Sneed v. State

Decision Date07 May 1923
Docket Number354
PartiesSNEED v. STATE
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from Craighead Circuit Court, Jonesboro District; R. E. L Johnson, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

J. H Hawthorne, F. C. Mullinix, L. C. Going, and Gautney & Dudley for appellant.

Evidence not sufficient to sustain verdict of murder in first degree. The conduct of the trial judge and the manner of his rulings indicated to the jury that he favored the prosecution, believed defendant should be convicted. 69 N.W. 274. The court erred in excluding evidence offered by the State and refusing to exclude evidence of the State, in commenting on the weight and effect of the evidence when ruling on the competency of the will of Mrs. Sneed, and the prejudicial effect was not removed by later allowing all the will to be introduced. Court erred in refusing to give appellant's requested instruction No. 14. It would have tended to correct the misleading instruction on reasonable doubt. 135 Ark. 159; 149 Ark. 346. Error was committed also in refusing to instruct the jury that they should not consider for any purpose the verdict of conviction on the former trial. 72 Ark. 138; 125 Ark. 314. The court erred in permitting improper argument by attorneys for the State and in making improper comment on the objections thereto. 58 Ark. 473; 62 Ark. 516; 95 Ark. 233; 74 Ark. 259.

J. S. Utley, Attorney General, Elbert Godwin and Wm. T. Hammock, Assistants, for appellee; N. F. Lamb, special counsel.

The evidence amply sustains the verdict--leaves no room for doubt of guilt of appellant. There was no misconduct of the trial judge nor anything in his manner of ruling or statements that could have indicated to the jury an opinion on the weight of testimony or guilty of appellant. No exceptions were reserved to any alleged misconduct. No error was committed in instruction to the jury relative to the former's verdict. Neither was there any error in excluding or admitting testimony. No error in refusing instruction No. 14. There is comparatively little circumstantial evidence in the record. No error committed in connection with the alleged improper argument to the jury. No exception saved on this subject. C. & M. Digest, § 3228, also §§ 1321, 1322; 88 Ark. 350; 119 Ark. 152; 87 Ark. 543; 57 Ark. 1; 56 Ark. 563.

WOOD J. HART and SMITH, JJ., dissenting.

OPINION

WOOD, J.

The appellant was indicted for the crime of murder in the first degree in the alleged killing of his wife, Cora Sneed, by poison. This is the second appeal in this case. Sneed v. State, 143 Ark. 178, 219 S.W. 1019. Both trials resulted in a verdict of murder in the first degree, fixing the punishment at imprisonment for life. The appellant contends that the judgment from which this appeal comes should be reversed upon the following grounds:

1. That the evidence is not legally sufficient to sustain the verdict.

2. Alleged misconduct of the trial judge.

3. Errors in excluding evidence offered by appellant and in refusing to exclude evidence of the State.

4. Errors in granting and refusing prayers for instructions.

5. Errors in refusing to sustain objection to improper argument and in making improper comment on the objection.

We will dispose of these in the order mentioned.

First: Counsel for the State, after making certain additions to the abstract of appellant, begin their brief by saying: "The evidence is so complete and conclusive of Sneed's guilt that there is no room for doubt in the mind of any impartial man." Counsel for the appellant, after stating the effect of the evidence as contained in their abstract, say: "The more rational view of the evidence is that she (Mrs. Sneed) did not die from the effects of strychnine poisoning, but that the cause of her death, so far as her doctors are concerned, and so far as the evidence shows, was unknown." Since there is this wide divergence of view by opposing counsel as to the effect of the evidence, we have thought it necessary to read the record of the evidence for ourselves, and, after having done so, our conclusion is that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the verdict. The record of the evidence covers more than six hundred pages of the transcript. Hence we can only give a synopsis of it.

The testimony adduced for the State tended to prove that about the 18th of August, 1919, Cora L. Sneed became ill, as she supposed, from a cold contracted during her menstrual period. After doctoring herself a few days with a "round of calomel," on Friday, the 22nd of August, she was seized with violent convulsions. The appellant sent for neighbors. When they arrived, they urged him to send for physicians, and he replied that he had sent for Dr. Bone, his family physician, who lived twelve miles distant. Other doctors lived in the city near by, and were not immediately called. Finally Dr. Walker was called early in the morning. He administered chloroform and morphine until the convulsions subsided, and left at nine o'clock. Dr. Bone arrived about 10:30 a. m. Dr. Walker returned about 11 o'clock, and they concluded that Mrs. Sneed was ill from the effects of severe constipation, and treated her for that. Among other things prescribed for her they left from twelve to seventeen thirtieth-grain strychnine tablets, to be given every three or four hours, as needed, to quiet her nerves. On the Sunday night following she was seized with similar convulsions to those had on Friday. The family physician was not notified of this attack.

Will Jinks, a brother of Mrs. Sneed, who was not on friendly terms with appellant and Mrs. Sneed, heard of her illness, and went to her home. He suspected that Sneed might be poisoning his sister, and suggested that another doctor be called, which was done, and this physician, in connection with the family physician, continued the treatment for "locked bowels." On Sunday night Dr. Lutterloh was called in. He and Dr. Bone continued the same treatment. Dr. Lutterloh left three sixtieth-grain strychnine tablets to be taken, and some other medicine. At the suggestion of Dr. Lutterloh, Dr. Altman was also called. On Monday Mrs. Sneed had other convulsions of a lighter character, but by Wednesday she was greatly improved and considered out of danger. After this spell she became apparently well, except that she was weakened as the result of her recent illness. During the latter part of this illness Dr. Bone had prescribed for her nervousness potassium bromide and strychnine injections when needed.

About four weeks from the time the illness just mentioned began, two little girls were at Sneed's home. Mrs. Sneed was looking after the laundry. Sneed came into the room where his wife was, and in a playful spirit jumped and boohed at her. She became nervous, and lay down on the bed. Sneed went out to play ball with a child, and returned in a short while. He went into the kitchen and returned with two glasses of medicine with about three-fourths of an inch of liquid in each glass, one a brown color and the other white, and gave the same to his wife. This was about eight o'clock. About an hour thereafter Mrs. Sneed was again in violent convulsions of the same type that she had had on the former occasions. Neighbors were called, and insisted on appellant calling a doctor rather than to wait for Dr. Bone, whom Sneed had already called. During this last attack Mrs. Sneed said, "Get a doctor quick, but don't touch me." The appellant didn't call for a doctor in town, and refused to permit one to come until the family physician arrived. Dr. Bone came about 10:30. He called in Dr. Ratcliff. Mrs. Sneed had been in convulsions about two and a half hours when Dr. Bone came, and she died at 11 o'clock. While Mrs. Sneed was in convulsions on the night of her death, appellant administered hypodermically one-sixtieth grain of strychnine at an interval of an hour, dividing it into two doses. During the convulsions Mrs. Sneed was perfectly rational. When the convulsions would subside she would say "I am going to have another spell," and would beg them not to let her have any more. She told the neighbors that she knew what was going on and knew they were sympathizing with her, but she could not speak.

Medical experts testified that consciousness during convulsions was never present in any other ailment except lockjaw (tetanus). Mrs. Sneed did not have lockjaw. The character of the convulsions was described before the jury as follows: Rigid condition of the body, head drawn back and heels drawn taut against the bed; toes turned out, extremely rigid; fingers drawn and clinched like bird-claws; eyes glassy and staring and the corners of the mouth contracted, giving the face a meaningless grin. After death there were livid or purple splotches on her neck and face and other parts of her body, characteristic of strychnine poisoning. None of the doctors who attended Mrs. Sneed during her last illness had ever been called before to treat a case of strychnine poisoning, and those of them who witnessed her during her convulsions did not suspect at the time that she had been poisoned, but all of them testified that the convulsions described were typical of strychnine poisoning as defined by the best medical authorities; and, in answer to hypothetical questions describing the convulsions of Mrs. Sneed, several of the experts testified that, in their opinion, the death of Mrs. Sneed was the result of poisoning by strychnine. Portions of the body of Mrs. Sneed were subjected to chemical analysis, according to the most approved methods, and the chemist ascertained that the portions of the body examined contained what he estimated to be one-tenth of a grain of strychnine, and the whole body would contain, according to correct standards of estimate and...

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  • Collins v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • March 7, 1977
    ...were a higher degree of murder in the first degree than murder in the first degree when the death penalty was not imposed. Sneed v. State, 159 Ark. 65, 255 S.W. 895. The rationale for doing so is even greater under the statutes in effect at the time appellant was sentenced. Previously, the ......
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