Smrz v. S. Carolina Dep't of Motor

• Decision Date: 25 May 2022
• Docket Number: 21-ALJ-21-0254-AP
• Parties: Ryan Patrick Smrz, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Motor, Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

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Ryan Patrick Smrz, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Motor, Respondent.

No. 21-ALJ-21-0254-AP

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

May 25, 2022

ORDER

SHIRLEY C. ROBINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) in its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to subsection l-23-660(B). S.C. Code Ann. §§ l-23-660(B) (Supp. 2021). Ryan Patrick Smrz (Appellant) seeks judicial review of a final decision rendered by the South Carolina Office of Motor Vehicle Hearings (OMVH) affirming the suspension of his motor vehicle license or driving privilege upon a habitual offender designation. Upon careful consideration of the Record on Appeal (Record), arguments advanced in the parties' briefs, and the applicable law the Court affirms the OMVH's Final Order and Decision.

BACKGROUND

By letter dated December 10, 2015, the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) advised Appellant of his standing under the habitual offender law. The letter stated he had accumulated two major offenses and no minor violations. It also contained a list of major and minor violations. The letter continued by stating if Appellant was convicted of any additional major or minor violations that would classify him as a habitual offender, his driving privileges would be suspended for five years. As discussed below, Appellant was thereafter charged with a third violation: reckless driving.

By letter dated November 2, 2018, the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) advised Appellant he had been declared a habitual offender for having accumulated three violations in a three-year period. By letter dated November 30, 2018, Appellant requested an administrative case hearing as to the Department's declaration that he was a habitual offender.^[1] On March 18, 2021, a hearing was held.^[2] Appellant did not contest the violations but moved to rescind the suspension. Appellant's counsel argued the Department's warning letter of December 15, 2015, listed reckless driving as both a minor and major violation which led Appellant to believe that a first offense of reckless driving would be considered a minor violation and a second offense of reckless driving would be considered a major violation. Appellant's counsel continued by arguing that because reckless driving was listed as both a minor and major violation on the letter, it was reasonable for Appellant to construe^[3] the warning letter to mean that his first offense of reckless driving was only a minor violation. Appellant maintains if this were the case, Appellant would only have two major violations and one minor violation within the prescribed three-year period and would not meet the criterion for Appellant to be declared a habitual offender. On June 17, 2021, the OMVH hearing officer issued a final order and decision rejecting Appellant's arguments and concluding the Department properly declared Appellant a habitual offender. On July 16, 2021, Appellant served his Notice of Appeal with this Court.

On August 13, 2021, the Record was filed. While neither party noticed, the Record evidenced multiple documents involving another individual with an OMVH case number different than the one in this case. On May 17, 2022, the Court issued an order for an Amended Record on Appeal. On May 18, 2022, an Amended Record on Appeal was filed.

On November 22, 2021, Appellant filed his brief. On December 10, 2021, the Department filed its brief. Both parties violated SCALC Rule 37(B)(2) and (3) by not providing a complete statement of the case or referencing the Record.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The OMVH is authorized by statute to determine contested cases including, inter alia implied consent proceedings. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2021). Therefore, the OMVH is an "agency" under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (Supp. 2021); S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Holtzclaw, 382 S.C. 344, 347, 675 S.E.2d 756, 758 (Ct. App. 2009) ("[t]he DMVH [subsequently renamed OMVH] is an agency under the [APA].").

Accordingly, the APA's standard of review governs appeals from its decisions. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-380 and l-23-600(D) (Supp. 2021); Gibson v. Florence Country Club, 282 S.C. 384, 386, 318 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1984). When acting in its appellate capacity, the Court's review is generally limited to the Record on Appeal. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(4) (Supp. 2021); see also SCALC Rule 36(G) ("The Administrative Law Judge will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record."). Additionally, subsection 1-23-380(5) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2021) provides the standard used by appellate bodies to review agency decisions. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(E) (Supp. 2021) (directing administrative law judges to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in section 1-23-380). Pursuant to this standard:

The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § l-23-380(5)(a)-(f).

The South Carolina Supreme Court has observed that "[substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla; rather, it is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the agency." Friends of the Earth v. Pub. Serv. Commission of S.C_L, 387 S.C. 360, 366, 692 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2010) (citation omitted). See also Bilton v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68 (Ct. App. 1984). A decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable minds may differ on the judgment. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm'n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995).

In applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995)). The party challenging an agency action has the burden of proving convincingly that the agency's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters, at 226, 467S.E.2dat917.

Nevertheless, this Court owes no particular deference to the fact finder when matters of law are at issue. See Flexon v. PHC-Jasper, Inc., 413 S.C. 561, 569, 776 S.E.2d 397, 402 (Ct. App. 2015) ("This court [Court of Appeals] reviews questions of law de novo.") (quoting Proctor v. Steedley, 398 S.C. 561, 573, 730 S.E.2d 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2012)). It is axiomatic that the ALC may reverse on errors of law. E.g., Olsen v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 379 S.C. 57, 63, 663 S.E.2d 497, 501 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding that an appellate court can reverse a lower court's decision "[i]f the findings are affected by error of law, are not supported by substantial evidence, or are characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."). If a decision is affected by an error of law, properly raised by a party, the Court will not hesitate to correct it. See also S.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Blue Moon of Newberry, 397 S.C. 256, 260, 725 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2012).

ISSUE

Whether the OMVH hearing officer properly sustained the Department's determination that Appellant is a habitual offender.

DISCUSSION

Section 56-1-1020 defines a "habitual offender" as:

[A]ny person whose record as maintained by the Department of Motor Vehicles shows that he has accumulated the conviction for separate and distinct offenses described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) committed during a three-year period provided, that where more than one included offense shall be committed within a one-day period such multiple offense shall be treated for the purposes of this article as one offense.

S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2018). While section 56-1-1020 does not specifically reference "major" and "minor" violations, subsection 56-1-1020(a) outlines those violations upon which three or more convictions lead a driver to be declared a habitual offender. Subsection 56-1-1020(b) sets forth those offenses which require ten or more convictions for a person to be deemed a habitual offender.

Subsection 56-1-1020(a) which outlines "major" violations specifically includes "Driving or operating a motor vehicle in a reckless manner" in subsection 56-l-1020(a)(3), and "Driving a motor vehicle while his license, permit, or privilege to drive a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked, except a conviction for driving under suspension for failure to file proof of financial responsibility" in subsection 56-1-1020(a)(4).

Subsection 56-1-1020(b) which sets forth "minor" violations...