Snook v. Long

• Decision Date: 04 April 1950
• Docket Number: No. 47554,47554
• Citation: 42 N.W.2d 76,21 A.L.R.2d 1,241 Iowa 665
• Parties: , 21 A.L.R.2d 1 SNOOK v. LONG et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 76

42 N.W.2d 76

241 Iowa 665, 21 A.L.R.2d 1

SNOOK v. LONG et al.

No. 47554.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 4, 1950.

Hoegh & Meyer, and W. W. Bulman, Chariton, Eugene Poston, Corydon, attorneys for plaintiff-appellant.

Stuart & Stuart, Chariton, attorneys for defendants-appellees.

HAYS, Justice.

Plaintiff, while riding in a car owned and operated by her husband, sustained serious personal injuries due to a head-on collision with a car driven by defendant's decedent, Earl H. Turner. Turner died as a result of injuries sustained and this action is brought against his Administrator to recover damages. At the close of all of the testimony there was a directed verdict for the defendant and plaintiff appeals. Where reference is made to Appellee, it is intended to refer to the deceased driver, Earl H. Turner.

Appellant in her petition asserts seven acts of negligence upon the part of Appellee. In substance they present but two propositions; (1) Violation of Section 321.285, Code 1946, I.C.A., being the 'assured clear distance ahead statute', and (2), defective and illegal lights. On this appeal the propositions or errors relied upon for a reversal center upon the refusal of the trial court to submit these two propositions to the jury.

Many material facts are not in dispute. At about 10:45 p. m. July 10, 1948, Appellant, her husband, Marvin Snook, and two other people left the Town of Humiston in her husband's Ford Coupe. Appellant did not drive a car and had no control thereof on the night in question. Leaving Humiston they drove North on Highway No. 65. At a point about two miles North, they approached a car being driven by one Dean Schecter which was likewise proceeding North at about 40 miles per hour. The night was clear, but dark and the pavement dry. When Appellant's car came within about 35 feet of the Schecter car, it turned into the left lane, or west side, of the pavement for the purpose of passing and when at a point approximately five feet to the rear and to the left of the Schecter car, collided head-on with Appellee's car which was approaching from the North. Appellee's car was at all times in its proper lane on the pavement.

The testimony in regard to the condition of the lights on Appellee's car is in sharp conflict. Testimony offered in behalf of Appellant tends to show that about ten days prior to the collision, the Appellees' car was being operated with head lights that cast a dull yellow glow and threw but little light on the pavement in front of it. On the night in question and just prior to the collision, Appellee's car was observed upon the highway No. 65 and that its lights were flickering on and off and casting a dull yellow to red light. Marvin Snook testified that he saw the Schecter car when he was about two hundred feet behind it. That he observed two dim yellow colored lights ahead which did not cast a light ahead on the pavement and appeared to be about a quarter to a half a mile down the highway. That he pulled to the left intending to pass the Schecter car and observed Appellee's car immediately in front of him and about 25 feet away. That the dim yellow lights on Appellee's car deceived him as to their distance in front of him at the time he turned into the left lane. Appellant, as a witness, stated that as they started to pass the Schecter car she noticed two dim yellow lights ahead which appeared to be about a half a mile away.

The Schecters, as witnesses for Appellee, testified that they observed Appellee's car as it approached them from the North. That its headlights appeared to be like those on any car and that as they approached it, the lights were dimmed. That they cast a clear white light ahead.

The record clearly shown that Appellant had no right of control over her husband's car. Under this situation, contributory negligence of her husband, if any, is not to be imputed to her. Carpenter v. Wolfe, 223 Iowa 417, 272 N.W. 169; Schwind v. Gibson, 220 Iowa 377, 260 N.W. 853. Also, a verdict having been directed for Appellee, Appellant is entitled to have the facts reviewed and considered in their most favorable light. Odegard v. Gregerson, 234 Iowa 325, 12 N.W.2d 559.

I. Did the court err in failing to submit to the jury, the issue of the assured clear distance ahead rule? We think not. This statute, Section 321.285, Code 1946, I.C.A., provides that no person shall drive at a speed greater than will permit him to stop within the assured clear distance ahead, such driver having the right, however, to assume that all persons using the highway will observe the law. The words 'within the assured clear distance ahead' mean the distance from which discernible objects, reasonably expected or anticipated to be upon the highway, may be observed. Central States Electric Co. v. McVay, 232 Iowa 469, 5 N.W.2d 817; Blowers v. Waterloo, Cedar Falls & Northern Ry. Co., 233 Iowa 258, 8 N.W.2d 751.

In the instant case, Appellee was in his rightful place on the highway. He was entitled to assume that any one approaching him from the opposite direction would observe the law, in this instance. Section 321.303, Code 1946, I.C.A., which prohibits one from passing another car...