Snelling v. Parker

• Decision Date: 31 January 1850
• Docket Number: No. 22.,22.
• Parties: John J. Snelling, plaintiff in error. vs. Simeon Parker and another, defendants.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

8 Ga. 121

John J. Snelling, plaintiff in error. vs. Simeon Parker and another, defendants.

No. 22.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

JANUARY TERM, 1850.

Rule against Sheriff, Talbot Superior Court. Decided by Judge Alexander, September Adjourned Term, 1849.

The only question in this case, arose upon the following agreed statement of facts:

At the December Term of the Inferior Court of Talbot County, 1842, John S. Buckner and John J. Snelling, each obtained a judgment against Charles Evans. An appeal was entered from the judgment in favor of Snelling —which appeal was determined at March Term, 184G, and a judgment entered in favor of Snelling. It was farther agreed, that the money in the hands of the Sheriff, was raised out of property aliened and sold by Evans, after the first judgment, and before the judgment on the appeal. Buckner and Snelling both claimed the amount in the Sheriff\'s hands.

The Court ordered the whole amount to be paid to Buckner, and Snelling excepted.

L. B. Smith, for plaintiff in error, cited—

Harden vs. Stovall, Simmons &Co. 1 Kelly, 95.

Worrell, for defendant.

The Court not being unanimous in their decision, pronounced their opinions seriatim,

Nisbet, J. delivering the opinion of the Court.

Two judgments were obtained by two different plaintiffs against the same defendant, at Common Law; upon one of them an appeal was entered, upon the other no appeal was entered. Intervening the date of the judgment at Common Law, and the judgment rendered on the appeal, in the appeal case, the defendant aliened his property. After the judgment on the appeal, his property was levied upon and sold. The money arising from the sale, being in the hands of the Court for distribution, the plaintiff in the judgment on the appeal claimed to be let in upon equal footing with the judgment at Common Law, from which there had been no appeal—that judgment contesting, denied the right of the appeal judgment to be so let in—claiming the whole fund upon its own prior and better lien. The Court below ordered the whole fund to be paid to the Common Law judgment, Theplaintiff in the appeal judgment excepted, and that order is for the review of this Court.

The judgment of this Court is, that the Circuit Court administered the law correctly. By Statute, all judgments take lien from the term at which they are rendered. This is the general rule. By this rule, how stand these two judgments, when both were rendered at Common Law? Both stood upon the same platform—both acquired a lien—and the liens were equal; and had no appeal been entered upon either, they would have equally bound all the property of the defendant, and would have been entitled to share in the distribution of this fund. But one is appealed from and the other is not. How, then, stands the case? Why, the judgment upon which there is no appeal, stands unaffected by the appeal entered on the other. Its lien is perfect still. It binds all the property of the defendant, whether it shall be aliened or not. It is bound to share with no judgment at the time of its date, not rendered.

But the effect of the appeal on the other judgment is, to prevent the lien which it held before the appeal. The appeal opens the whole case—it renews the litigation before the appellate tribunal. When it reaches that tribunal, the case is before it in its totality. When an appeal is entered, there is no judgment. Whether there ever will be a judgment or not in the case for the plaintiff, depends upon the event of the trial on the appeal. If the trial results in favor of the plaintiff, then, and not till then, is there any lien created for him, except in one single instance and for one tingle purpose. These exceptions are created by the Act of 1822. That Act not only creates the exceptions which 1 will state, but it declares all the principles in relation to these two judgments, which I have before stated. For example, it declares, " that all the property of the party against whom a verdict shall be entered, and a judgment signed thereon, in conformity to the provisions of the 26th section of the Judiciary Act of 1799, shall be bound from the signing of the first judgment, in cases where no appeal is entered." That is to say, if an appeal is entered, the first judgment does not bind the property of the defendant, from its signing. Now, this judgment at Common Law, not being appealed from, by this very Act, acquired an unrestricted, unlimited, absolute lien upon all this property, and, of course, the money raised from the sale of it, at the time it was first signed. Thenit had no competitor—now it has none, as wo shall see. The full lien which this Statute gave it, when first signed, accompanies it to the time when it seeks its satisfaction before this Court, wholly unimpaired by any thing that I can see. If this Act stopped just here, the inference would be irresistible, that a judgment appealed from, does not bind the property of the defendant from the time of its first signing. But it does not stop here. It declares farther, that in cases where an appeal is entered from the first verdict, the property of the party against whom the verdict is rendered, shall not be bound, exeept from the signing of the judgment on the appeal. Thus declaring all the propositions I have laid down as to the effect of an appeal. But now comes the exceptions to which I just now referred. The Act proceeds, " except so far as to prevent the alienation by the party, of his, her or their property, between the signing of the first judgment and the signing of the judgment on the appeal." By which I understand the Act to say, that the first signing of a judgment which is appealed from, has generally no effect—creates no lien whatever—and that the property of the defendant is not bound until the signing of the judgment on the appeal, except in one instance, and that is where the defendant aliens his property; and except for one purpose, and that is to prevent such alienation. Words cannot be plainer. The property of the defendant is not bound, by the terms of the Act, except where it is aliened, and to prevent the alienation. Now, because the judgment on the first trial is a judgment for that purpose, it is contended that a lien is created for it on such property as is aliened. This I do not deny; but it is, to my mind, a lien good only against the title of the purchaser. As between him and the plaintiff in that judgment, his title must yield; and when his property is sold, the plaintiff, if not superseded by a better lien, will take the money. The object of the law clearly is, to prevent a fraudulent alienation of property, by defendants, pending an appeal, to the injury of parties plaintiffs. To prevent that, the law gives effect to the first judgment, in case of appeal, and for no other purpose. It gives no effect to it as against other judgments not appealed from. They stand with a perfect prior lien, unaffected by this Act. They are neither benefited nor injured by it. Their lien binds the property at all events. But the construction contended for, would injure them, in all cases where the property aliened is all the property of thedefendant, and is not sufficient, as in this case, to pay both judgments. This construction impairs the lien of judgments, from which there is no appeal—it holds them in abeyance, so far as aliened property is concerned, and compels them to take, pro rata, with a judgment perhaps six months, it may be six years, younger. But how is it possible to extend the exception in the Statute beyond its terms 1 The rule is, that judgments appealed from, do not bind property, except from the signing of the judgment on the appeal. The exception is, that they do bind it for the purpose of preventing alienation. Now, how can this exception be so enlarged as to give effect to judgments appealed from, not only to prevent alienation, but farther, for the purpose of weakening and limiting the liens of other judgments? The idea is plainer thus—the rule is, judgments appealed from, are no judgments but from the signing of the judgment on the appeal. The exception is, they are judgments to prevent alienation. How can this exception, in contravention of the rule, make them judgments for another purpose, to wit: for the purpose of holding (in case property is aliened) equal lien with judgments whose lien is older and better by the general Law? By all rules of construction, the exception proves the rule and excludes any other exception. One of the consequences of the construction I am combatting, will be to put it in the power of a defendant, when an appeal is entered, by selling his property, to lessen the claim of a subsisting judgment. It gives him the power to let in the claim of the plaintiff on the appeal, even if founded on an open account, equally to participate in a fund raised from alienated property, with a judgment. If that be the true construction, then, in cases like this, the plaintiff on the appeal ought and would desire, that the defendant should sell his property, since, by the sale alone, he gets a claim upon it, equal to the judgment not appealed from; whilst, at the same time, to prevent such sale is the very object which the Act of 1822 has in view. But the construction which wo give to the Act, whilst it maintains the dignity of the judgment not appealed from, gives to that Act a specific and highly beneficial effect. That effect is, pending an appeal, to prevent an alienation of his property by the defendant, to the prejudice of the plaintiff\'s claim.

Let the judgment below be affirmed.

Lumpkin, J. concurring—

The preamble to the Act of 1822 sets forth, that " a contrariety of decisions having taken place in the different Courts of this State, as to the time when the property of the party against whom judgment is entered, shall bo bound, &c." Enacts, "that from and after the passing of said Act, all property of the party against whom a verdict shall be rendered, and a judgment...