Smith v. Wells, D2194

• Decision Date: 03 May 1972
• Docket Number: No. 19410,S,No. 4,No. D2194,D2194,4,19410
• Citation: 188 S.E.2d 470,258 S.C. 316
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Annie S. SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of Ray E. Smith, Respondent-Appellant, v. James Robert WELLS and one 1964 Falcon, LicenseerialH 160153, Appellant-Respondent.

Page 470

188 S.E.2d 470

258 S.C. 316

Annie S. SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of Ray E Smith, Respondent-Appellant, v. James Robert WELLS and one 1964 Falcon, License No. D2194 Serial No. 4 H 160153, Appellant-Respondent.

No. 19410.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 3, 1972.

J. Kendall Few, of Burns, McConald, Bradford, Erwin & Few, Greenwood, for appellant-respondent.

Judson F. Ayers, Jr., of Watson & Ayers, Greenwood, for respondent-appellant.

LEWIS, Justice.

The sole question to be decided in this appeal is as follows: In an action brought for the benefit of the widow and children of a deceased, as statutory beneficiaries under the South Carolina Wrongful death statute, is evidence of the remarriage of the widow admissible?

Ray E. Smith was killed when the motorcycle he was riding collided with an automobile driven by the defendant. He left surviving him his widow, twenty-four years of age, and two infant daughters, ages two and five. This action was brought pursuant to the South Carolina wrongful death statute (Section 10--1951 et seq., 1962 Code of Laws) for the benefit of the surviving wife and children, and resulted in a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $22,500.00, actual damages.

During the trial of the case, defendant was permitted, over the objection of plaintiff, to elicit testimony from the wife of the deceased to the effect that she had remarried slightly less than six (6) months after the decedent's death. The trial judge had earlier in the trial refused to permit plaintiff to swear the widow, as a witness, under her name before she remarried. He did however exclude testimony as to the earnings of her second husband. In their arguments to the jury, both counsel discussed the effect that the remarriage should properly have upon any verdict rendered; but no specific instructions thereabout were given by the court to the jury.

Upon the return of the verdict, plaintiff moved for a new trial upon several grounds. Included was the ground that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence showing that the wife of the deceased had remarried. The motion for a new trial was granted upon the foregoing ground, without consideration of the others; and defendant has appealed. While plaintiff has preserved the additional grounds urged in the lower court for a new trial, we find it necessary to consider only the question of whether it was eror to admit testimony relative to the widow's remarriage.

Code Section 10--1954 provides that, in every action for wrongful death, 'the jury may give such damages, . . ., as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought.'

We have held that, in determining the damages recoverable under the wrongful death statute, the question is not one of the value of the human life lost, but is rather the damages sustained by the beneficiaries from the death. Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S.C. 127, 165 S.E.2d 640.

The beneficiaries are entitled to recover all damages, present and prospective, which are naturally the proximate consequence of the wrongful act, including: (1) pecuniary los, (2) mental shock and suffering, (3) wounded feelings, (4) grief and sorrow, (5) loss of companionship, and (6) deprivation of the use and comfort of the intestate's society, including the loss of his experience, knowledge, and judgment in managing the affairs of himself and of his beneficiaries. Mishoe v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co....