Snider v. Brown

• Decision Date: 15 April 1898
• Citation: 48 S.W. 377
• Parties: SNIDER v. BROWN et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

48 S.W. 377

SNIDER v. BROWN et al.

Court of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee.

April 15, 1898.

Appeal from chancery court, Claiborne county; Hugh G. Kyle, Chancellor.

Bill by La Fayette Snider against John S. Brown, administrator, and others. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Leabow & Chance, for appellant. Montgomery & Arnold, for appellees.

WILSON, J.

This bill was filed September 24, 1897, to enjoin the defendants, acting through the sheriff of the county, from selling a parcel or tract of land in the Fourteenth civil district of Claiborne county, under levies of executions on magistrates' judgments and condemnation proceedings based thereon in the circuit court, and to remove the levies and condemnation orders of sale as clouds upon the title of complainant. The bill avers that September 27, 1889, the complainant bought the parcel of land in question from T. J. Byars and wife; that he paid for it, taking a general warranty deed purporting to convey the fee; that he immediately went into possession of it after his purchase; that he had carelessly omitted to have his deed registered, but that ever since his purchase he had been in the actual, open, and adverse possession of the land, claiming it as his against all the world, and that by reason of this possession for over seven years under the deed of his vendor his title had been perfected against all the world, although his deed was not registered. A copy of this deed is exhibited with the bill. It appears to have been acknowledged before the county court clerk September 7, 1891, that the tax on such conveyance was paid September 2, 1897, and that it was noted for registration and registered on the date last above named. The bill further avers that after complainant purchased this land his vendor went into the mercantile business with I. J. and G. W. Byars, under the name of T. J. Byars & Co., that this firm got badly in debt, and that the defendants obtained judgments against the firm or its members. The bill then sets out the dates and amounts of the judgments, and the justice of the peace by whom rendered. These judgments were obtained in the months of February, March, and May, 1893. It further appears from the averments of the bill that July 5, 1897, executions were regularly issued on these judgments, and placed in the hands of the sheriff of the county, who levied them upon the parcel of land in question, and returned them to the issuing justice. This latter official returned all the papers to the next term of the circuit court of the county, when each of the judgment creditors obtained judgments of condemnation. It further appears from the bill that August 16, 1897, orders of sale issued from the circuit court to the sheriff, and this bill was filed to enjoin him from proceeding under these orders. It is averred that complainant had no notice of the levies and condemnation proceeding, and knew nothing of them until the orders of sale were placed in the hands of the sheriff. The position of the bill is that the possession of complainant under his deed from his vendor vested in him a good and indefeasible title in fee to the parcel of land, and that the defendants did not bring their action or levy upon the land until more than seven years after their right of action in the premises accrued. The prayer of the bill is for an injunction to restrain the threatened sale of the land, and for the removal of the levies of defendants and the subsequent condemnation proceeding as a cloud upon the title of complainant. The bill was presented to Judge Sneed, at chambers, for a fiat for an injunction, which was refused by him in writing, on the grounds: First, that the defendants, as judgment creditors, secured by the levy of their executions liens on the land superior to the right of the complainant under his unregistered deed; second, that the seven-years adverse holding of the complainant under his deed was not complete before the passage of Act 1895, c. 38, requiring assurance of title to land to be registered. Defendants, at the term of the chancery court after the bill was filed, interposed a demurrer embracing the following grounds: (1) The bill shows on its face that defendants are judgment creditors of the vendor of complainant, and that their executions were levied upon the land before the deed to the complainant to the land was noted for registration in the county. (2) It shows on its face that complainant had not been in possession of the land levied upon seven years before the passage of Act 1895, c. 38. (3) It shows on its face that the defendants are not prosecuting an action for the land, but that they are availing themselves of the means sanctioned by the statute to collect their debts due from the vendor of complainant. (4) It shows on its face that its averment that defendants did not bring their action nor levy upon the land until more than seven years after their right of action in the premises accrued is untrue. The chancellor heard the cause upon bill and demurrer October 13, 1897. He held that the demurrer was well taken in law, and was fatal to the case of the complainant, and dismissed the bill. The complainant prayed and was granted an appeal to the supreme court, and has assigned error.

The essential error relied on is that the chancellor mistook the law in holding that Act 1895, c. 38, defeated the right of complainant to perfect his title under the first section of Act 1819, c. 28 (Mill. & V. Code, § 3459), to the land in issue, unless his adverse holding of it covered a period of seven years under a registered deed, before the defendants made their levies on it. Under the averments of the bill, the complainant had not been in possession seven years when Act 1895, c. 38, was passed. This act was passed February 13, 1895. He had been in possession over seven years when the defendants levied their executions. The contention of complainant, in the first place, is that, prior to Act 1895, c. 38, his possession under his unregistered deed, if continued for seven years, would, under Act 1819, c. 28, have perfected his title as against the claim of judgment creditors of his vendor, and that the act of 1895, cited, was not intended by the legislature to apply to parties holding under unregistered deeds executed prior to its passage. In other words, his first position is that, having gone into possession under his unregistered deed, which purported to convey to him the fee, before the passage of the act of 1895, his title and claim were completely perfected to the land, notwithstanding the act, by seven years' possession against all parties, even judgment creditors, who failed to fasten a lien on it before the lapse of seven years. He next insists that, having the right under Act 1819, c. 28, to perfect his title and claim to the land as against creditors by holding seven years under his unregistered deed, and having gone into possession under that act, it was not competent for the legislature to interfere with his right to perfect his claim and title under the act of 1819, by prescribing that his holding must be for a given time under a registered deed. The argument is that Act 1895, c. 38, if given a reprospective operation, and made to apply to deeds executed prior to its passage, and to holdings under such deeds, would make it obnoxious to the constitution of the United States (article 1, § 10) and of this state (article 1, § 20). It is said, in this connection, that all laws in force when a contract is made, which affect its validity, construction, duration, discharge, evidence, and enforcement, constitute its obligation, and are as much a part of it as if set out in its stipulations. Counsel cite in support of this proposition: Hannum v. McInturf, 6 Baxt. 230; Townsend v. Townsend, Peck, 13; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 317; State v. Carew, 91 Am. Dec. 245; Scobey v. Gibson, 79 Am. Dec. 490; Western Sav. Fund. Soc. v. City of Philadelphia, 72 Am. Dec. 730. In Hannum v. McInturf, supra, the question was the validity of the homestead exemption, under the constitution and the act of 1870, as against debts contracted by the party claiming it before the constitution and enactment were adopted. After quoting at length from the case of McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608, 609, and referring to several other cases from the supreme court of the United States, Judge Freeman, delivering the opinion of our court, speaking on the precise point before him in advance of the supreme court of the United States, said: "We therefore conclude the sound rule to be that such property as was subject to execution at the time the debt was contracted must remain subject to execution or sale by other process until the debt is paid." The precise point decided was afterwards sustained by the supreme court of the United States. See Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610. This is an entirely correct statement of the law when applied and confined to the matter in hand and before the court for decision in that case. So, likewise, this quotation in the opinion of Judge Freeman from the opinion in the case in 2 How., supra, was eminently sound, as applied to the case and subject-matter before the court: "These laws giving these rights were as perfectly binding on the defendant, and as much a part of the contract, as if they had been set forth in its stipulations in the very words of the laws relating to judgments and executions." The case was one from the state of Illinois. The law in existence at the time the debt involved was contracted provided that the property of the debtor might be levied upon and sold to the highest bidder. The law enacted after the debt was made provided that the debtor's property levied upon should be appraised by three freeholders, and that, when offered for sale, it should not be struck off unless two-thirds of the appraised value fixed by the three appraisers was bid. This is the law that was held unconstitutional, as...