Snay v. Lovely

Decision Date26 June 1931
Citation276 Mass. 159,176 N.E. 791
PartiesSNAY v. LOVELY et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Qua, Judge.

Suit by Grace M. Snay against Collis Lovely and others. Decree of dismissal, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

J. W. Tushins, of Boston, for appellant.

H. B. Ehrmann, of Boston, and J. W. Murdoch, of Brockton, for appellees.

RUGG, C. J.

[1] The plaintiff, on December 1, 1924, filed this suit in equity against certain defendants as representatives of the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, hereafter called the union, of which she was formerly a member, against other defendants as representatives of Stitchers' Local Union No. 154, a subsidiary of the union, and against still other defendants as representatives of Brockton Shoe Manufacturers' Association, these three groups being voluntary unincorporated associations. The case was referred to a master, whose findings of fact must be accepted as final, since the evidence was not reported. Those findings, so far as material to the grounds of this decision, are that the union is a widespread organization designed to organize into one union all shoe workers in North America. It is affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. It is mainly composed of local union, the government of which is vested in the union. To it all matters of general importance must be referred, and its decisions are final. The administrative power of the union, when no convention is in session, is vested in a general executive board consisting of three specified officers and eight members elected at large. Regular conventions of the union are to be held biennially, and one was held in 1925. In the constitution of the union are stringent provisions against participation by members in strikes unauthorized by the union, and these further terms: ‘Any member leaving his or her employment in any Union Stamp factory, in violation of the arbitration contract because of any grievance or in any attempt to redress any grievance, either upon the member's own motion or under instructions from any authority to which such member holds allegiance, shall be fined ten dollars ($10.00), and immediately and automatically suspended until such fine is paid.’ ‘All charges of whatever nature against any officer, member, union or council, must be presented in writing to the body before which the charge is made, and no defendant shall be found guilty without having upon written application a copy of the charges preferred and opportunity for defense.’ ‘Appeals against the decision of any officer, committee, board, union or council must be presented in writing to the next highest authority, and no appeals shall be considered unless the appellant conforms to the decision appealed from, pending decision on the appeal.’ The plaintiff was for many years employed as a shoe stitcher and was a member of the union. On March 14, 1923, she was discharged from her employment at the Eaton factory in Brockton because of lack of work, and was not employed again until August 8, 1923, when she went to work for a different employer. During this interval she was not in good health and did not seek employment. In May, 1923, shoe workers in Brockton engaged in a strike which did not have the consent of the union and was in fact an ‘outlaw’ strike against the union. A separate union of strikers was formed, but there was no evidence that the plaintiff was ever affiliated with it. Further findings of the master are these: ‘On June 11, 1923, the plaintiff was fined $10 and suspended from the union for going out on strike from the Eaton factory in Brockton, Mass. She was in good standing in the union at this time. No notice was given to her of charges made or of any hearing thereon, nor was she notified to this fine and suspension until she again went to work. This action was taken by the union officials as the result of an unverified report received by the union that she had gone on strike, coupled by an arrest for loitering. No investigation was made of these reports at this time. When notified of the action of the union, she appealed. A hearing was given on her appeal before a committee of the general executive board on September 23, 1923. On October 25, 1923, she was notified that her appeal was denied. The committee of the general executive board which heard her appeal received only evidence of the plaintiff and of her husband on the day of the hearing. This evidence was that the plaintiff did not go out on strike, and was then uncontradicted. In considering her case the committee decided that they would, in accordance with their custom in what they considered to be doubtful cases, refer the matter to an investigator, which they did. This investigator reported that he had consulted the person who was foreman of the Eaton factory at the time she left there; and that she went out on a strike. It was upon the strength of this report that the board denied the appeal. * * * As no strike existed at the time that her employment ceased at the Eaton factory, it is quite obvious that she did not go out on strike; and it is further obvious that a checking up by the investigator of the records of Eaton Company, which he did not trouble to do, would have disclosed that fact. The finding of the general executive board was clearly wrong and was based upon hearsay evidence given to them by an investigator who failed to make a complete investigation. A careful examination of this evidence by the board, or its committee, would have shown the justice of the appellant's (this plaintiff's) position. * * * In August, 1923, the plaintiff paid $4.25 to the union for the purpose of reinstatement and for dues, which said money was accepted by the union with her due book. The union refused or neglected to give her a new book, for the reason that this fine appeared against her upon their records.’ The plaintiff thereafter worked at several ‘union’ shops, but was forced to leave after a...

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    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • September 5, 1944
    ...constitution, by-laws and rules of a voluntary association or trade union constitute a contract. 63 C.J. 662 Sec. 11; Snav v. Lovely et al., 176 N.E. 791, 793 (Mass.); Polin v. Kaplan, 177 N.E. 833, 834 Damages recoverable for a breach of contract are those naturally flowing from the breach......
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    ... ... l. c. 904; Mulcahey v. Huddell (Mass.), 172 N.E ... 796, l. c. 797; Agrippino v. Perrotti (Mass.), 16 ... N.E. 793, l. c. 794; Snay v. Lovely (Mass.), 176 ... N.E. 791, l. c. 793; Crowden v. Dieu Nous Protege, etc., ... Assn. (La.), 146 So. 710, l. c. 711; State ex rel ... ...
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    ... ... Maloney ... v. United Mine Workers, 308 Pa. 251, 162 A. 225; Long v ... B. & O. R. Co., 141 A. 504; Snay v. Lovely, 176 ... N.E. 791; Mulcahy v. Huddle, 172 N.E. 796; West ... v. B. & O. R. Co., 137 S.E. 654; Crisler v ... Crum, 213 N.W. 366; ... ...
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