Snow v. Commonwealth
| Docket Number | 0908-21-1 |
| Decision Date | 14 June 2022 |
| Parties | JEFFERY TERRY SNOW, IV, S/K/A JEFFREY TERRY SNOW, IV v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
From the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News Christopher R Papile, Judge
Charles E. Haden for appellant.
Lauren C. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Athey and Chaney Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
Jeffery Terry Snow, IV, was convicted in a bench trial of malicious wounding, in violation of Code § 18.2-51. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.[1]
I. BACKGROUND[2]
On October 16, 2019, the appellant and Samantha Harvey, the victim, were dating. As Harvey finished a shower, the appellant began arguing with her. The argument continued in the kitchen, where the appellant struck Harvey's "face with [a] frying pan several times" and shoved her into the stove. She tried to escape, but the repeated blows knocked her to the ground. The appellant spit on her and then stomped on her face with his foot as she lay on the floor, rendering her unconscious. When she awoke, police were in the home and the appellant had left. According to Harvey, she drank less than "a whole drink" that evening and denied that alcohol had caused the incident. Harvey admitted that she was "upset" and "mad" at the appellant because of the assault.
When Newport News Police Officer Matt Crutcher arrived at the apartment, Harvey's eye and lip were swollen, and she was bleeding from several cuts on her face. Officer Crutcher also saw blood on the frying pan, stove, counter, and floor.[3] Harvey told Crutcher that she was a "MMA fighter" and had tried to defend herself. Harvey was transported to a hospital, where she was treated for a concussion, broken jaw, four chipped teeth, and scratches on her face. She still had scars on her face at the time of the appellant's trial.
After the close of the evidence and counsel's arguments, the trial court found the appellant guilty of malicious wounding. The court credited Harvey's testimony, finding that the photographs depicting "significant swelling" and "cuts to [her] face" matched her account of the incident. It also found that the appellant began the physical altercation and that there was no evidence that Harvey struck the appellant "other than in defense of herself." The appellant was sentenced to twenty years in prison, with thirteen years and six months suspended.
II. ANALYSIS
The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. He argues that the evidence did not prove that he acted with malice. Although the appellant acknowledges Harvey's testimony that he attacked her without provocation, he maintains that her testimony was incredible because she had been drinking alcohol and arguing with him. He emphasizes that Harvey provided no "reason or motive" for the assault and admitted that she was angry with him. He concludes that the trial court should have reduced the charge to unlawful wounding because Harvey, "a trained MMA fighter, initiated the fight" and provoked him to respond in the heat of passion.[4]
In this Court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we will affirm the decision unless the trial court was plainly wrong or the conviction lacks evidence to support it. See, e.g., Burkeen v. Commonwealth, 286 Va. 255, 258 (2013). The Court examines "the evidence in the light most favorable" to the Commonwealth, as "the prevailing party at trial[, ] and consider[s] all inferences fairly deducible from that evidence." Id. at 258-59 () (quoting Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636, 640 (2010)). In doing so, we "discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 53 Va.App. 79, 99 (2008) (quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498 (1980)).
In the end, the "Court does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va.App. 513, 521 (2020) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). "Instead, the only 'relevant question is, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021) (quoting Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676 (2010)).
"If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, 'the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.'" McGowan, 72 Va.App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va.App. 149, 161 (2018)).
We apply these well-established legal principles here in considering whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the appellant was guilty of malicious wounding. "To be convicted of malicious wounding, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant maliciously stabbed, cut, or wounded 'any person or by any means cause[d] [her] bodily injury, with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill.'" Ramos v. Commonwealth, 71 Va.App. 150, 162 (2019) (first alteration in original) (quoting Burkeen, 286 Va. at 259). Malice is an element of the offense. Id.
The law regarding malice, the challenged element of the offense, is clearly defined. It is "the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will." Watson-Scott v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 251, 255-56 (2019) (quoting Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 61 (1947)). "Malice is evidenced either when the accused acted with a sedate, deliberate mind, and formed design, or committed a purposeful and cruel act without any or without great provocation." Synan v. Commonwealth, 67 Va.App. 173, 187 (2017) (quoting Robertson v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 814, 823 (2000)). Malice is a question of fact and may be "directly evidenced by words" or implied by conduct. Id. at 187-88 (quoting Robertson, 31 Va.App. at 823). "Implied malice may be inferred from 'conduct likely to cause death or great bodily harm, willfully or purposefully undertaken.'" Canipe v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 629, 642 (1997) (quoting Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 281 (1984)). For example, "repeated" blows with fists "applied to vital and delicate parts of the body of a defenseless, unresisting [person], on the ground" may support a finding of malice. Roark v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 244, 250 (1944) (quoting McWhirt v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. 594, 611 (1846)).
In addition, "[m]alice may be inferred 'from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon.'" Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 201-02 (2010) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 263 (1990)). A deadly weapon is "one which is likely to produce death or great bodily injury from the manner in which it is used." Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 72 Va.App. 493, 507 (2020) (quoting Pannill v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 244, 254 (1946)). "[W]hether a weapon is to be regarded as deadly often depends more on the manner in which it has been used than on its intrinsic character . . . ." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Pannill, 185 Va. at 254). "Among other instruments which may under the circumstances of their use be regarded as deadly weapons [include] . . . metal bars and rods." Id. at 507-08 (alterations in original) (quoting Pannill, 185 Va. at 254). In fact, this Court has recognized that even "a sidewalk curb" can constitute a deadly weapon when used as a device to "bash[]" the victim's head. Hampton v. Commonwealth, 34 Va.App. 412, 420 (2001).
The record here establishes that after arguing with Harvey, the appellant repeatedly struck her in the face with a frying pan before shoving her into the stove. The blows knocked Harvey to the ground and prevented her from escaping. Under these circumstances, the appellant's use of a heavy metal object to strike Harvey's face forcefully and repeatedly may properly be considered use of a deadly weapon. See Pannill, 185 Va. at 254. Moreover, as Harvey lay on the ground, the appellant continued to attack her from that defenseless position by stomping her face with his foot, rendering her unconscious. See Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 331-32 (2018) (). The appellant's separate, and wholly gratuitous, act of spitting on Harvey evinced his attitude toward his defenseless victim. In all, the force of the blows the appellant struck gave Harvey a concussion, broke her jaw, chipped four of her teeth, and left cuts and permanent scars on her face. See Johnson, 53 Va.App. at 104-05 ( that evidence that the defendant struck the victim with such force that the victim suffered a concussion and two cuts to his ear, along with other evidence, supported a finding of an intent to permanently injure). Consequently, the appellant's repeated use of a deadly weapon and continued attack on Harvey as she lay defenseless amply support the trial court's finding that the appellant acted with malice.
Despite the significant evidence of malice, the appellant maintains that the Commonwealth failed to exclude the possibility that Harvey instigated the attack. He invites this Court to reject the trial court's credibility determinations in favor of his theory that he...
To continue reading
Request your trial