Carpenter v. Wolfe

• Decision Date: 11 May 1937
• Docket Number: 43868.
• Citation: 273 N.W. 169,223 Iowa 417
• Parties: CARPENTER v. WOLFE et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

273 N.W. 169

223 Iowa 417

CARPENTER v. WOLFE et al.

No. 43868.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 11, 1937

Appeal from District Court, Carroll County; M. E. Hutchison, Judge.

An action for damages for personal injuries and to automobile growing out of an automobile accident. From a verdict for the plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

M. M Cooney, of Coon Rapids, and F. H. Cooney, of Carroll, for appellants.

Clark D. Mantz and Chas. S. White, both of Audubon, for appellee.

STIGER, Justice.

The accident out of which this case arises occurred about a mile east of Coon Rapids, Iowa, on highway No. 46 at a Y intersection. Highway 46 runs east and west and the Y intersection is formed by a road running north from highway 46. The approach on highway 46 to the intersection from the west is a slight ascending grade and on the day of the accident was a smooth, straight graveled road. East of the intersection there is a slight descending grade. The distance from the west edge of the west wing of the Y intersection to center of the intersection is 100 feet.

On Sunday, June 3, 1934, the plaintiff and her husband, George Carpenter, went to the home of Mr. Carpenter's father and mother in Mr. Carpenter's one-seated, 1930 model A Ford car to spend Sunday with them. Mr. Carpenter drove the car and was driving at the time of the accident. Mrs. Carpenter did not know how to drive a car. They were familiar with the intersection. On the trip home they drove east from Coon Rapids on highway 46. At this time the defendant Thomas Wolfe, 16 years of age, was driving a master Chevrolet sedan owned by his father, defendant Channing E. Wolfe, east on 46 ahead of the Carpenter car, both cars approaching the intersection from the west. Miss Dorothy Vanderloo, 18 years of age, was riding with Thomas, who testified that he intended to go to the center of the intersection, make a U-turn and return to Coon Rapids. As the cars approached the intersection, the Wolfe car was on the right and south side of highway 46. At the west end of the intersection, Mr Carpenter increased his speed and drove on the north side of the highway in an attempt to pass the Wolfe car and proceed east on 46.

Both cars reached the middle of the intersection at about the same time. At this point, Thomas Wolfe turned his car to the left, a collision followed and plaintiff's car went in a north easterly direction across the intersection into a ditch, then up a steep bank in the north east corner of the intersection, and then rolled down into the ditch. Plaintiff sustained personal injuries and the Carpenter car was damaged. The occupants of the Wolfe car were not injured and the damage to the car was negligible.

At the time of the accident there were no other cars in or approaching the intersection.

Thomas Wolfe, hereafter referred to as the defendant, testified that it was his intention to make a turn at the intersection; that before he got to the corner he signaled by putting his left arm straight out on the left side of the car; that before he signaled he saw the Carpenter car approaching from the rear at a distance of about 400 feet; that he held his arm out until he was almost to the middle of the intersection; that he started to turn about a foot beyond the middle of the intersection, traveling at about 5 miles per hour, and when the front wheels of his car were past the center of the road his car was struck by the Carpenter car. He testified that the windows of his car were open and he did not hear any horn sounded and when he came into the intersection he was traveling about 10 miles per hour.

Mr. Carpenter testified that he remained back of the Wolfe car about 25 feet for several hundred feet before he reached the intersection; that when the cars reached the intersection and he observed that the Wolfe car did not turn north on the west wing of the intersection and that no cars were approaching the intersection, he sounded his horn and turned out to the north side of the road in order to pass; that defendant did not put out his arm or give any signal that he intended to turn at the intersection until he started to make the turn to the left, at which time he put out his left arm; that both cars were traveling about 35 miles per hour when approaching the intersection; that when he saw the Wolfe car turning to the left, he sounded his horn and turned his car sharply in a northeasterly direction toward the ditch.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $975. The answers of the jury to special interrogatories disclose that it allowed plaintiff for personal injuries $850 and for damages to her husband's car, whose claim had been assigned to her, $125.

The trial court overruled defendant's motion for a new trial and defendants appeal.

I.

The first error relied on by appellant for reversal is that the verdict allowing damages for injuries to the Carpenter car was contrary to the evidence and to certain instructions of the court. The material part of instruction No. 14 is as follows: " Statutory provisions of the state of Iowa with respect to the driving and operation of motor vehicles upon the highway of the state are as follows: Code § 5031: ‘ The person operating a motor vehicle * * * shall have the same under control and shall reduce the speed to a reasonable and proper rate * * * when approaching and traversing a crossing or intersections of public highways.’ A failure to observe the requirements of any of the foregoing sections of our Code would constitute negligence."

The issue on this assignment is whether, under the circumstances, the question of negligence on the part of George Carpenter was for the jury. The defendant urges that Carpenter was guilty of violating Code, § 5031, as a matter of law.

George Carpenter testified that about halfway up the hill approaching the intersection he overtook the defendant's car and followed it at a distance of about 25 feet for several hundred feet and until he could see that the road was clear to the east; that as he came up to the intersection, he was on the north side of the road ready to pass defendant's car, which was on the south side of the road, if the defendant did not signal an intention to turn north on the west wing; that the reason he did not attempt to pass defendant's car sooner was that he could not see over the intersection and observe cars approaching from the east until he was close to the intersection; that defendant was driving 30 to 35 miles per hour when he started to pass him in the intersection. Carpenter further testified: " As soon as we came to the intersection, and I thought it was safe, I made up my mind to pass the other car and speeded up my car; when the defendant's car was just past where the west track turned off to the north, I speeded up my car all I could; I still had about 80 feet to go before I reached the middle of the intersection; I would think I got my car up to between 40 and 50 miles an hour by the time I got up to the car; I was only 20 or 25 feet behind him when I speeded up my car; when the defendant's car was east of the center of the intersection, the driver stuck his arm out of the window; I had already attempted to pass him by speeding up my car; he turned his car at the same time he stuck out his hand; he did not have his hand out at any time until after he had passed the middle of the intersection; the front wheels of his car were 3 or 4 feet past the middle when I saw his arm stuck out of the window from the left side of the car; the car was already turning and I honked and started for the ditch to the north east as sharp as I could turn; when the two cars collided, the blow turned my car around more; I lost control of my car; I had put on the brakes before the actual collision but couldn't stop; the brakes were still locked when we pulled the car out of the ditch."

Section 5031 required Carpenter to have his car under control and reduce the speed to a reasonable and proper rate when approaching and traversing the intersection.

Carpenter admits that he increased his speed while traversing the intersection from 30 to 35 miles an hour to 40 to 50 miles an hour and was increasing the speed of his car as much as possible at the time of the collision. The plaintiff's testimony as to the manner in which the car was driven across the intersection was substantially the same as Mr. Carpenter's testimony.

The Legislature, in enacting section 5031, subsec. 3, recognized that an intersection was a dangerous zone and the purpose of the statute was to provide a speed standard for intersections which requires the operator of motor vehicles to approach an intersection at a reasonable and proper rate of speed. A reasonable and proper rate of speed will depend on the existing conditions. With reference to this statute, we said in the case of Carlson v. Meusberger, 200 Iowa, 65, loc. cit. 76, 204 N.W. 432, 437:" The requirement that the speed of the car shall be reduced to a reasonable and proper rate must receive a reasonable construction. If the car is not traveling at a rate that is, under the circumstances, unreasonable or improper, it, obviously, is not required that the speed be reduced; the requirement of the statute is a rate of speed that is reasonable and proper under the circumstances."

An increase of speed in approaching and traversing an intersection is not, per se, a violation of the statute. There was a wide, smooth area in the Y intersection immediately north of highway 46 providing ample space for the Carpenter car to pass the Wolfe car. Carpenter had ascertained that there were no other cars in or approaching the intersection before he started to pass.

Under the provisions of Code, § 5032, it was the duty of defendant before...