d 490 (Miss.1987). While the Chancellor erred in finding that Van Slyke did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Board of Trustees and its makeup, he properly considered the merits of Van Slyke's arguments in granting the motion for summary judgment. There being no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we affirm his finding that the Board of Trustees, as presently composed and operating, is constitutional.

I.

This chapter in the protracted legal battle between former State Representative J.B. Van Slyke, Jr. and the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning (hereinafter "Board of Trustees") began on August 9, 1984, when Van Slyke wrote to Board Director, Dr. E.E. Thrash, seeking access to certain Board records pursuant to the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983, Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 25-61-1, et seq. He specifically sought access to those documents pertaining to the discipline of computer science at it applied to the University of Southern Mississippi. Apparently, the Board of Trustees was considering the removal or reassignment of leadership roles and doctoral programs in computer science and other disciplines from the University of Southern Mississippi to another institution.

Thrash responded in writing on August 16, 1984, advising Van Slyke that certain of the requested documents were consultants' reports which had been made in confidence and thus were not available for release. He was, however, willing to provide Van Slyke with copies of the non-confidential documents.

Van Slyke again wrote to Thrash on August 20, 1984. This time, he requested copies of all records pertaining to all leadership roles of the three major universities. He advised Thrash to make any denial of access in writing so as to establish the jurisdictional requirements for legal action to obtain the documents. Thrash denied the request on August 23, 1984, stating that certain of the requested documents were confidential and exempt from the provisions of the Open Records Act and the Open Meetings Act.

Van Slyke promptly filed suit against the Board of Trustees in the Chancery Court of Hinds County on August 30, 1984, to obtain the documents he sought. Both parties concede that the issues of that case were resolved by this Court's decision in Mississippi Publishers Corp. v. Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning, 478 So.2d 269 (Miss.1985). Apparently, the Board of Trustees ultimately relinquished the documents Van Slyke had requested.

Van Slyke filed a second suit against the Board of Trustees and its members in the Chancery Court of Forrest County on October 29, 1984. He sought to enjoin the Board of Trustees from removing or reassigning any leadership roles until decisions were rendered on constitutional issues now before this Court, as well as on the suit he had brought in Hinds County. He further averred that he had been denied access to documents pertaining to the removal of two leadership roles from the University of Southern Mississippi.

The Board of Trustees filed motions to dismiss the second suit and for a change of venue to Hinds County. Both motions were overruled by the Forrest County Chancery Court on December 10, 1984. The Chancellor further denied the Board of Trustees' motion to stay further proceedings on December 18, 1984 and set a hearing on the injunctive relief requested by Van Slyke for January 3, 1985. The Board of Trustees then filed a Petition for a Grant of Interlocutory Appeal with Supersedeas with this Court. It was granted on January 2, 1985, and proceedings in the lower court were stayed pending the decision of the issue on appeal.

On December 17, 1986, we issued a written opinion finding that Van Slyke had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Board and that venue was properly fixed in the Forrest County Circuit Court. However, that opinion was withdrawn following the granting of the Board of Trustees' Petition for Rehearing. In Board of Trustees v. Van Slyke, 510 So.2d 490 (Miss.1987) (hereinafter, "Van Slyke I "), we remanded the case to the Hinds County Chancery Court for trial without actually making a determination of whether Van Slyke had standing to raise the constitutional challenge to the Board of Trustees' composition.

II.

We look first at the question of whether the Chancellor erred in finding that Van Slyke did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the composition of the Board of Trustees. In so holding, the Chancellor wrote as follows:

[T]here is nothing in the pleadings to show that he is sufficiently affected or adversely affected by any action of the Board of Trustees. He is not a student, he is not a faculty member nor is there any other relationship which appears to be sufficient to give him standing to bring his suit. He appears to be no more interested than any other private citizen in the State of Mississippi and therefore does not have a right to bring this suit. Birdsong v. Grubbs, 208 So.2d [Miss.] 123, 43 So.2d 878 (1950).

Van Slyke contends that the Board of Trustees' denial of his request for documents under the Open Records Act constitutes an injury. The Board of Trustees, however, asserts that Van Slyke has shown no injury resulting from the operation or enforcement of the challenged constitutional provisions.

While the majority in Van Slyke I did not address Van Slyke's standing to bring suit with regard to the open records act or the constitutionality of the composition of the Board of Trustees, but limited its opinion to the venue questions raised, Justice Prather, in her dissent, discussed the subject as it applied to both issues. As she noted:

[s]uccinctly phrased, standing to bring a lawsuit describes who may be heard by a judge. The law of standing is primarily concerned with determining the right of an individual to assert a claim for relief, calling into question the constitutionality and/or review of administrative or other government action.

510 So.2d at 495 (Prather, J., dissenting).

The federal courts, which adhere to a stringent definition of standing based on the United States Constitution, art. III, Sec. II, limit review to actual "cases and controversies." Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-403, 95 S.Ct. 553, 556-559, 42 L.Ed.2d 532, 539-543 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1215, 39 L.Ed.2d 505, 515, n. 10 (1974). The Mississippi Constitution, however, contains no such restrictive language. Therefore, we have been more permissive in granting standing to parties who seek review of governmental actions. Van Slyke I, 510 So.2d at 496. See also, Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So.2d 332, 338 (Miss.1987) (State Senators had standing to sue Lieutenant Governor on charges that their legislative power had been impinged by his actions; Attorney General did not have exclusive power to bring suit); Canton Farm Equipment, Inc. v. Richardson, 501 So.2d 1098, 1106-1107 (Miss.1987) (unsuccessful bidder for contract with County Board of Supervisors granted taxpayer standing to sue supervisor who did not comply with statutes in awarding bids, even though public not expressly invited to join the suit).

In suggesting that Van Slyke was a proper party to challenge the constitutionality of the composition of the Board of Trustees, it was observed in Van Slyke I that:

The argument persists that citizens should have the authority to challenge the constitutionality and/or review of governmental action, and if individuals do not have such authority, how else may constitutional conflicts be raised. This is particularly true when a public official charged with such a duty fails to act. Constitutional litigation by private citizens may be maintained in cases where there is no probability of the statute being challenged by one of the class discriminated against; or, when a decision on validity would not be necessary, one not within the class may question the validity of the statute. Miller v. Lamar Life Insurance Co., 158 Miss. 753, 131 So. 282 (1930).

Van Slyke I, 510 So.2d at 497 (Prather, J., dissenting).

While Van Slyke's original Open Records Act claim against the Board of Trustees is moot, this should not, under our liberal standing requirements, preclude him from challenging the constitutionality of the Board's composition. He ostensibly has brought this action as a private citizen rather than as a legislator. ¹ Accordingly, we hold that the Chancellor erred in finding that Van Slyke did not have standing to bring suit against the Board of Trustees on the constitutional questions.

III.

Finding that Van Slyke had standing to bring suit against the Board of Trustees, we turn next to the merits of the constitutional challenges he has raised. In so doing, we find two canons of constitutional construction to be particularly instructive. As we stated in Dye, provisions of the constitution should be read "so...